ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT

23 September 2026 (*)

( Interim relief – Common foreign and security policy – Restrictive measures against Iran – Freezing of funds – Application for suspension of operation – Lack of urgency )

In Case T‑365/26 R,

Europäisch-Iranische Handelsbank AG, established in Hamburg (Germany), represented by J. Pfeil and F. Randolph, lawyers,

applicant,

v

Council of the European Union, represented by D. Yovanof and A. Antoniadis, acting as Agents,

defendant,

THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT

makes the following

Order

1        By its application under Articles 278 and 279 TFEU, the applicant, Europäisch-Iranische Handelsbank AG, seeks suspension of the operation of Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2025/1971 of 29 September 2025 implementing Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran (OJ L, 2025/1971), of Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1978 of 29 September 2025 amending Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran (OJ L, 2025/1978) and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1980 of 29 September 2025 implementing Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran (OJ L, 2025/1980), in so far as they reimpose the freezing of the applicant’s assets and financial resources and reimpose the prohibition on making funds or economic resources available, directly or indirectly, to or for the applicant’s benefit, pending a ruling on the action which the applicant has brought under Articles 263 and 275 TFEU.

 Background to the dispute and forms of order sought by the parties

2        The present case has been brought in connection with the restrictive measures adopted by the European Union against Iran.

3        The applicant is a German bank specialising in services and businesses relating to Iran or in Iran.

4        Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP of 26 July 2010 concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Common Position 2007/140/CFSP (OJ 2010 L 195, p. 39) and Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 of 23 March 2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Regulation (EU) No 961/2010 (OJ 2012 L 88, p. 1) provide, inter alia, for the funds and economic resources of the persons and entities whose names appear on the lists in Annex II to that decision and Annex IX to that regulation, respectively, to be frozen (‘the lists at issue’).

5        The applicant’s name was included on the lists at issue.

6        Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1863 of 18 October 2015 amending Decision 2010/413 (OJ 2015 L 274, p. 174) and Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1861 of 18 October 2015 amending Regulation No 267/2012 (OJ 2015 L 274, p. 1) inter alia suspended the application of the restrictive measures in respect of the applicant.

7        By Decision 2025/1978 and Implementing Regulation 2025/1980, the Council inter alia lifted the suspension of the restrictive measures in respect of the applicant. It also amended Annex II to Decision 2010/413 and Annex IX to Regulation No 267/2012, respectively. Those annexes set out the following grounds for the applicant’s listing:

‘Europäisch-Iranische Handelsbank (EIH) is owned and controlled by the Iranian Government and the Bank of Industry and Mines. Therefore, the EIH is an entity owned or controlled by the Government of Iran.’

8        By Implementing Decision 2025/1971, the Council also amended Annexes I and II to Decision 2010/413.

9        By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 17 December 2025, the applicant brought an action, registered as Case T‑865/25, seeking, inter alia, annulment of Implementing Decision 2025/1971 and Article 1 of Implementing Regulation 2025/1980.

10      By separate document lodged at the Court Registry on 24 December 2025, the applicant made an application for interim measures, registered as Case T‑865/25 R, seeking, inter alia, suspension of the operation of Implementing Decision 2025/1971 and Implementing Regulation 2025/1980.

11      On 31 December 2025, the applicant requested the Council of the European Union to reconsider its situation.

12      By order of 23 March 2026, Europäisch-Iranische Handelsbank v Council (T‑865/25 R, not published, EU:T:2026:210), the President of the General Court dismissed the application for interim measures referred to in paragraph 10 above.

13      On 30 March 2026, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2026/774 amending Decision 2010/413 (OJ L, 2026/774) and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/775 implementing Regulation No 267/2012 (OJ L, 2026/775), by which the names of six persons and two entities were removed from the lists at issue. The applicant’s name was not one of them.

14      On 31 March 2026, the Council informed the applicant of its decision to maintain the applicant’s name on the lists at issue (‘the decision to maintain’).

