JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Ninth Chamber)
23 September 2026 (*)
( Common foreign and security policy – Restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine – Freezing of funds – Lists of persons, entities and bodies subject to the freezing of funds and economic resources – Maintenance of the applicant’s name on the lists – Plea of illegality – Error of assessment – Support for the Lukashenko regime – State-owned undertaking – Financial support – Right to property – Freedom to conduct a business )
In Case T‑239/24,
OAO Belaz-upravljajusaja kompanija holdinga Belaz Holding, established in Zhodino (Belarus), represented by N. Montag and M. Krestiyanova, lawyers,
applicant,
v
Council of the European Union, represented by A. Antoniadis and A. Boggio-Tomasaz, acting as Agents,
defendant,
THE GENERAL COURT (Ninth Chamber),
composed, at the time of the deliberations, of L. Truchot, President, H. Kanninen (Rapporteur) and T. Perišin, Judges,
Registrar: L. Ramette, Administrator,
having regard to the written part of the procedure,
further to the hearing on 15 December 2025,
gives the following
Judgment
1 By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, OAO Belaz-upravljajusaja kompanija holdinga Belaz Holding, seeks annulment, first, of Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/769 of 26 February 2024 amending Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (OJ L, 2024/769), and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/768 of 26 February 2024 implementing Article 8a of Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (OJ L, 2024/768) (together, ‘the 2024 maintaining acts’), and, second, of Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/385 of 24 February 2025 amending Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (OJ L, 2025/385), and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/386 of 24 February 2025 implementing Article 8a of Regulation No 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (OJ L, 2025/386) (together, ‘the 2025 maintaining acts’), in so far as all those acts (‘the contested acts’) concern it.
Background to the dispute and events subsequent to the bringing of the action
2 The applicant is a company, established in Zhodino (Belarus), that manufactures trucks and other heavy transport equipment.
3 The present case has been brought in the context of the restrictive measures adopted by the European Union in respect of Belarus, from 2004, as a result of the deterioration in the situation in that country with regard to democracy, the rule of law and human rights and also, since 2022, because of the country’s involvement in the Russian aggression against Ukraine.
4 The Council of the European Union adopted, on 18 May 2006, on the basis of Articles 60 and 301 EC (now Articles 75 and 215 TFEU), Regulation No 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures against President Lukashenko and certain officials of Belarus (OJ 2006 L 134, p. 1) and, on 15 October 2012, on the basis of Article 29 TEU, Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Belarus (OJ 2012 L 285, p. 1).
5 In the versions of those acts applicable on the dates on which the contested acts were adopted, points (a) and (b) of Article 4(1) of Decision 2012/642 and paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 2 of Regulation No 765/2006, which refer to those points, provide that all funds and economic resources owned, held or controlled by, inter alia, persons, entities or bodies responsible for serious violations of human rights or the repression of civil society and democratic opposition, or whose activities otherwise seriously undermine democracy or the rule of law in Belarus, or by natural and legal persons, entities and bodies that benefit from or support the Lukashenko regime, are to be frozen.
6 On 21 June 2021, the Council adopted Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2021/1002 implementing Decision 2012/642 (OJ 2021 L 219 I, p. 70), and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/997 implementing Article 8a(1) of Regulation No 765/2006 (OJ 2021 L 219 I, p. 3) (together, ‘the initial acts’), by which the applicant’s name was included on the lists of persons, entities and bodies subject to the restrictive measures in Annex I to Decision 2012/642 and in Annex I to Regulation No 765/2006 (together, ‘the lists at issue’).
7 In the initial acts, the Council’s reasons for adopting the restrictive measures in respect of the applicant were as follows:
‘OJSC “Belaz” is one of the leading state-owned companies in Belarus and one of the largest manufacturers of large trucks and large dump trucks in the world. It is a source of significant revenue for the [Lukashenko] regime. [Lukashenko] stated that the government will always support the company, and described it as [a] “Belarusian brand” and “part of the national legacy”. OJSC BelAZ has offered its premises and equipment to stage a political rally in support of the regime. Therefore OJSC “Belaz” benefits from and supports the [Lukashenko] regime.
The employees of OJSC “Belaz” who took part in strikes and peaceful protests in the aftermath of the fraudulent August 2020 elections in Belarus were threatened with layoffs and intimidated by the company management. A group of employees was locked indoors by OJSC Belaz to prevent them from joining the other protesters. The company management presented a strike to the media as a staff meeting. Therefore OJSC “Belaz” is responsible for the repression of civil society and supports the [Lukashenko] regime.’
8 By Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/307 of 24 February 2022 amending Decision 2012/642 (OJ 2022 L 46, p. 97) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/300 of 24 February 2022 implementing Article 8a of Regulation No 765/2006 (OJ 2022 L 46, p. 3), the restrictive measures applied to the applicant were maintained for reasons substantially identical to those set out in paragraph 7 above.
9 By Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/421 of 24 February 2023 amending Decision 2012/642 (OJ 2023 L 61, p. 41) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/419 of 24 February 2023 implementing Article 8a of Regulation No 765/2006 (OJ 2023 L 61, p. 20) (together, ‘the 2023 maintaining acts’), the restrictive measures applied to the applicant were maintained for reasons that remained unchanged.
10 The applicant brought an action, registered as Case T‑533/21, against the initial acts and the 2023 maintaining acts, in so far as those acts concerned it. That action was dismissed by judgment of 18 October 2023, Belaz-upravljajusaja kompanija holdinga Belaz Holding v Council (T‑533/21, not published, EU:T:2023:657).
11 By letters of 21 December 2023 and 26 January 2024, the Council informed the applicant of its intention to renew the restrictive measures against it on the basis of the documents enclosed with those letters.
12 On 26 February 2024, the Council adopted the 2024 maintaining acts by which it maintained the applicant’s name on the lists at issue for reasons that remained unchanged.
13 By letters of 16 December 2024 and 16 January 2025, the Council informed the applicant of its intention to renew the restrictive measures against it on the basis of the documents enclosed with those letters.
14 By letter of 30 January 2025, the applicant replied that the documents sent by the Council did not justify the continued inclusion of its name on the lists at issue.
15 On 24 February 2025, the Council adopted the 2025 maintaining acts by which it maintained the applicant’s name on the lists at issue for reasons that once again remained unchanged.
16 By letter of 25 February 2025, the Council stated that the observations contained in the letter of 30 January 2025 referred to in paragraph 14 above did not cast doubt on its assessment that the applicant’s name should be maintained on the lists at issue.
Forms of order sought
17 Following modification of the application pursuant to Article 86 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the applicant claims that the Court should:
– annul the contested acts, in so far as they concern it;
– order the Council to pay the costs;
– reject the Council’s request in the alternative for the effects of Decision 2024/769 to be maintained as regards the applicant until the partial annulment of Implementing Regulation 2024/768 takes effect.
18 The Council claims that the Court should:
– dismiss the action as unfounded;
– order the applicant to pay the costs;
– in the alternative, should the Court annul the restrictive measures adopted against the applicant, order that the effects of Decision 2024/769 be maintained as regards the applicant until the partial annulment of Implementing Regulation 2024/768 takes effect.
Law
19 In support of its application for annulment of the contested acts, the applicant relies on three pleas in law, which it is appropriate to examine in order. The first plea in law, in the light of the explanations provided by the applicant in response to a question put by the Court at the hearing, is a plea of illegality in respect of Article 2(5) of Regulation No 765/2006. The second and third pleas in law allege, in essence, respectively, an error of assessment by the Council and infringement of the applicant’s freedom to conduct a business and of its right to property.
The first plea in law, plea of illegality in respect of Article 2(5) of Regulation No 765/2006
20 Article 4(1)(b) of Decision 2012/642, the terms of which are reproduced in Article 2(5) of Regulation No 765/2006, provides that the funds and economic resources of the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies benefiting from or supporting the Lukashenko regime may be frozen. As is apparent from the judgment of 20 March 2024, Belshyna v Council (T‑115/22, EU:T:2024:187, paragraph 61 (not published)), the General Court has held that the criterion of ‘support’ for the Lukashenko regime was a listing criterion distinct from the criterion of ‘benefit’ derived from that regime (those criteria, together, ‘the criteria at issue’).
21 Under the first plea in law, on the basis of Article 277 TFEU, the applicant claims that the criteria at issue as they are set out in Article 2(5) of Regulation No 765/2006 are unlawful.
22 The Council disputes both that the first plea in law is admissible and that it is well founded.
Admissibility
23 First, the Council relies on the first paragraph of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and on Article 76(1)(d) of the Rules of Procedure to claim that the subject matter of the plea of illegality raised in the first plea is not clearly identified by the applicant. The Council asserts that the applicant is relying on Article 215 TFEU, which is the legal basis for Regulation No 765/2006. However, in the application, the applicant makes no reference to Article 2(5) of that regulation and refers only to Article 4(1)(b) of Decision 2012/642, which has its legal basis in Article 29 TEU.
24 Second, the Council submits that, by the plea of illegality raised in support of the first plea in law, the applicant is seeking annulment of a criterion for inclusion on the lists at issue that is laid down in Decision 2012/642 and Regulation No 765/2006. Nevertheless, according to the Council, the applicant has failed to comply with the obligation, established in the second paragraph of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, to annex to the application the act of which annulment is sought.
25 The applicant disputes that the first plea in law is inadmissible.
26 In the first place, as regards the plea of inadmissibility raised by the Council on the basis of the first paragraph of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 76(1)(d) of the Rules of Procedure, it should be recalled that, under those provisions, the application must contain, inter alia, the subject matter of the proceedings and a summary of the pleas in law relied on. Those elements must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the General Court to rule on the application, if necessary without any further information. In order to guarantee legal certainty and sound administration of justice it is necessary, in order for an action to be admissible, that the basic legal and factual particulars relied on be indicated coherently and intelligibly in the application itself (see order of 23 January 2018, Campailla v European Union, T‑759/16, not published, EU:T:2018:26, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
27 It should also be recalled that the application must be interpreted with a view to giving it practical effect by carrying out an overall assessment of the application. The application satisfies the requirements laid down in the Rules of Procedure, provided that the basic legal and factual particulars on which an action is based are indicated, at least in summary form, but coherently and intelligibly, in the application itself and that it enables both the Court and the defendant to identify the conduct alleged against the defendant and the facts and circumstances which gave rise to the dispute. The pleas in law on which the application is based, for the purposes of the Rules of Procedure, need not be set out in a particular way. The pleas may be expressed in terms of their substance rather than their legal classification provided that the application sets them out with sufficient clarity (see judgment of 22 March 2023, Satabank v ECB, T‑72/20, EU:T:2023:149, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
28 In the present case, admittedly, as the Council notes, the applicant states, several times in the application, that the plea of illegality raised in the present plea in law is directed against ‘criterion 4(1)(b)’, which might suggest that it is invoking illegality in relation to the provisions of Article 4(1)(b) of Decision 2012/642 but is not referring to those of Article 2(5) of Regulation No 765/2006.
29 However, first, the fact that, under the first plea in law, the applicant, in addition, alleges only the Council’s lack of competence under Article 215 TFEU, even though that provision is not the legal basis of Decision 2012/642, concerns the merits of the first plea in law rather than its admissibility in the light of the first paragraph of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure.
30 Second, as the applicant correctly states in the reply, Article 4(1)(b) of Decision 2012/642 and Article 2(5) of Regulation No 765/2006 contain provisions that are in essence identical, enshrining the criteria at issue as criteria for inclusion on the lists at issue. Furthermore, it is apparent from reading the first plea in law as a whole, in the light of its heading and of paragraph 11 of the application, which refer expressly to, inter alia, Article 2(5) of Regulation No 765/2006, that the applicant is, in essence, calling into question the Council’s competence to adopt those listing criteria.
31 In addition, as already pointed out in paragraph 19 above, in response to a question put by the Court at the hearing, the applicant stated that it was claiming only that Article 2(5) of Regulation No 765/2006 was unlawful.
32 The present plea in law must therefore be understood as alleging illegality in relation to Article 2(5) of Regulation No 765/2006. To that extent, contrary to the Council’s argument, the present plea is sufficiently clear and precise to comply with the requirements of the first paragraph of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 76(1)(d) of the Rules of Procedure.
33 In the second place, as regards the plea of inadmissibility raised by the Council under the second paragraph of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, it should be recalled that, as a result of that provision, which is referred to in Article 78(1) of the Rules of Procedure, all applicants must annex to the application the acts that they are seeking to have annulled before the General Court.
34 It should also be recalled, first, that the sole purpose of Article 277 TFEU is to protect parties against the application of an unlawful act of general application where the act itself can no longer be challenged owing to the expiry of the periods laid down in Article 263 TFEU. Second, in allowing a party to plead the inapplicability of an act of general application, Article 277 TFEU does not constitute an independent right of action and recourse may be had to it only as an incidental plea, the validity of the act being challenged in so far as it constitutes the legal basis of that measure (see order of 25 October 2024, Mylan Ireland v EMA, T‑703/20, not published, EU:T:2024:764, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).
35 In the present case, it should be noted that, in the application, the applicant seeks annulment of the 2024 maintaining acts, in so far as they concern it. The plea of illegality raised under the first plea in law, on the basis of Article 277 TFEU, in support of that application for annulment is seeking to have the provisions of general application of Article 2(5) of Regulation No 765/2006 held inapplicable in so far as they form the legal basis of the 2024 maintaining acts.
36 It follows that, contrary to the Council’s claim, Regulation No 765/2006, Article 2(5) of which is the subject matter of the plea of illegality raised under the first plea in law, is not the act of which the applicant is seeking annulment in the application within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The acts of which the applicant is seeking annulment in the application are the 2024 maintaining acts, which were duly produced by the applicant when it brought its action.
37 It follows from all the foregoing that the first plea in law is admissible.
Substance
38 It is appropriate to examine in turn the two parts of the first plea in law, which allege, first, that the Council lacked competence to adopt the criteria at issue on the basis of Article 215 TFEU and, second, that those criteria infringe the principle of legal certainty.
– The first part, alleging that the Council lacked competence to adopt the criteria at issue on the basis of Article 215 TFEU
39 Under the first part of the first plea in law, the applicant claims that it is not open to the Council to rely on Article 215(1) TFEU in order to take measures against certain persons or entities present in a third country or associated with it in some other way without establishing a ‘reasonably strong link with the leadership of the third country concerned’.
40 In that regard, the applicant states that it is not sufficient that certain restrictive measures are aimed at persons or entities present in a third country or associated with it in some other way for those measures to be regarded as having been adopted against that country. According to the applicant, ‘the ability to put pressure on the “Lukashenko regime” is necessarily dependent on a very specific, strong relationship and strong ties between an entity and high-ranking State officials’. The applicant submits that that requirement, which arose from the former Articles 60 and 301 EC and had been recalled in the judgments of 3 September 2008, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission (C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461), and of 13 March 2012, Tay Za v Council (C‑376/10 P, EU:C:2012:138), still holds good after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.
41 The applicant claims that the criteria at issue, which were adopted in order to extend the initial scope of the individual restrictive measures adopted in view of the situation in Belarus, fall under Article 215(1) TFEU, in so far as they form part of a regime of restrictive measures targeting a third country and are intended to increase the pressure exerted on the Lukashenko regime. Those measures are not of the kind provided for by Article 215(2) TFEU, under which the Council can adopt thematic restrictive measures, such as those relating to transnational terrorism.
42 According to the applicant, the criteria at issue, as interpreted by the Court in the judgments of 18 October 2023, MAZ-upravljajusaja kompanija holdinga Belavtomaz v Council (T‑532/21, not published, EU:T:2023:656), and of 18 October 2023, Belaz-upravljajusaja kompanija holdinga Belaz Holding v Council, T‑533/21, not published, EU:T:2023:657), allow the targeting of entities that support or profit from the Lukashenko regime in ways that are entirely common in comparable situations in countries other than the Republic of Belarus or ‘that do not go beyond the legal obligations incumbent upon the holder of a specific State function’, for the sole reason that those entities are State-owned, without it been demonstrated that they are capable of influencing the Lukashenko regime or putting pressure on it. That gives rise to a contradiction between the stated objective of the restrictive measures in question, which is to put pressure on the Lukashenko regime, and the criteria at issue.
43 The applicant adds that the Council can discharge the burden of proof borne by it by providing a body of evidence establishing that there is a sufficient link between the entity subject to a measure freezing its funds and the regime or, in general, the situations, being combated. The applicant states that ‘it cannot be accepted that the EU judicial system’s protection of property according to peace-time rules ([for example], human rights law) could be less extended than the one accorded to “enemy property” under international humanitarian law’, and that the applicant itself has no influence over ‘[Belarus’s] involvement in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine’.
44 Last, in the reply, the applicant claims that the Council established an irrebuttable presumption that the undertakings owned by the Belarusian State support the Lukashenko regime or benefit from it, by dispensing with the need for it to establish, in the applicant’s case, the existence of a relationship with that regime beyond the fact that the Republic of Belarus was its sole shareholder.
45 The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.
46 According to consistent case-law, the choice of legal basis for an EU measure must rest on objective factors amenable to judicial review, including the aim and content of that measure (see judgment of 19 July 2012, Parliament v Council, C‑130/10, EU:C:2012:472, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
47 In the present case, Council Regulation (EU) No 114/2012 of 10 February 2012 amending Regulation No 765/2006 (OJ 2012 L 38, p. 3), by which the criteria at issue were included in Regulation No 765/2006, refers to Article 215 TFEU as being its legal basis.
48 Article 215 TFEU provides, first, in paragraph 1, that where a decision, adopted in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title V of the EU Treaty, provides for ‘the interruption or reduction, in part or completely, of economic and financial relations with one or more third countries’, the Council is to adopt the necessary measures; and, second, in paragraph 2, that where a decision adopted in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title V of the EU Treaty so provides, the Council may adopt ‘restrictive measures … against natural or legal persons and groups or non-State entities’.
49 In the first place, the applicant submits that the criteria at issue are based on Article 215(1) TFEU because they were adopted with the aim of increasing the pressure exerted on the Lukashenko regime. According to the applicant, the persons or entities subject to restrictive measures adopted against Belarus on the basis of the criteria at issue must therefore have strong, close links with members of the Lukashenko regime, with the effect that they are able to influence that regime, or even to put pressure on it, and the mere fact that an undertaking is owned by the Republic of Belarus does not constitute such a link. To apply the criteria at issue to such undertakings therefore conflicts with the objective pursuant to which they were adopted.
50 First, it should be noted that, since they serve as the basis for the adoption of individual restrictive measures targeting natural or legal persons, groups or non-State entities that are identified by name, the criteria at issue have their legal basis not in Article 215(1) TFEU, as the applicant claims, but in Article 215(2) TFEU. It must be borne in mind that Article 215(2) TFEU provides for the possibility of the Council adopting restrictive measures not only against the leaders of a third country and the persons or entities associated with or directly or indirectly controlled by those leaders, but also against persons and entities that have no link with the governing regime of that country, and it is noted furthermore that EU law already afforded that dual possibility, before the Treaty of Lisbon, on the basis, respectively, of Articles 60 and 301 EC, on the one hand, and of those provisions and Article 308 EC, on the other (see, to that effect, judgments of 3 September 2008, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paragraphs 166 and 216; of 13 March 2012, Tay Za v Council, C‑376/10 P, EU:C:2012:138, paragraphs 63 and 64; and of 19 July 2012, Parliament v Council, C‑130/10, EU:C:2012:472, paragraphs 51 to 53 and 73).
51 Second, inasmuch as the applicant alleges that there is a contradiction between the objective pursued by the Council when it adopted the criteria at issue, which is to put pressure on the Lukashenko regime, and the fact that those criteria may be applied to undertakings owned by the Republic of Belarus that do not have a strong, close link with that regime, it should be noted that it is clear from the wording of Article 215(2) TFEU that the Council can adopt restrictive measures against natural or legal persons, groups or non-State entities, on the basis of that provision, only where so provided for by a decision adopted in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 2 of Title V of the EU Treaty, which include Article 29 of that Treaty.
52 It should also be noted that any decision adopting restrictive measures against natural or legal persons, groups or non-State entities on the basis of Article 29 TEU, with a view to putting pressure on a third country, must define and delimit the objective being pursued through that pressure and the categories of persons or entities covered by those criteria. In that context, such a decision must, in the criteria it lays down, establish an objective link between those categories of persons or entities and the third country concerned, in the light of the objective thus defined and delimited. In particular, those categories must be established in such a way that the persons and entities covered by them have an objective link with that third country, if the restrictive measures imposed on that basis are to be capable of achieving, in a way that is not manifestly inappropriate, the objective of bringing pressure to bear that the European Union is thus seeking to achieve. If no such link exists, a criterion for inclusion on a list of persons subject to such measures would be manifestly inappropriate for achieving the objective pursued and would, therefore, have to be regarded as unlawful (see, by analogy, judgment of 31 January 2019, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and Others v Council, C‑225/17 P, EU:C:2019:82, paragraph 111).