15      By application lodged at the Court Registry on 10 June 2026, the applicant brought an action, registered as Case T‑365/26, seeking annulment of the decision to maintain and, consequently, annulment of Implementing Decision 2025/1971, Decision 2025/1978 and Implementing Regulation 2025/1980.

16      By separate document lodged at the Court Registry on 17 July 2026, the applicant made the present application for interim measures, in which it claims that the judge hearing the application for interim measures should:

–        suspend the operation of Implementing Decision 2025/1971, Decision 2025/1978 and Implementing Regulation 2025/1980, in so far as those acts reimpose the freezing of its assets and economic resources and reimpose the prohibition on making funds or economic resources available, directly or indirectly, to or for its benefit, pending a ruling on the action which it has brought under Articles 263 and 275 TFEU;

–        order the Council to pay the costs.

17      In its observations on the application for interim measures, which were lodged at the Court Registry on 27 August 2026, the Council contends that the judge hearing the application for interim measures should:

–        dismiss the application for interim measures as inadmissible or, in the alternative, as unfounded;

–        order the applicant to pay the costs.

 Law

 General considerations

18      It is apparent from reading Articles 278 and 279 TFEU together with Article 256(1) TFEU that the judge hearing an application for interim measures may, if he or she considers that the circumstances so require, order that the operation of a measure challenged before the General Court be suspended or prescribe any necessary interim measures. Nevertheless, Article 278 TFEU establishes the principle that actions do not have suspensory effect, since acts adopted by the EU institutions are presumed to be lawful. It is therefore only exceptionally that the judge hearing an application for interim measures may order the suspension of operation of an act challenged before the General Court or prescribe any interim measures (see order of 19 July 2016, Belgium v Commission, T‑131/16 R, EU:T:2016:427, paragraph 12 and the case-law cited).

19      The first sentence of Article 156(4) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court provides that applications for interim measures are to state ‘the subject matter of the proceedings, the circumstances giving rise to urgency and the pleas of fact and law establishing a prima facie case for the interim measure applied for’.

20      Thus, the judge hearing an application for interim measures may order suspension of the operation of an act and other interim measures if it is established that such an order is justified, prima facie, in fact and in law (fumus boni juris), and that it is urgent in so far as, in order to avoid serious and irreparable damage to the applicant’s interests, it must be made and produce its effects before a decision is reached on the substance of the case. Those conditions are cumulative, with the result that an application for interim measures must be dismissed if any one of them is not satisfied. The judge hearing an application for interim measures is also to undertake, when necessary, a weighing of the competing interests (see order of 2 March 2016, Evonik Degussa v Commission, C‑162/15 P-R, EU:C:2016:142, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).

21      In the context of that overall examination, the judge hearing an application for interim measures enjoys a broad discretion and is free to determine, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case, the manner and order in which those various conditions are to be examined, there being no rule of law imposing a pre-established scheme of analysis within which the need to order interim measures must be assessed (see order of 19 July 2012, Akhras v Council, C‑110/12 P(R), not published, EU:C:2012:507, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).

22      Having regard to the material in the case file, the President of the General Court considers that he has all the information needed to rule on the present application for interim measures, without there being any need first to hear oral argument from the parties.

23      In the present case, the Council submits that the application for interim measures is inadmissible on the ground, first, that the main action is manifestly inadmissible, secondly, that the applicant has no interest in securing the suspension of the acts at issue and, thirdly, that that application does not meet the requirements of Article 156(4) of the Rules of Procedure as regards the condition of urgency.

24      Nevertheless, in the circumstances of the present case, the sound administration of justice and economy of procedure justify examining the application for interim measures on the merits, without first ruling on its admissibility. Against that background, it is appropriate to examine first of all whether the condition relating to urgency is satisfied.

 The condition relating to urgency

25      In order to determine whether the suspension of operation sought is urgent, it should be noted that the purpose of the procedure for interim relief is to guarantee the full effectiveness of the future final decision, in order to prevent a lacuna in the legal protection afforded by the Court. To attain that objective, urgency must be assessed in the light of the need for an interlocutory order to avoid serious and irreparable damage to the party requesting the interim measure. That party must demonstrate that it cannot await the outcome of the main proceedings without suffering serious and irreparable damage (see order of 14 January 2016, AGC Glass Europe and Others v Commission, C‑517/15 P-R, EU:C:2016:21, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).