53 When the Council adopts a regulation under Article 215(2) TFEU, that regulation in turn must inevitably reflect such a link, and cannot change its scope. Since the purpose of such a regulation is to implement the decision in the field of the common foreign and security policy taken on the basis of Article 29 TEU; to give effect to the restrictive measures prescribed in that decision to the extent that they fall within the scope of the FEU Treaty; and to ensure the uniform application of those measures in all the Member States, the regulation concerned must confine itself to reproducing the essential content of the decision and to providing definitions and clarification relating to the application of the restrictive measures prescribed by that decision, and may not, however, add new criteria or new restrictive measures or change the scope of the criteria and measures contained in that decision (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraphs 89 and 90).
54 In the present case, it should be noted that, in the context of the restrictive measures taken against Belarus since 2004, the criteria at issue were originally introduced by Article 1(1) and (2) of Council Decision 2012/36/CFSP of 23 January 2012 amending Decision 2010/639/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Belarus (OJ 2012 L 19, p. 31), and were then reproduced in Article 4(1)(b) of Decision 2012/642, which replaced Decision 2010/639. Consequently, those criteria were enshrined in Article 2(5) of Regulation No 765/2006 by virtue of Regulation No 114/2012.
55 As regards the objectives pursued by introducing the criteria at issue, the Court of Justice has held that it followed from recitals 1 to 5 and 8 of Decision 2012/642 that, in view of the lack of improvement in the situation in Belarus as regards democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Council had, in essence, considered that new measures should be introduced in order to increase pressure on the Lukashenko regime and force it to change its behaviour. Thus, the inclusion of the names of persons on the lists in question has gradually been extended to cover not only the persons identified as bearing particular responsibility for the fraudulent nature of the presidential elections and breaches of international electoral standards or those responsible for severe human rights violations and the repression of peaceful demonstrators following those elections, but also persons and entities who benefit from or support the regime in Belarus or entities owned or controlled by those persons or entities (judgment of 8 May 2025, Gutseriev v Council, C‑681/23 P, not published, EU:C:2025:327, paragraph 41).
56 In the light of the foregoing, it should be noted that, contrary to the applicant’s assertion, the Council is not required to adopt criteria for inclusion on the lists at issue that cover only categories of persons with strong, close relations with the rulers of the Republic of Belarus that are therefore established as being actually able to influence – or to put pressure on – those rulers. As is clear from paragraph 52 above, it is in fact open to the Council to adopt criteria aimed at categories of persons that have an ‘objective link’ with the third country in question.
57 Consequently, it cannot be held, on the basis of Article 277 TFEU, that the criteria at issue are not applicable in the present case because they do not lay down a strong, close link between the categories of persons subject to the restrictive measures and the Lukashenko regime.
58 In the light of that conclusion, it should be noted that the applicant is wrong to invoke, in the context of its arguments, the approach taken by the Court in the judgments of 18 October 2023, MAZ-upravljajusaja kompanija holdinga Belavtomaz v Council (T‑532/21, not published, EU:T:2023:656), and of 18 October 2023, Belaz-upravljajusaja kompanija holdinga Belaz Holding v Council (T‑533/21, not published, EU:T:2023:657), for the purposes of claiming that the criteria at issue should not be applied to entities merely because they are undertakings owned by the Republic of Belarus, without a strong, close link being established between those entities and the Lukashenko regime. That argument is in fact based on an incorrect premiss.
59 In the second place, first, the case-law laid down in paragraph 99 of the judgment of 20 July 2017, Badica and Kardiam v Council (T‑619/15, EU:T:2017:532), and referred to by the applicant, according to which the Council may use the body of evidence method to establish certain facts justifying individual restrictive measures, has no bearing for the purposes of delimiting the Council’s competence. Mere use of that method by the Council does not, in itself, predetermine in any way which facts may be established against certain persons or entities in a specific case and, accordingly, whether or not there is a sufficient link between them and the regime in power in the third country in question. The arguments based on the case-law referred to above must therefore be rejected as unfounded.
60 Second, the applicant’s arguments that, in the present case, the Council established an irrebuttable presumption that the undertakings owned by the Belarusian State support the Lukashenko regime or benefit from it must also fail, because they have no basis in fact.
61 In the present case, as is apparent from the first paragraph of the reasons in the contested acts (see paragraph 7 above), the Council did not rely only on the fact that the applicant’s capital is held by the Belarusian State as justification for including its name on the lists at issue on the basis of the criteria at issue, but relied also on circumstances concerning the applicant’s position in the Belarusian economy, the fact that it represented a significant source of revenue for the Lukashenko regime and the fact that it had offered its premises and equipment to stage a political rally in support of the regime. In the second paragraph of those reasons, the Council also relied on considerations relating, in essence, to the repression of employees of the applicant who had taken part in collective protests, in order to establish support for the Lukashenko regime. The applicant is therefore wrong to claim that the Council established an irrebuttable presumption that the undertakings owned by the Belarusian State support the Lukashenko regime.
62 As regards the applicant’s claim that the establishment of a presumption in the present case is clear from the fact that, beyond the evidence relating to the fact that the applicant is owned by the Belarusian State, the Council has not put forward sufficient evidence to justify the inclusion of its name on the lists at issue, that claim overlaps with the second plea in law, alleging an error of assessment, and must therefore be examined under that plea in law.
63 In the light of the foregoing, the first part of the first plea in law should be rejected.
– The second part, alleging infringement of the principle of legal certainty
64 Under the second part of the first plea in law, the applicant claims that the criteria at issue were introduced by the Council unaccompanied by any objective element to guide their interpretation. Accordingly, the principle of legal certainty has been infringed, since it is not possible from the wording of the relevant provisions objectively to define a limited category of persons that may be subject to restrictive measures.
65 The applicant submits that the General Court’s interpretation of the criteria at issue has the effect that any business, regardless of its importance or influence, any profitable State-owned company in Belarus or anyone ‘employed in the broadest sense by the State’ may be subject to restrictive measures. Accordingly, the Council has granted itself power to adopt measures against a potentially unlimited category of persons without meeting the requirement that there must be a sufficient link between those persons and the Lukashenko regime.
66 The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.
67 As a preliminary point, it should be recalled, first, that, according to settled case-law, the Council enjoys a broad discretion as regards the general and abstract definition of the legal criteria and procedures for adopting restrictive measures (see judgment of 28 April 2021, Sharif v Council, T‑540/19, not published, EU:T:2021:220, paragraph 167 and the case-law cited).
68 In that way, the rules of general application defining those criteria and procedures are subject to a limited judicial review, restricted to checking that the rules governing procedure and the statement of reasons have been complied with, that the facts are materially accurate, and that there has been no error of law, manifest error of assessment of the facts or misuse of power (see judgment of 28 September 2022, LAICO v Council, T‑627/20, not published, EU:T:2022:590, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).
69 Second, the principle of legal certainty requires, on the one hand, that the rules of law be clear and precise and, on the other, that their application be foreseeable for those subject to the law, in particular, where they may have adverse consequences. That principle requires, inter alia, that legislation must enable those concerned to know precisely the extent of the obligations imposed on them, and those persons must be able to ascertain unequivocally their rights and obligations and take steps accordingly. However, the foregoing requirements cannot be interpreted as precluding the EU legislature from having recourse, in a norm that it adopts, to an abstract legal notion, nor as requiring that such an abstract norm refer to the various specific hypotheses in which it applies, given that all those hypotheses could not be determined in advance by the legislature or even by the Courts of the European Union when they interpret that provision (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 October 2024, Lithuania and Others v Parliament and Council (Mobility package), C‑541/20 to C‑555/20, EU:C:2024:818, paragraphs 158 and 159 and the case-law cited, and of 1 August 2025, Timchenko v Council, C‑703/23 P, EU:C:2025:608, paragraph 33).
70 That principle applies to restrictive measures, such as those at issue in the present case, which have a considerable impact on the rights and freedoms of the persons concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 April 2015, Bank of Industry and Mine v Council, T‑10/13, EU:T:2015:235, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited).
71 In the present case, it is apparent from Article 2(5) of Regulation No 765/2006 that fund-freezing measures may be imposed on the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies that ‘have been identified by the Council as benefiting from or supporting the [Lukashenko] regime’. As the Court has already held, those terms are not defined either by those provisions or by other provisions of Regulation No 765/2006 or Decision 2012/642 (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 October 2023, MAZ-upravljajusaja kompanija holdinga Belavtomaz v Council, T‑532/21, not published, EU:T:2023:656, paragraph 51, and of 18 October 2023, Belaz-upravljajusaja kompanija holdinga Belaz Holding v Council, T‑533/21, not published, EU:T:2023:657, paragraph 48).
72 Admittedly, by their broad wording, the criteria at issue confer discretion on the Council.
73 However, the fact that a law confers a discretion on the authorities responsible for implementing it is not in itself inconsistent with the requirement of foreseeability, provided that the scope of the discretion and the manner of its exercise are indicated with sufficient clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim in question, to give adequate protection against arbitrary interference (judgment of 16 February 2022, Hungary v Parliament and Council, C‑156/21, EU:C:2022:97, paragraph 225).
74 It should also be recalled that, in accordance with settled case-law, the meaning and scope of the terms contained in Article 2(5) of Regulation No 765/2006 must be determined by considering their usual meaning in everyday language, while also taking into account the context in which they occur and the purposes of the rules of which they are part (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 October 2023, MAZ-upravljajusaja kompanija holdinga Belavtomaz v Council, T‑532/21, not published, EU:T:2023:656, paragraph 52, and of 18 October 2023, Belaz-upravljajusaja kompanija holdinga Belaz Holding v Council, T‑533/21, not published, EU:T:2023:657, paragraph 49). Accordingly, a regulation providing for restrictive measures must, in particular, be interpreted in the light of the decision adopted in the framework of the common foreign and security policy referred to in Article 215 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 October 2023, MAZ-upravljajusaja kompanija holdinga Belavtomaz v Council, T‑532/21, not published, EU:T:2023:656, paragraph 53, and of 18 October 2023, Belaz-upravljajusaja kompanija holdinga Belaz Holding v Council, T‑533/21, not published, EU:T:2023:657, paragraph 50).
75 In the present case, it should be noted that the criteria at issue form part of a legal framework which is clearly delimited by the objectives pursued by the rules governing the restrictive measures introduced against Belarus.
76 It is clear from recital 6 of Decision 2012/642 that the fund-freezing measures should be applied to ‘persons and entities benefiting from or supporting the [Lukashenko] regime, in particular persons and entities providing financial or material support to the regime’. Furthermore, as already noted in paragraph 55 above, by laying down those criteria, the Council, in view of the lack of improvement in the situation in Belarus as regards democracy, human rights and the rule of law, broadened the circle of persons and entities subject to EU restrictive measures with the aim of increasing pressure on that regime and forcing it to change its behaviour.
77 In the light of that legal framework, it has been held that it was apparent both from the clear and precise wording of Article 4(1)(b) of Decision 2012/642, which refers to persons and entities ‘benefiting from or supporting the [Lukashenko] regime’, and from the objective pursued by that provision, which is to increase pressure on that regime, that it was the relationship that certain persons and entities had with the Lukashenko regime which justified the adoption of restrictive measures, where that relationship took the form of a benefit derived from the regime or of support, in particular financial support (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 October 2023, MAZ-upravljajusaja kompanija holdinga Belavtomaz v Council, T‑532/21, not published, EU:T:2023:656, paragraph 67, and of 18 October 2023, Belaz-upravljajusaja kompanija holdinga Belaz Holding v Council, T‑533/21, not published, EU:T:2023:657, paragraph 64).
78 The Court of Justice has also stated that the objective of applying greater pressure on the Lukashenko regime could mean that restrictive measures may relate to forms of support for that regime or of benefit derived from it other than those of a financial or material nature (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 May 2025, Gutseriev v Council, C‑681/23 P, not published, EU:C:2025:327, paragraph 52).
79 It has also been held that it was not appropriate to add further conditions not laid down by the clear and precise wording of the provisions establishing the criteria at issue, such as, in relation to the criterion of support for the Lukashenko regime, a condition relating to the significance of any financial support (judgment of 3 July 2025, Grodno Azot and Khimvolokno Plant v Council, C‑326/24 P, EU:C:2025:522, paragraph 77), or to the use that may be made of such support by that regime (judgments of 18 October 2023, MAZ-upravljajusaja kompanija holdinga Belavtomaz v Council, T‑532/21, not published, EU:T:2023:656, paragraph 71, and of 18 October 2023, Belaz-upravljajusaja kompanija holdinga Belaz Holding v Council, T‑533/21, not published, EU:T:2023:657, paragraph 68).
80 Similarly, in the light of the context of the criterion of ‘support’ and of the purposes of the rules of which it is part, the Court has held that, in order to apply that criterion in a situation in which the support in question was financial, the Council did not have to demonstrate that the person or entity concerned was responsible, by reason of the financial contributions of that person or entity, for breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law or the repression of civil society and democratic opposition (judgments of 18 October 2023, MAZ-upravljajusaja kompanija holdinga Belavtomaz v Council, T‑532/21, not published, EU:T:2023:656, paragraphs 75 and 76, and of 18 October 2023, Belaz-upravljajusaja kompanija holdinga Belaz Holding v Council, T‑533/21, not published, EU:T:2023:657, paragraphs 71 and 72).
81 In addition, it is apparent from the case-law that the criteria at issue mean that there must be a sufficient link between the regime of President Lukashenko and the person subject to restrictive measures for having benefited from or supported that regime (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 September 2023, Gutseriev v Council, T‑526/21, not published, EU:T:2023:512, paragraph 45). Accordingly, the Court of Justice has held that the Council was entitled to rely on factual circumstances that, together, demonstrated the closeness of the applicant or of its activities to the Lukashenko regime and, as a result, constituted a sufficiently concrete, precise and consistent body of evidence to establish that the applicant benefited from or supported that regime and that, therefore, the criteria at issue were satisfied (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 May 2025, Gutseriev v Council, C‑681/23 P, not published, EU:C:2025:327, paragraphs 79 and 87).
82 It is apparent from the foregoing that the criteria at issue are aimed at persons or entities that have relations with the Lukashenko regime in the form of a benefit derived from that regime or of support, in particular financial or material support, for it, which demonstrate that those persons or entities are close to that regime. Accordingly, contrary to the applicant’s claim, the criteria at issue are aimed at a limited category of addressees, which is defined on the basis of objective elements.
83 In those circumstances, it must be found that the rules established by the criteria at issue are clear, precise and predictable in their effects. The present part and, consequently, the first plea in law in its entirety, must therefore be rejected.
The second plea in law, alleging an error of assessment
84 Under the second plea in law, the applicant submits that the factual allegations used to justify maintaining its name on the lists at issue in the contested acts are not supported by the evidence provided by the Council.
Preliminary observations
– The relevant legal framework
85 First, it must be borne in mind that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) requires, inter alia, that the Courts of the European Union are to ensure that the decision adopting or maintaining restrictive measures, which affects the person or entity concerned individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119).
86 It is the task of the competent EU authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person or entity concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person or that entity to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 121).
87 If the competent EU authority provides relevant information or evidence, the Courts of the European Union must then determine whether the facts alleged are made out in the light of that information or evidence and assess the probative value of that information or evidence in the circumstances of the particular case and in the light of any observations submitted in relation to them by, among others, the person or entity concerned (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 124).
88 The assessment of the reasons at issue must be carried out by examining the evidence and information not in isolation but in their context. The Council discharges the burden of proof borne by it if it presents to the Courts of the European Union a sufficiently concrete, precise and consistent body of evidence to establish that there is a sufficient link between the entity subject to a measure freezing its funds and the regime or, in general, the situations, being combated (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 February 2020, Kanyama v Council, T‑167/18, not published, EU:T:2020:49, paragraph 93 and the case-law cited).
89 Second, it should be recalled that what the applicant is required to do in the context of a legal challenge is to identify the impugned elements of the contested decision, to formulate grounds of challenge in that regard and to adduce evidence – direct or circumstantial – to demonstrate that its objections are well founded (see judgment of 26 January 2017, Duravit and Others v Commission, C‑609/13 P, EU:C:2017:46, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited). On that basis, the applicant’s challenge may not be in general terms, but must be specific and detailed (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 March 2019, Hamas v Council, T‑289/15, EU:T:2019:138, paragraph 151 and the case-law cited).
90 Third, according to the case-law, restrictive measures are of a precautionary and, by definition, provisional nature, and their validity always depends on whether the factual and legal circumstances which led to their adoption continue to apply and on the need to persist with them in order to achieve their objective. It is thus for the Council, in the course of its periodic review of those restrictive measures, to conduct an updated assessment of the situation and to appraise the impact of such measures, in order to determine whether they have made it possible to attain the objectives pursued by the initial inclusion of the names of the persons and entities concerned on the list at issue or whether the same conclusion in respect of those persons and entities can still be drawn (see judgment of 27 April 2022, Ilunga Luyoyo v Council, T‑108/21, EU:T:2022:253, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).
91 As justification for maintaining a person’s name on the list, the Council is not prohibited from relying on the same evidence justifying the initial inclusion, re-inclusion or previous maintenance of the applicant’s name on the list, provided that (i) the reasons for inclusion remain unchanged and (ii) the context has not changed in such a way that that evidence is now out of date. That context includes not only the situation of the country in respect of which the system of restrictive measures was established, but also the particular situation of the person concerned (see judgment of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited).
92 Fourth, having regard to the preventive nature of the restrictive measures in question, if, in the course of their review of the lawfulness of the contested decision, the Courts of the European Union consider that, at the very least, one of the reasons mentioned in the summary in question is sufficiently detailed and specific, that it is substantiated and that it constitutes in itself a sufficient basis to support that decision, the fact that the same cannot be said of other such reasons cannot justify the annulment of that decision (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 130, and of 24 November 2021, Assi v Council, T‑256/19, EU:T:2021:818, paragraph 168 (not published)).
– The argument raised by the applicant at the hearing in respect of the admissibility of certain evidence
93 It should also be noted, as a preliminary point, that, at the hearing, the applicant referred, in essence, to the case-law cited in paragraph 91 above, although adding a condition not envisaged by that case-law. The applicant submitted that, as justification for a decision maintaining a person’s name on the lists at issue on the basis of reasons that are unchanged, the Council could rely only on evidence that was formally part of the evidence file compiled when that decision was adopted, as notified to the person or entity concerned. Accordingly, in the present case, according to the applicant, the Council was not entitled to adduce items of evidence from the files compiled on adoption of the initial acts and of the 2023 maintaining acts, on the ground that they were not formally included in the evidence files referred to, on the one hand, in the letters of 21 December 2023 and 26 January 2024 and, on the other, in the letters of 16 December 2024 and 16 January 2025, by which the applicant was informed of the Council’s intention to adopt the 2024 maintaining acts and the 2025 maintaining acts respectively.
94 In that regard, it should be noted that the condition on which the applicant relies, which concerns the admissibility of the evidence produced before the Court, is based on a misinterpretation of the objective pursued by the periodic review of restrictive measures. The purpose of that review is not to carry out a completely new assessment of the situation of the person concerned, but an updated assessment of that situation, in order to determine whether the factual and legal circumstances which led to the adoption of the restrictive measures against that person have continued to apply during the period concerned, as is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraph 90 above. Therefore, where the Council finds, in the context of that review, that the reasons for including the name of the person concerned on the lists in question currently in force remain valid, it maintains its original assessment, based on the evidence already obtained, and compiles a new file containing the evidence that forms the basis of its updated assessment of the situation.
95 Accordingly, the fact that the Council provided the person concerned with an updated evidence file cannot be understood as a waiver of its right to rely, before the Court, on the evidence gathered previously. The foregoing applies without prejudice to the right of the person concerned, under Article 41(2) of the Charter, to have access to the files forming the basis of all the listings concerning that person, in order to inspect the evidence obtained by the Council, first, at the time of the initial listing, and then in connection with each subsequent periodic review.
96 It follows that, in the present case, the Council is entitled to rely on items of evidence from the evidence files compiled in connection with the adoption of the initial acts and of the 2023 maintaining acts.
97 It is necessary to examine the applicant’s criticisms in the light of the foregoing, in so far as they relate, first, to the 2024 maintaining acts and, second, to the 2025 maintaining acts.
The 2024 maintaining acts
98 The Court considers it appropriate to begin by examining the findings set out in the first paragraph of the reasons at issue (see paragraph 7 above), in particular in so far as that paragraph states that the applicant is one of the leading State-owned companies in Belarus and one of the largest manufacturers of large trucks and large dump trucks in the world, that it is a source of significant revenue for the Lukashenko regime, that Lukashenko stated that the Belarusian Government would always support that company, which he described as a ‘Belarusian brand’ and ‘part of the national legacy’, and that it therefore benefits from and supports the Lukashenko regime.
99 Those reasons are based on the two criteria at issue, and it will be recalled that ‘support’ for the Lukashenko regime is a listing criterion distinct from the criterion of the ‘benefit’ derived from that regime (see paragraph 20 above).