26      It is in the light of those criteria that it is necessary to examine whether the applicant has succeeded in demonstrating urgency.

27      In the present case, in order to demonstrate that the damage is serious and irreparable, the applicant claims that, if the freezing of its assets, funds and economic resources is maintained, it will not be able to continue to trade in the very near future, resulting in 67 employees losing their jobs.

28      It submits in that regard that the undertakings which provide services to it that are essential for the continuance of its business have ended relations with it and are refusing to provide those services.

29      The applicant states that, in addition, the German Central Bank is refusing to make payments out of the funds which it holds with that bank, even payments for which authorisations have been granted. The German Central Bank is also refusing to return those funds to the applicant so that the applicant can make payments itself. Consequently, the applicant claims that it is at risk of not being able to make payments that are due.

30      Moreover, according to the applicant, the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, Germany; ‘the BaFin’) has suggested, or even threatened, that the applicant should be regarded as technically insolvent and that insolvency proceedings be initiated.

31      The applicant also states that two Iranian banks, which are not subject to restrictive measures and which are essential for providing payment channels for humanitarian supplies, will no longer be able to operate in the near future. The applicant maintains that it is almost the only conduit for providing funds to those banks for their operations outside Iran. Those funds can thus no longer be used to finance humanitarian services, as EU legislation does not allow authorisations to be granted for the release of frozen funds for such purposes save in emergencies.

32      The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.

33      In that regard, it should be observed that the main damage alleged by the applicant, namely the risk of it ceasing to trade, is, in essence, of a financial nature.

34      In accordance with settled case-law, damage of a pecuniary nature cannot, otherwise than in exceptional circumstances, be regarded as irreparable since, as a general rule, pecuniary compensation is capable of restoring the aggrieved person to the situation that obtained before he or she suffered the damage. Any such damage could in particular be recouped by the applicant’s bringing an action for compensation on the basis of Articles 268 and 340 TFEU (see order of 23 April 2015, Commission v Vanbreda Risk & Benefits, C‑35/15 P(R), EU:C:2015:275, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).

35      However, where the damage referred to is of a financial nature, the interim measures sought are justified where, inter alia, in the absence of those measures, the party seeking them would be in a position that would imperil its financial viability before final judgment is given in the main action (see order of 23 March 2017, Kanyama v Council, T‑145/17 R, not published, EU:T:2017:212, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).

36      To that end, the judge hearing the application for interim measures must have specific and precise information, supported by detailed, certified documentary evidence, which shows the situation in which the party seeking the interim measures finds itself and enables the probable consequences, should the measures sought not be granted, to be assessed. It follows that that party, in particular when it relies on the occurrence of financial damage, must in principle produce, with supporting documentation, an accurate overall picture of its financial situation (see order of 29 February 2016, ICA Laboratories and Others v Commission, T‑732/15 R, not published, EU:T:2016:129, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).

37      Furthermore, under the second sentence of Article 156(4) of the Rules of Procedure, applications for interim measures ‘shall contain all the evidence and offers of evidence available to justify the grant of interim measures’.

38      Thus, an application for interim measures must, of itself, enable the defendant to prepare its observations and the judge hearing the application to rule on it, if necessary, without any supporting information, since the essential elements of fact and law on which the application is based must be found in the actual text of that application (see order of 6 September 2016, Inclusion Alliance for Europe v Commission, C‑378/16 P-R, not published, EU:C:2016:668, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited).

39      In the present case, first, as regards the applicant’s argument that it will not be able to continue to trade in the very near future, first of all, it must be stated that the applicant does not rely, in the application for interim measures, on any evidence capable of demonstrating that its claims are well founded. It is true that it provides, as an annex to that application, certain documents, originating mainly from the BaFin. However, in the body of the application, the applicant does not refer, in support of its arguments seeking to demonstrate the urgency of the suspension of operation sought, to specific evidence annexed to that application, or annexed to its application in the main proceedings. It is not for the judge hearing the application for interim measures to seek, in the stead of the party concerned, those matters contained in the annexes to the application for interim measures, in the application lodged in the main proceedings or in the annexes thereto which would support that application for interim measures (see order of 23 March 2026, Europäisch-Iranische Handelsbank v Council, T‑865/25 R, not published, EU:T:2026:210, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).