100 The applicant disputes that those reasons are well founded. In the application, it submits that, among the evidence files provided to it by the Council, documents WK 735/2024 INIT and WK 735/2024 ADD 1 contain evidence relating to the context in Belarus and document WK 16661/2023 INIT contains press articles that may, at most, corroborate certain facts. The applicant also claims that one item of evidence in document WK 16661/2023 INIT consists in a press release of no probative value. It also submits that the Council’s file contains no evidence demonstrating that the applicant represents a significant source of revenue for the Lukashenko regime.
101 In the reply, the applicant notes that the Council is entitled to rely on the evidence that justified an earlier listing provided that, in particular, the context has not changed in such a way that that evidence appears to be out of date, which entails a review including an updated assessment of the situation. In the present case, according to the applicant, the fact that the Council has not produced any evidence relating to the type of financial support which it would provide to that regime shows that there was no genuine review of the situation.
102 First, the applicant submits that the Council relies on a misreading of paragraph 62 of the judgment of 18 October 2023, Belaz-upravljajusaja kompanija holdinga Belaz Holding v Council (T‑533/21, not published, EU:T:2023:657), in order to attribute statements to the applicant that it did not make. In that regard, it submits that it did not at any time state that it represented a significant source of revenue for the Lukashenko regime. Second, the applicant claims that the only evidence adduced by the Council in relation to its financial situation and the sums of money paid by it to the Belarusian State is that examined in the aforementioned judgment, in the assessment of whether the initial acts were well founded. In support of those acts, the Council assessed the applicant’s situation in 2019 and 2020, and the evidence available to it related to the applicant’s net profit and dividend payments in 2019. Consequently, that evidence was between four and five years old on the date on which the 2024 maintaining acts were adopted.
103 The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.
104 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, as justification for the 2024 maintaining acts, the Council retained unchanged the findings set out in paragraph 98 above, which were included in the reasons in the 2023 maintaining acts.
105 In addition, as the Council correctly notes, it is apparent from paragraphs 46 and 94 of the judgment of 18 October 2023, Belaz-upravljajusaja kompanija holdinga Belaz Holding v Council (T‑533/21, not published, EU:T:2023:657), that the Court found that, in the initial acts and in the 2023 maintaining acts, the Council had not made an error of assessment in finding that the applicant was one of the leading State-owned companies in Belarus and one of the largest manufacturers of large trucks and large dump trucks in the world, that it was a source of significant revenue for the Lukashenko regime and that Lukashenko had stated that the Belarusian Government would always support that company, which he had described as a ‘Belarusian brand’ and as ‘part of the national legacy’.
106 The applicant disputes the factual basis of the 2024 maintaining acts, claiming that the evidence file prepared by the Council at the time of its periodic review of the restrictive measures in 2024 is in itself insufficient and that that institution is relying on evidence relating to income generated or distributed by the applicant in 2019 and 2020, which had served as a basis for the initial acts and the 2023 maintaining acts and was, by the date on which the 2024 maintaining acts were adopted, out of date within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraphs 90 and 91 above.
107 Therefore, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraphs 90 and 91 above, it is necessary to examine whether, on the date on which the 2024 maintaining acts were adopted, the context – which includes not only the situation of the country in respect of which the system of restrictive measures was established, but also the particular situation of the person concerned – had changed in such a way that the factual basis of the 2023 maintaining acts had become out of date.
108 As regards the evolution of the situation in Belarus, it is apparent from recital 2 of Decision 2024/769 that it is one of persistent gravity as regards democracy, the rule of law and human rights and in which the Republic of Belarus was involved in the illegal aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. The applicant does not dispute those observations.
109 As regards the evolution of the applicant’s situation, it should be noted, as a preliminary point, that, in the first paragraph of the reasons in the 2024 maintaining acts, the Council relies on the factual findings set out in paragraph 98 above to conclude both that the applicant benefits from the Lukashenko regime and that it supports that regime. In paragraphs 55, 58 to 60 and 73 to 75 of the defence, the Council develops its arguments in support of those factual findings, both in a part of the defence relating to the criterion of ‘support’ and in a different part relating to the criterion of ‘benefit’. In paragraphs 30 to 34 of the reply, the applicant responds to all the Council’s claims in a part dealing only with the criterion of ‘benefit’. In those circumstances, in order to ensure an effective judicial review, it is necessary to examine all the arguments of the parties relating to the accuracy of the facts at issue, without prejudice, at the present stage of the examination, to whether their legal classification is on the basis of the ‘benefit’ criterion or of the ‘support’ criterion.
– The findings relating to the fact that the Belarusian State is the sole shareholder of the applicant and to the applicant’s position in the Belarusian economy
110 It is appropriate to examine the Council’s findings that the applicant is one of the leading State-owned companies in Belarus and one of the largest manufacturers of large trucks and large dump trucks in the world, and that Lukashenko stated that the Belarusian Government would always support it, that it was a ‘Belarusian brand’ and that it was ‘part of the national legacy’.
111 First, the Council submits that, as justification for the 2024 maintaining acts, it continues to rely on the fact that the applicant is a truck manufacturer wholly owned by the Belarusian State, the importance of which to the Belarusian economy was emphasised in various statements by President Lukashenko. The Council relies on evidence contained in the evidence file compiled at the time of the adoption of the initial acts in order to substantiate its claims.
112 Accordingly, first, the Council submits a screenshot dated 5 May 2021 from the ‘emitent.info’ website, from which it is apparent that the applicant’s share capital belongs entirely to the Belarusian State. Second, it produces a news report published on the ‘eng.belta.by’ website on 21 September 2020 referring to statements by Lukashenko to the effect that the Belarusian Government would always support the applicant, which was a ‘Belarusian brand’ forming ‘part of the national legacy’.
113 In respect of that evidence, the applicant merely claims that the Council ‘recycles 2021 information’ on the ownership of its capital and ‘a 2020 statement by President [Lukashenko] regarding the applicant’. However, first the Council cannot be criticised for failing to adduce evidence of the negative, that no change of circumstances had occurred between the adoption of the initial acts or of the 2023 maintaining acts and the adoption of the 2024 maintaining acts such as to have an impact on the ownership of the applicant’s share capital or the validity of the statements in question by President Lukashenko. Second, the applicant, for its part, has failed to provide any specific information about any such change of circumstances and is not arguing that the Republic of Belarus is no longer its sole shareholder or that it should no longer be regarded as a ‘Belarusian brand’ forming ‘part of the national legacy’.
114 It follows that the applicant has not produced a specific and detailed case capable of substantiating the line of argument on which it relies to the effect that the Council’s evidence is out of date, whether as regards the ownership of the applicant’s share capital or President Lukashenko’s statements about that company.
115 Second, the Council relies on the fact that the applicant’s general director was appointed by its supervisory board, the chairman of which was the Minister of the Economy of the Republic of Belarus, and that that appointment received the approval of, inter alia, President Lukashenko.
116 In that regard, the Council relies on items of evidence contained in the evidence file compiled at the time of the adoption of the initial acts, which consistently confirm its claims, namely: a screenshot of the ‘belaz.by’ website taken on 6 April 2021; two press releases published on the ‘economy.gov.by’ website on 25 September 2020 and 6 April 2021; a news report published on the ‘eng.belta.by’ website on 4 January 2020; and two news reports published on that website on 21 September 2020.
117 Admittedly, the applicant asserts that the person identified by the Council as being its general director was arrested during 2023. However, it should be noted that, in its written submissions, the Council refers to that person’s appointment in order to show that the procedure followed in that appointment demonstrated the applicant’s association with the regime. The claim that the applicant’s former general director was arrested, even assuming that it is established, would not cast doubt on the association existing between the applicant and the Lukashenko regime, which can be demonstrated by the fact that the latter is involved in the appointment of its senior management.
118 Furthermore, the applicant does not dispute that its supervisory board was still chaired by the Minister of the Economy of the Republic of Belarus on the date on which the 2024 maintaining acts were adopted. That circumstance is, in itself, evidence of its association with the Lukashenko regime.
119 Third, in asserting that, on the date on which the 2024 maintaining acts were adopted, the applicant was still one of the largest manufacturers of large trucks and large dump trucks in the world, the Council relies on the fact that that information is apparent from the grounds, as set out on 24 March 2023 on the ‘home.treasury.gov’ website, on which the United States Department of the Treasury included the applicant’s name on a list of persons or entities subject to sanctions established by the legislation of that third country.
120 It should be noted that the extract from the ‘home.treasury.gov’ website published on 24 March 2023, on which the Council relies, is contained in document WK 16661/2023 INIT. In that regard, the applicant incorrectly claims that that document contains only press articles, which, by nature, can only corroborate certain facts. That extract from the website is in fact a press release, published by an authority of a third country in order to announce the entry into force of a decision, as the applicant itself notes elsewhere in its written submissions.
121 By contrast, the applicant notes, correctly, that the grounds on which the United States Department of the Treasury relies as justification for its decision to take measures against it, as set out in the extract from the ‘home.treasury.gov’ website published on 24 March 2023, reproduce word for word part of the text of the second paragraph of the reasons in the contested acts and state that the applicant ‘was previously designated by the European Union’. In addition, it is apparent from that extract that ‘today’s actions further align the United States [of America] with its international partners’. Accordingly, the measures adopted by the United States of America against the applicant may have their origin, even if only indirectly, in the EU restrictive measures.
122 The Council’s argument, put forward at the hearing, that it is not inconceivable that the United States Department of the Treasury relied on its own sources of information in taking measures against the applicant, rather than only on those resulting from international cooperation on restrictive measures adopted in respect of Belarus, is purely speculative and therefore cannot succeed.
123 It follows that the extract from the ‘home.treasury.gov’ website published on 24 March 2023 has little probative value.
124 In addition, the Council has produced a news report published on 30 March 2023 on the ‘eng.belta.by’ website, from which it is apparent that, in 2022, the applicant’s sales in Russia amounted to 800 000 000 United States dollars (USD) (approximately EUR 759 760 000) and included 843 heavy trucks, and that, in January and February 2022, the applicant exported goods to that third country with a value of USD 153 000 000 (approximately EUR 134 227 000).
125 In respect of, first, the document referred to in paragraph 124 above, the applicant claims that it is unrelated to the reasons in the 2024 maintaining acts, but does not cast doubt on its content.
126 However, contrary to the applicant’s claim, the information apparent from the aforementioned news report published on the ‘eng.belta.by’ website is evidence that it was able to fulfil orders relating to several hundred truck units and, consequently, that its substantial activities in the truck manufacturing sector continued during the period preceding the adoption of the 2024 maintaining acts. That information is therefore relevant to establishing that the applicant’s position in the Belarusian economy continued to be important. In addition, the document in question is a news report published by an official communications agency of the Republic of Belarus and the applicant has not put forward any material capable of casting doubt on its credibility.