40      Next, it should be observed that, in its application for interim measures, the applicant does not provide any information to substantiate its assertions. In particular, it entirely fails to explain its financial situation and to provide, in the application for interim measures, any data at all, including figures, which would make it possible to assess the serious and irreparable nature of the financial damage which it claims it is already suffering and which it fears it will suffer in the future as a result of the restrictive measures concerning it. Similarly, although it states, in general terms, that the undertakings which provide services to it that are essential for the continuance of its business have ended relations with it and are refusing to provide those services, the applicant does not give any precise and specific examples of such terminations or refusals.

41      Lastly, as regards the argument relating to the measures allegedly taken by the German Central Bank, it should be borne in mind that, where suspension of the operation of an EU act is sought, the grant of the interim measures requested is justified only if the act at issue constitutes the decisive cause of the alleged serious and irreparable damage (see order of 14 January 2016, AGC Glass Europe and Others v Commission, C‑517/15 P-R, EU:C:2016:21, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited). In the present case, even if it were shown that the German Central Bank had actually taken those measures, the alleged damage flowing from them would be the direct result not of the acts in respect of which suspension is sought, but of the conduct of the German Central Bank. The same is true of the claim concerning the purported intentions of the BaFin.

42      The argument concerning the applicant’s ceasing to trade in the very near future must therefore be rejected.

43      Secondly, as regards the claims relating to the two Iranian banks which, according to the applicant, will no longer be able to operate in the near future, suffice it to note that the applicant must demonstrate that the suspension of operation sought is necessary for the protection of its own interests, since it cannot plead damage to an interest which is not personal to it, such as, for example, damage to the rights of third parties. Therefore, the applicant cannot validly plead the damage suffered by the two Iranian banks in question in order to substantiate the urgency of the suspension of operation sought by it, since such damage can be taken into consideration, where appropriate, only in the context of weighing up the competing interests (see, to that effect, order of 17 February 2012, Hassan v Council, T‑572/11 R, not published, EU:T:2012:83, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited). The judge hearing an application for interim measures is not required to weigh up the competing interests if he or she first finds that one of the conditions for the grant of interim measures is not met (see order of 30 April 2020, Nouryon Industrial Chemicals and Others v Commission, T‑868/19 R, not published, EU:T:2020:171, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited). In addition, as the Council essentially points out, the applicant has not demonstrated either that the Iranian banks in question did not have accounts with other banks that could provide them with the funds needed to pay for humanitarian supplies, or that those supplies could not be paid for by other financial institutions or through other channels.

44      The argument relating to the two Iranian banks which, it is claimed, will no longer be able to operate in the near future must therefore also be rejected.

45      Thirdly, the argument that 67 employees would lose their jobs if the applicant were to cease trading must be rejected for the same reasons as those set out in paragraph 43 above, since the applicant neither claims nor demonstrates that such a scenario would adversely affect its own interests and not solely the rights of those employees. Moreover, it must be pointed out that the risk of the applicant ceasing to trade has not been proven either (see paragraph 42 above).

46      It follows from the foregoing that the applicant has not demonstrated that the alleged damage is serious and irreparable.

47      Accordingly, the application for interim measures must be dismissed since the applicant has failed to establish that the condition relating to urgency has been satisfied, without there being any need to rule on the admissibility of the present application for interim measures, to examine the condition relating to the existence of a prima facie case or to weigh up the competing interests.

48      Pursuant to Article 158(5) of the Rules of Procedure, the costs are to be reserved.

On those grounds,

THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT

hereby orders:

1.      The application for interim measures is dismissed.

2.      The costs are reserved.

Luxembourg, 23 September 2026.

*      Language of the case: English.