127 Second, the applicant has not put forward a specific and detailed case claiming that there was a change of circumstances in the period preceding the adoption of the 2024 maintaining acts, as a result of which it could no longer be considered to be one of the largest manufacturers of large trucks and large dump trucks in the world, and has produced no evidence in that regard.
128 It follows that the applicant has not demonstrated that, on the date on which the 2024 maintaining acts were adopted, there was insufficient evidence supporting the allegations that it was one of the leading State-owned companies in Belarus and one of the largest manufacturers of large trucks and large dump trucks in the world, and that Lukashenko had stated that the Belarusian Government would always support it, that it was a ‘Belarusian brand’ and that it was ‘part of the national legacy’, or that the evidence supporting those allegations was out of date.
– The finding that the applicant is a significant source of revenue for the Lukashenko regime
129 It is necessary to examine the finding that the applicant is a significant source of revenue for the Lukashenko regime.
130 As the applicant observes, and as the Council acknowledged, in essence, at the hearing, the Council has not produced any direct evidence of the revenue supposedly paid by the applicant to the Republic of Belarus. At the hearing, the Council relied on the fact that it had no investigative powers in Belarus and that the applicant’s balance sheets had no longer been accessible since 2021.
131 On the basis of that observation, the applicant submits that the only information put forward by the Council as regards its financial situation and the resources transferred to the Belarusian State is that relating to the net profit generated by it in 2019 and to the payment of dividends, which was taken from the proceedings that gave rise to the judgment of 18 October 2023, Belaz-upravljajusaja kompanija holdinga Belaz Holding v Council (T‑533/21, not published, EU:T:2023:657).
132 The applicant refers in particular to paragraph 45 of the judgment of 18 October 2023, Belaz-upravljajusaja kompanija holdinga Belaz Holding v Council (T‑533/21, not published, EU:T:2023:657), concerning the examination of the factual basis of the initial acts. In paragraph 45, the Court noted that the applicant had not disputed the information reported by the Council to the effect that, in 2019, the applicant had generated a net profit of more than 266 000 000 Belarusian roubles (BYN) (approximately EUR 76 459 000) and that it had stated, during the proceedings, first, that it ‘[was possible that it would] pay dividends to its shareholder, [that] information [being] included in the audited accounts’ and, second, that it had paid, in addition to tax, mandatory contributions to the National Development Fund in 2019 and to the Centralised Investment Fund of the Ministry of Industry of Belarus between 2019 and 2021.
133 The applicant notes that that evidence relates to facts that were between four and five years old on the date on which the 2024 maintaining acts were adopted.
134 In that regard, first of all, it must be recalled that, as the Council stated at the hearing, whether sums are paid to the Belarusian State on the basis of being classified as a tax or as dividends is not decisive for identifying ‘support for the Lukashenko regime’ under Article 4(1)(b) of Decision 2012/642. Both cases involve sums paid to the State, pursuant to State legislation imposing that payment, by an entity in which the State holds almost all of the capital. To exclude such payments from that concept of ‘support for the Lukashenko regime’, solely on the ground that the sums due are classified as taxes, could enable the circumvention of EU rules by increasing the rate of tax on the profits of such entities, in return for a reduction in the amount of the dividends (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 July 2025, Grodno Azot and Khimvolokno Plant v Council, C‑326/24 P, EU:C:2025:522, paragraph 56). It should also be borne in mind that, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 79 above, the clear and precise wording of that article precludes the imposition of an additional condition not laid down in that provision, concerning the significance of the support for the Lukashenko regime.
135 Next, it should be noted that the Council has produced certain items of evidence obtained at the time of the periodic review of the restrictive measures which led to the adoption of the 2024 maintaining acts.
136 First, as part of its assessment of the relevant general context, the Council relies on a statement on the investment climate in Belarus in 2023 prepared by the United States Department of State, published on an unspecified date on the ‘www.state.gov’ website. As the Council observes, it is apparent from that statement that undertakings owned by the Republic of Belarus dominate the economy in terms of value. The statement indicates that, according to the Belarusian Ministry of Taxes and Duties, the share of those undertakings represented 38% of the budget revenue of the Republic of Belarus in 2022, and that those statistics were misleading in so far as they did not take account of the share represented by joint stock companies in which the capital is held by the State.
137 It is true that, as the applicant notes, the statement on the investment climate in Belarus in 2023 makes only general observations concerning the situation of State-owned undertakings and provides no information whatsoever as regards the specific situation of the applicant. However, as is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraph 88 above, such observations may be taken into account as information describing the relevant context of the facts at issue. In the present case, the fact, which has not been disputed, that the applicant belongs to a group of operators which, according to figures that are almost certainly an underestimate, provided 38% of the budget revenue of the Republic of Belarus in the period preceding the adoption of the 2024 maintaining acts is a factor supporting the Council’s arguments regarding the financial support provided to the Lukashenko regime.
138 Second, the Council relies on an article published on 30 March 2023 on the ‘eng.belta.by’ website, already referred to in paragraph 124 above, from which it is apparent that, in 2022, the applicant’s sales in Russia amounted to USD 800 000 000 (approximately EUR 759 760 000) and that, in January and February 2022, it exported goods to that third country with a value of USD 153 000 000 (approximately EUR 134 227 000).
139 Admittedly, as the applicant noted at the hearing, that information, which gives an indication of the volume of sales and, to a certain extent, of turnover in the period preceding the adoption of the 2024 maintaining acts, does not, in itself, demonstrate that the applicant generated a net profit or distributed income. However, the Council countered, correctly, that, since it was impossible to produce direct evidence that income was distributed, an indication that the applicant had had significant sales in 2022 could be regarded as circumstantial evidence in that regard.
140 Last, the foregoing evidence and information must be assessed not in isolation but in the context of which they form part, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 88 above.
141 In the present case, as is apparent from paragraphs 110 to 128 above, the Council has established to the requisite legal standard that, on the date on which the 2024 maintaining acts were adopted, the applicant was one of the leading State-owned companies in Belarus and one of the largest manufacturers of large trucks and large dump trucks in the world, and that Lukashenko stated that the Belarusian Government would always support it, that it was a ‘Belarusian brand’ and that it was ‘part of the national legacy’.
142 In addition, it is clear from the information contained in paragraph 132 above that, in the past, the applicant had generated a net profit of more than BYN 266 000 000 (approximately EUR 76 459 000) in 2019, and that it had stated, before the Court that it was subject to tax in Belarus, that it was possible that it would pay dividends to its shareholder and that it had paid various mandatory contributions between 2019 and 2021.
143 Accordingly, on the date on which the 2024 maintaining acts were adopted, it was established that the applicant was still an important Belarusian undertaking owned by the Republic of Belarus; that, according to its own statements made in earlier court proceedings, it had, in consequence, contributed revenue to the Republic of Belarus between 2019 and 2021, in the form of mandatory contributions or dividends; that it was subject to tax in Belarus; that it belonged to a category of operators that had provided more than a third of the budget revenue of the Republic of Belarus in the period preceding the adoption of those maintaining acts; and that it had had significant sales in Russia in 2022.
144 Those factors, taken together, constituted a body of evidence that was sufficiently precise, specific and consistent to enable the Council to find that the applicant was still a significant source of revenue for the Lukashenko regime on the date on which the 2024 maintaining acts were adopted.
145 In the light of the foregoing, it is for the applicant, in order to demonstrate the error of assessment that it is alleging, to provide a specific and detailed case challenging that body of evidence, supported by evidence to the contrary.
146 That is all the more so since the evidence relating to the revenue contributed by the applicant consists in documents to which neither the Council nor the Member States have access, meaning that the applicant is best placed to produce those documents in support of its claim relating to a change in its personal situation. In addition, account must also be taken of the difficulty, for the Council, in obtaining more specific evidence in a country having an authoritarian regime, such as Belarus (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council, C‑630/13 P, EU:C:2015:247, paragraph 47). The resulting investigative difficulties may in that way contribute to preventing the production of specific evidence and objective information (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 September 2025, Khudaverdyan v Council, T‑1116/23, not published, EU:T:2025:840, paragraph 115).
147 Before the Court, the applicant merely asserts that the evidence produced by the Council is too old. It has not put forward any specific and detailed case claiming that there was a change in its situation during the period preceding the adoption of the 2024 acts, as a result of which it ceased to contribute revenue to the Belarusian State in the form of tax, mandatory contributions or dividends, and has produced no evidence to that effect.
148 Consequently, the Council has established to the requisite legal standard that, on the date on which the 2024 maintaining acts were adopted, the applicant was a significant source of revenue for the Belarusian regime.
– Conclusion
149 In the light of the foregoing, it should be found that the applicant has not demonstrated the inaccuracy of the assessment, in the first paragraph of the reasons at issue in the 2024 maintaining acts, according to which, on the date on which those acts were adopted, the applicant was one of the leading State-owned companies in Belarus and one of the largest manufacturers of large trucks and large dump trucks in the world, and represented a significant source of revenue for the Lukashenko regime; and according to which Lukashenko had stated that the Belarusian Government would always support that company, which he had described as a ‘Belarusian brand’ and as being ‘part of the national legacy’.
150 Furthermore, first, the applicant’s position in the Belarusian economy, the fact that it is owned by the State and the fact that it represents a significant source of revenue for the Lukashenko regime, taken together, constitute a sufficient basis for the view to be taken that the applicant supports that regime for the purposes of Article 4(1)(b) of Decision 2012/642, that provision referring in particular to persons and entities providing financial support to that regime (judgment of 18 October 2023, Belaz-upravljajusaja kompanija holdinga Belaz Holding v Council, T‑533/21, not published, EU:T:2023:657, paragraph 79).
151 Second, the Court considers that the aforementioned reasons, which are sufficiently detailed and specific and contain no error of assessment of the facts or error of law, constitute in themselves a sufficient basis to justify the maintenance of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue in 2024.
152 Therefore, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 92 above, the complaints alleging an error of assessment vitiating the 2024 maintaining acts should be rejected as unfounded, and it is not necessary to examine the applicant’s arguments directed against the other reasons at issue, since the fact of those reasons not being substantiated could not give rise to annulment of those acts.
The 2025 maintaining acts
153 The Court considers it appropriate, as in the case of the 2024 maintaining acts (see paragraph 98 above), to begin by examining the findings set out in the first paragraph of the reasons at issue (see paragraph 7 above), in particular in so far as that paragraph states that the applicant is one of the leading State-owned companies in Belarus and one of the largest manufacturers of large trucks and large dump trucks in the world, that it is a source of significant revenue for the Lukashenko regime, that Lukashenko stated that the Belarusian Government would always support that company, which he described as a ‘Belarusian brand’ and ‘part of the national legacy’, and that it therefore benefits from and supports the Lukashenko regime.
154 It should be recalled that those reasons are based on the two criteria at issue, and it is noted that ‘support’ for the Lukashenko regime is a listing criterion distinct from the criterion of the ‘benefit’ derived from that regime (see paragraph 20 above).
155 In the statement of modification, the applicant claims that the items of evidence contained in documents WK 16114/2024 INIT and WK 234/2025 INIT, which were communicated to it by the letter of 16 December 2024 and the letter of 16 January 2025 respectively, do not establish any significant financial contribution to the Lukashenko regime, contain no reference to any political support provided by it to that regime and do not present any evidence of the slightest benefit that it derived from it. The applicant adds that certain items of evidence relate solely to its customers and suppliers in Russia, while five other items suggest that it indirectly supports the earnings and mining industry of that third country, and that, in its letter of 30 January 2025, it contested the validity of the evidence relied on against it.
156 The applicant, submitting that the Council maintained its name on the lists at issue in 2025 for reasons that were unchanged from those justifying the 2024 maintaining acts and which it claims are vitiated by errors of assessment, reiterates all the pleas in law and arguments set out in the application.
157 The Council submits that it duly examined the evidence provided by the applicant when reviewing the inclusion of its name on the lists at issue and replied to the applicant’s observations in the letter of 25 February 2025. Furthermore, the Council claims that the additional information collected at the time of that review constitutes a sufficient factual basis to justify the adoption of the 2025 maintaining acts concerning the applicant.
158 The Council refers to the arguments developed in its defence and rejoinder in asserting that it has already set out the reasons why the applicant was supporting and benefiting from the Lukashenko regime.
159 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, as justification for the 2025 maintaining acts, the Council retained unchanged the factual findings concerning the financial support provided by the applicant to the Lukashenko regime, which are set out in paragraph 98 above and are contained in the reasons in the 2023 maintaining acts and the reasons in the 2024 maintaining acts.
160 In that regard, it is apparent from the examination set out in paragraphs 98 to 148 above that the Council has established to the requisite legal standard that the 2024 maintaining acts have a well-founded factual basis.
161 In its statement of modification, the applicant disputes the factual basis of the 2025 maintaining acts. It reiterates in that regard the arguments put forward in the application and in the reply (see paragraph 106 above), according to which the evidence file prepared by the Council for the purposes of adopting the maintaining acts in question is in itself insufficient, and according to which that institution is relying on evidence relating to income generated or distributed by the applicant in 2019 and 2020, which had served as the basis of the initial acts and the 2023 maintaining acts, even though that evidence it become out of date, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraphs 90 and 91 above, by the date on which the 2025 maintaining acts were adopted.
162 Therefore, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraphs 90 and 91 above, it is necessary to examine whether the context – which includes not only the situation of the country in respect of which the system of restrictive measures was established, but also the particular situation of the person concerned – changed in such a way that the factual basis of the 2024 maintaining acts had become out of date by the date on which the 2025 maintaining acts were adopted.
163 As regards the evolution of the situation in Belarus, it is apparent from recital 2 of Decision 2025/385 that it is one of persistent gravity as regards democracy, the rule of law and human rights and in which the Republic of Belarus was involved in the illegal aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. The applicant does not dispute those observations.
164 As regards the evolution of the applicant’s situation, in the first place, it is appropriate to examine the findings that it is one of the leading State-owned companies in Belarus and one of the largest manufacturers of large trucks and large dump trucks in the world, and that Lukashenko stated that the Belarusian Government would always support it, that it was a ‘Belarusian brand’ and that it was ‘part of the national legacy’.
165 In that regard, as already noted, the applicant reiterates the arguments put forward in its written submissions in relation to the 2024 maintaining acts, while the Council reiterates its arguments in defence.
166 In addition, in its observations on the statement of modification concerning the finding that the applicant benefits from and supports the Lukashenko regime, the Council refers to evidence obtained at the time of the restrictive measures review that gave rise to the adoption of the 2025 maintaining acts. Accordingly, the Council refers, in particular, to a news report published on 14 October 2024 on the ‘sb.by’ website, from which it is apparent that the applicant held approximately 30% of the global market for heavy-duty mining dump trucks, which is evidence of its enduring position in that economic sector and, consequently, of its continuing importance to the Belarusian economy in the period preceding the adoption of the 2025 maintaining acts. The applicant has not commented on that document.
167 Consequently, the applicant’s arguments in the application and the reply, in so far as they are repeated in relation to the 2025 maintaining acts, must be rejected, first, for the reasons set out in paragraphs 110 to 128 above and, second, in view of the evidence examined in paragraph 166 above, which confirms that the facts attributed to the applicant continued to apply in the period preceding the adoption of the 2025 maintaining acts.
168 It should therefore be found that the applicant has not demonstrated that, on the date on which the 2025 maintaining acts were adopted, there was insufficient evidence supporting the allegations that it is one of the leading State-owned companies in Belarus and one of the largest manufacturers of large trucks and large dump trucks in the world, and that Lukashenko stated that the Belarusian Government would always support it, that it was a ‘Belarusian brand’ and that it was ‘part of the national legacy’, or that the evidence supporting those allegations was out of date.
169 In the second place, it is necessary to examine the finding that the applicant is a significant source of revenue for the Lukashenko regime.
170 In the statement of modification, the applicant reiterates the arguments that it put forward in the application and in the reply (see paragraphs 131 to 133 above) that the Council is relying on evidence relating to income generated or distributed by the applicant in 2019 and 2020, which had served as a basis for the initial acts and the 2023 maintaining acts, even though it had become out of date, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraphs 90 and 91 above, by the date on which the contested acts were adopted, and adds that the evidence provided does not establish any significant financial contribution, whether direct or indirect, benefiting the Lukashenko regime.
171 In its observations on the statement of modification, the Council reiterates the arguments set out in its previous written submissions in relation to the 2024 maintaining acts, and refers to the evidence obtained at the time of the restrictive measures review that gave rise to the adoption of the 2025 maintaining acts, submitting that the applicant was able to export trucks to various Russian regions and that it is a profitable State-owned company.
172 It should be observed that, among the various documents to which the Council refers, it is apparent from three news reports published on 14 October 2024, 16 October 2024 and 1 November 2024 on the ‘sb.by’ website; from two news reports published on 30 September 2024 and 6 November 2024 on the ‘soyuz.by’ website; and from a news report published on 23 July 2024 on the ‘belta.by’ website that the applicant delivered trucks to Russia and could benefit from other orders, and also that it planned to diversify its product range. In addition, it is apparent from an item published on 1 October 2023 on the ‘leave-russia.org’ website and from an article published on 16 August 2024 on the ‘ashaniva.com’ website that the applicant generated significant income in 2023 and that it is one of the most profitable undertakings in Belarus.
173 At the hearing, the applicant referred, first, to the item published on 1 October 2023 on the ‘leave-russia.org’ website. It submitted that the information in that article related in fact to TD Belaz, an independent dealership established in Russia. In that regard, suffice it to note that the screenshot of that article, as included in the file, refers expressly to the undertaking ‘Belaz’, described as a ‘Belarusian automotive factory’ founded at Zhodino, which has manufactured heavy trucks since 1958, is composed of a holding company comprising eight subsidiaries and exports its products to more than 80 countries worldwide, including Russia. It is therefore clear that it is indeed the applicant, rather than a third party established in Russia, that is referred to in that document.
174 Furthermore, it is apparent from the item published on 1 October 2023 on the ‘leave-russia.org’ website that the applicant’s total income was USD 1 078 000 000 (approximately EUR 996 611 000) and that it had increased between 2022 and 2023. The applicant has not put forward anything to dispute that information.
175 Subsequently, at the hearing, the applicant also referred to the article already referred to, published on 16 August 2024 on the ‘ashaniva.com’ website. Admittedly, as the applicant observes, the main purpose of that article is to emphasise that a significant portion of its income from sales is taken by the intermediaries that distribute its products. Nevertheless, that article also states that the applicant is a very profitable undertaking, as a result of its position in the heavy truck market, which is highly concentrated. That article also sets out in detail why, even though the applicant’s financial results have been confidential since 2021, it is permissible to assume that it remained profitable in the period 2021 to 2023. The applicant does not dispute that information.
176 It should also be noted that, in the absence of direct evidence that income was distributed, the fact that, in 2024, the applicant had made deliveries of trucks to Russia, could benefit from other orders, was planning to diversify its product range, had generated significant income in 2023 and was one of the most profitable undertakings in Belarus, together with the fact that it was an undertaking owned by the Belarusian State and, according to its own statements made in earlier court proceedings, was subject to tax and had contributed revenue to that State between 2019 and 2021, in the form of mandatory contributions or dividends, constituted a sufficiently concrete, precise and consistent body of evidence to establish that the applicant continued to be a significant source of revenue for the Belarusian regime in the period preceding the adoption of the 2025 maintaining acts.
177 Consequently, the applicant’s arguments in the application and the reply, in so far as they are repeated in relation to the 2025 maintaining acts, must be rejected, first, for the reasons set out in paragraphs 129 to 148 above and, second, in view of the evidence examined in paragraphs 171 to 176 above, which confirms that the facts attributed to the applicant continued to apply in the period preceding the adoption of those 2025 maintaining acts.
178 In the light of the foregoing, it should be found that the Council has established to the requisite legal standard the validity of the assessment, in the first paragraph of the reasons at issue, according to which, on the date on which the 2025 maintaining acts were adopted, the applicant was one of the leading State-owned companies in Belarus and one of the largest manufacturers of large trucks and large dump trucks in the world, and represented a significant source of revenue for the Lukashenko regime; and according to which Lukashenko had stated that the Belarusian Government would always support that company, which he had described as a ‘Belarusian brand’ and as being ‘part of the national legacy’.
179 Furthermore, first, the applicant’s position in the Belarusian economy, the fact that it belongs to the Belarusian State and the fact that it represents a significant source of revenue for the Lukashenko regime, taken together, constitute a sufficient basis for the view to be taken that the applicant supports that regime for the purposes of Article 4(1)(b) of Decision 2012/642, that provision referring in particular to persons and entities providing financial support to that regime (judgment of 18 October 2023, Belaz-upravljajusaja kompanija holdinga Belaz Holding v Council, T‑533/21, not published, EU:T:2023:657, paragraph 79).
180 Second, the Court considers that those reasons, which are sufficiently detailed and specific and contain no error of assessment of the facts or error of law, constitute in themselves a sufficient basis to justify the maintenance of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue in 2025.
181 Therefore, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 92 above, the complaints alleging an error of assessment vitiating the 2025 maintaining acts should be rejected as unfounded, and it is not necessary to examine the applicant’s arguments directed against the other reasons at issue, since the fact of those reasons not being substantiated could not give rise to annulment of those acts.
182 Consequently, the second plea in law should be rejected in its entirety as unfounded.
The third plea in law, alleging infringement of the applicant’s freedom to conduct a business and of its right to property
183 The applicant claims that the contested acts interfere with its freedom to conduct a business and its right to property, enshrined in Articles 16 and 17 respectively of the Charter.
184 The applicant does not dispute that the contested acts pursue a legitimate objective. However, first of all, it asserts that the measures taken against it cannot be regarded as being provided for by law, since the listing criteria relied on are unlawful and since the Council’s examination is vitiated by errors of assessment, as established by the applicant under the first and second pleas in law.
185 Next, the applicant submits that the contested acts impair the very essence of its right to property and of its freedom to conduct a business. In that regard, it asserts that the inclusion of its name on the lists at issue has considerable consequences, since it deprives the applicant of the ability to dispose of its assets and to carry on its activities in the European Union, notwithstanding the existence of conditions, which, however, it does not meet, subject to which the release of certain assets can be requested; and has consequences for the lives of the thousands of people it employs. In addition, the applicant submits that the listing in question cannot be seen as being limited in time and reversible because, for three years, it has been renewed by the Council – on the basis of reasons that have remained unchanged – following purely formal periodic reviews, in the context of which the observations communicated by the applicant have been ignored.
186 Last, the applicant claims that the restrictive measures concerning it are disproportionate, because they do not serve to achieve the objective that they pursue, which is to increase pressure on the Lukashenko regime. It asserts that it does not form part of the Belarusian State apparatus, that it is not in a position to put pressure on or to influence the Lukashenko regime, that the Council has not demonstrated that the applicant supported that regime, and that to target the applicant by taking measures against its assets does not translate into a cost to the Belarusian Government or to that regime.
187 The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.
188 It should be recalled that the freedom to conduct a business and the right to property, on which the applicant relies in the present plea in law, are enshrined in Articles 16 and 17 respectively of the Charter.
189 It must be observed that the restrictive measures in question, in so far as they consist in an asset freeze, give rise to a restriction of the applicant’s right to property and affect its freedom to pursue an economic activity in the European Union.
190 However, the fundamental rights relied on by the applicant are not absolute, and may, therefore, be subject to limitations, as provided for in Article 52(1) of the Charter (see judgment of 13 September 2018, Gazprom Neft v Council, T‑735/14 and T‑799/14, EU:T:2018:548, paragraph 161 and the case-law cited).
191 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, according to Article 52(1) of the Charter, first, ‘any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by [the] Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms’, and, second, ‘subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the [European] Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others’.
192 Thus, in order to comply with EU law, a limitation on the exercise of the fundamental rights in question must satisfy three conditions. First, the limitation must be provided for by law. In other words, the measure in question must have a legal basis. Second, the limitation must refer to an objective of general interest, recognised as such by the European Union. Third, the limitation may not be excessive. It must be necessary and proportional to the aim sought, and the ‘essence’, that is, the substance, of the right or freedom in question must not be impaired (see judgment of 19 March 2025, BSW – management company of ‘BMC’ holding v Council, T‑1042/23, EU:T:2025:314, paragraph 95 and the case-law cited).
193 As regards the first condition referred to in paragraph 192 above, it should be borne in mind that the requirement that any limitations that may be imposed on the exercise of fundamental rights must be provided for by law (the principle of legality) implies that the act which permits the interference with those rights should itself define the scope of the limitation on the exercise of the right concerned, bearing in mind, on the one hand, that that requirement does not preclude the limitation in question from being formulated in terms which are sufficiently open to be able to adapt to different scenarios and keep pace with changing circumstances and, on the other hand, that the Court of Justice of the European Union may, where appropriate, specify, by means of interpretation, the actual scope of the limitation in the light of the very wording of the EU legislation in question as well as its general scheme and the objectives it pursues, as interpreted in view of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter (see judgment of 21 March 2024, Landeshauptstadt Wiesbaden, C‑61/22, EU:C:2024:251, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited).
194 First, it should be noted that the restrictive measures in question are ‘provided for by law’, since they are set out in acts of general application with a clear legal basis in EU law, namely in Article 29 TEU, as regards Decision 2024/769 and Decision 2025/385, and in Article 215 TFEU, as regards Implementing Regulation 2024/768 and Implementing Regulation 2025/386 (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 March 2025, BSW – management company of ‘BMC’ holding v Council, T‑1042/23, EU:T:2025:314, paragraph 97).
195 Furthermore, in so far as the contested acts have their basis in Article 4(1)(a) and (b) of Decision 2012/642 and Article 2(4) and (5) of Regulation No 765/2006, the applicant claims that, under the first and second pleas in law, it has demonstrated the invalidity of the listing criteria enshrined in those provisions and the errors of assessment made by the Council and, therefore, that there is no legal provision forming the basis of those acts.
196 It is sufficient to observe that those arguments must be rejected, since the Court has concluded that the first and second pleas in law in the present action should be rejected.
197 Second, it is necessary to examine whether Decision 2012/642 and Regulation No 765/2006 themselves define, clearly and precisely, the scope of the limitation on the exercise of the right concerned.
198 In that regard, first, it should be noted that restrictive measures taken on the basis of Decision 2012/642 and Regulation No 765/2006 and consisting, as is the case of the measures laid down by the contested acts in the present case, in a freezing of funds, can only be enacted in respect of categories of persons and entities falling within the scope of Article 4 of that decision and of Article 2 of that regulation, containing the criteria at issue, which, on their own, justify including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue in the contested acts (see paragraphs 151 and 180 above). Moreover, it is apparent from examination of the second part of the first plea in law that those criteria are consistent with the principle of legal certainty (see paragraphs 67 to 83 above).
199 Second, Article 5 of Decision 2012/642 and Article 3 of Regulation No 765/2006 provide that the use of frozen funds may be authorised in order to meet basic needs or to meet certain commitments, and that specific authorisations may be granted permitting the release of funds, other financial assets or other economic resources.
200 Consequently, it must be found that Decision 2012/642 and Regulation No 765/2006, by determining by means of objective criteria the categories of persons that may be subject to fund-freezing measures and by establishing the derogations from those fund-freezing measures, themselves define, clearly and precisely, the scope of the limitation on exercise of the fundamental rights on which the applicant relies.
201 As regards the second condition referred to in paragraph 192 above, it should be noted that the contested acts were adopted by the Council in order to achieve the objective of general interest of consolidating and supporting democracy, the rule of law and human rights, which is provided for in Article 21(2)(b) TEU, concerning the provisions on the European Union’s external action, and is, consequently, legitimate, a point which, moreover, the applicant does not dispute.
202 As regards the third condition referred to in paragraph 192 above, first, in so far as concerns whether the restrictive measures in question are necessary and proportionate, it should be noted that alternative and less restrictive measures, such as a system of prior authorisation or an obligation to justify, a posteriori, how the funds transferred were used, are not as effective in achieving the objectives pursued, in particular given the possibility of circumventing the restrictions imposed (see, by analogy, judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 182 and the case-law cited). Moreover, it should be noted that the applicant has failed to indicate which less restrictive measures the Council could have adopted.
203 In addition, it should be borne in mind that the restrictive measures adopted in respect of the applicant are temporary and reversible. Under Article 8a(4) of Regulation No 765/2006, the list in Annex I to that regulation is to be reviewed at regular intervals and at least every 12 months. As regards Decision 2012/642, it is apparent from Article 8(2) thereof that the decision is to be kept under constant review and is to be renewed or amended, as appropriate, if the Council deems that its objectives have not been met.
204 The mere fact, to which the applicant refers, that its name was included on the lists at issue by the initial acts and then maintained subsequently, in particular by the contested acts, does not, contrary to the applicant’s claim, mean that the restrictive measures taken against it have ceased to be provisional and precautionary. That is so because, in the course of the periodic reviews of the restrictive measures against Belarus, undertaken following the adoption of the initial acts, the Council found that the circumstances that justified the initial inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue continued to apply. Furthermore, it is apparent from examination of the second plea in law in the present action that the Council did not make an error of assessment in that respect at the time it adopted the contested acts. In those circumstances, the fact that the restrictive measures imposed on the applicant were renewed several times cannot mean that they are permanent and irreversible and that the applicant could not subsequently secure the removal of its name from the list in question or authorisation for the release of its funds (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 March 2025, Shuvalov v Council, C‑271/24 P, EU:C:2025:180, paragraph 80).
205 Second, as regards the applicant’s arguments that the contested acts involve significant negative consequences for it and seriously disrupt the lives of the thousands of people it employs, even though the applicant is not in a position to put pressure on the Lukashenko regime, it should be noted that restrictive measures affecting the activities of entities such as large undertakings owned by the Belarusian State and that constitute a source of revenue for that State are such as to limit the resources available to the Government of the Republic of Belarus, thereby increasing the cost of its actions against democracy, the rule of law and human rights in Belarus and, consequently, the pressure exerted on it, in accordance with the objective, referred to in paragraph 55 above, pursued by the Council when it adopted the criteria at issue. The mere fact, adduced by the applicant, that the restrictive measures arising from the contested acts have the effect of further fostering the economic ties between Belarus and Russia is not such as to refute that finding.
206 Moreover, it should be recalled that the importance of the aim pursued by the contested acts is such as to justify their possible – even substantial – negative consequences for the applicant without that affecting their legality (judgment of 7 June 2023, Skryba v Council, T‑581/21, not published, EU:T:2023:321, paragraph 83), including where they also give rise to negative consequences for its employees.
207 In the light of the foregoing, it must be found that the contested acts, in so far as they limit the applicant’s freedom to conduct a business and its right to property enshrined in Articles 16 and 17 respectively of the Charter satisfy the three conditions set out in paragraph 192 above.
208 It follows that the third plea in law must be rejected and, accordingly, the action must be dismissed in its entirety. In those circumstances, it is not necessary to rule on the Council’s request, made in the alternative, for an order that the effects of Decision 2024/769 be maintained as regards the applicant until the partial annulment of Implementing Regulation 2024/768 takes effect.
Costs
209 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs in accordance with the form of order sought by the Council.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Ninth Chamber),
hereby:
1. Dismisses the action;
2. Orders OAO Belaz-upravljajusaja kompanija holdinga Belaz Holding to pay the costs.
Truchot | Kanninen | Perišin |
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 23 September 2026.
V. Di Bucci | S. Papasavvas |
Registrar | President |
* Language of the case: English.