JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)

30 September 2026 (*)

( Common Foreign and Security Policy – Restrictive measures taken in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine – Freezing of funds – Restrictions on entering the territories of the Member States – List of persons, entities and bodies subject to the freezing of funds and economic resources and subject to restrictions on entry into the territories of the Member States – Maintenance of the applicant’s name on the list – Article 2(1)(a) of Decision 2014/145/CFSP – Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 – Error of assessment )

In Case T‑583/24,

Viktor Fedorovych Yanukovych, residing in Rostov-on-Don (Russia), represented by B. Kennelly, Senior Counsel,

applicant,

Council of the European Union, represented by A. Boggio-Tomasaz and J. Rurarz, acting as Agents, assisted by B. Maingain, lawyer,

defendant,

THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber),

composed of E. Buttigieg, President, M. Kancheva and F. Bestagno (Rapporteur), Judges,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci,

having regard to the written part of the procedure, in particular the measure of organisation of procedure of 6 February 2026 inviting the parties to submit their observations on the appropriate conclusions to be drawn, for the present case, from the judgment of 10 September 2025, Yanukovych v Council (T‑643/22, not published, EU:T:2025:838), and the replies of the applicant and of the Council, lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 27 March and 25 March 2026 respectively,

having regard to the withdrawal by the applicant of his request for a hearing and having decided, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, to give a ruling without an oral part of the procedure,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By his action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Mr Viktor Fedorovych Yanukovych, seeks annulment of (i) Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/2456 of 12 September 2024 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L, 2024/2456) and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2455 of 12 September 2024 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L, 2024/2455) (together, ‘the September 2024 maintaining acts’) and (ii) Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/528 of 14 March 2025 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L, 2025/528) and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/527 of 14 March 2025 implementing Regulation No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L, 2025/527) (together, ‘the March 2025 maintaining acts’), in so far as all those acts (together, ‘the contested acts’) concern him.

Background to the dispute and events subsequent to the bringing of the action

2 The applicant is the former President of the Republic of Ukraine.

3 The present case has arisen in the context of the restrictive measures adopted by the European Union in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

4 On 17 March 2014, on the basis of Article 29 TEU, the Council of the European Union adopted Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 16).

5 On the same date, on the basis of Article 215 TFEU, the Council adopted Regulation No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 6).

6 On 25 February 2022, in view of the seriousness of the situation in Ukraine, the Council adopted (i) Decision (CFSP) 2022/329 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 50, p. 1) and (ii) Regulation (EU) 2022/330 amending Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 51, p. 1) in order, inter alia, to amend the criteria by which natural or legal persons, entities or bodies could be made subject to the restrictive measures at issue.

7 Article 2(1) and (2) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, (‘Decision 2014/145, as amended’) is worded as follows:

‘1. All funds and economic resources belonging to …:

(a) natural persons responsible for, supporting or implementing actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or stability or security in Ukraine, or which obstruct the work of international organisations in Ukraine;

… shall be frozen.

2. No funds or economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in the Annex.’

8 The detailed rules for the freezing of those funds are set out in the subsequent paragraphs of Article 2 of Decision 2014/145.

9 Article 1(1)(a) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, prohibits the entry into, or transit through, the territories of the Member States of natural persons who satisfy essentially the same criteria as those set out in Article 2(1)(a) of that decision.

10 Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/330, requires the adoption of measures to freeze funds and lays down the detailed rules governing the freezing of those funds in terms that are, in essence, identical to those of Decision 2014/145, as amended. Article 3(1)(a) to (g) of that regulation essentially reproduces Article 2(1)(a) to (g) of that decision.

11 By letters of 25 February and 13 April 2022, the Council informed the applicant of its intention to add his name to the lists annexed to Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/330, and to Decision 2014/145, as amended, (‘the lists at issue’), and sent the files bearing the references WK 1271/2022 and WK 1271/2022 ADD 1 (‘the first WK files’).

12 On 4 August 2022, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/1355 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 204 I, p. 4) and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1354 implementing Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 204 I, p. 1) (together, ‘the initial acts’).

13 The reasons for the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue are as follows:

‘From 2010 until 2014, Viktor Yanukovych was President of Ukraine. He pursued a pro-Russian policy when in office. A Ukrainian court found Viktor Yanukovych guilty of treason for having invited the Russian Federation to invade Ukraine. After being removed from power, he relocated to Russia, from where he has continued his activities aimed at destabilising Ukraine.

He assisted in the Russian military interference in Ukraine by calling on the President of the Russian Federation to send Russian troops to Ukraine in March 2014. Viktor Yanukovych supported pro-Russian politicians who held public offices in occupied Crimea. In 2021, a new pre-trial investigation in Ukraine was opened according to which Mr Viktor Yanukovych, together with two former Ministers of Defence, has purposefully reduced the defence capacity of Ukraine, particularly in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. He considers himself as the legitimate President of Ukraine and has consistently presented a pro-Russian stance in his public interventions. According to different sources, Mr Viktor Yanukovych has been part of a Russian special operation, aimed at replacing the Ukrainian President with him, during the first phases of the unprovoked illegal military aggression against Ukraine. Furthermore, the President of the Republic of Chechnya Ramzan Kadyrov, has requested the President of Ukraine to transfer all his powers to Viktor Yanukovych.

Therefore, Viktor Yanukovych is responsible for supporting or implementing actions or policies which threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, as well as the state’s stability and security.’

14 On 14 September 2022, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/1530 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 239, p. 149) and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1529 implementing Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 239, p. 1) (together, ‘the September 2022 maintaining acts’), which extended the measures taken against the applicant until 15 March 2023 without making any changes to the reasons for including his name on the lists at issue in comparison with the reasons set out in the initial acts.

15 By letter of 22 December 2022, the Council informed the applicant that it intended to extend the restrictive measures taken against him for the same reasons as those set out in the initial acts and sent him the file bearing the reference WK 17599/2022 (‘the second WK file’).

16 By letter of 11 January 2023, the applicant submitted his observations.

17 By Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/572 of 13 March 2023 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2023 L 75 I, p. 134) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/571 of 13 March 2023 implementing Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2023 L 75 I, p. 1), the restrictive measures taken against the applicant were extended until 15 September 2023. By letter of 14 March 2023, the Council informed the applicant of its decision.

18 By letter of 19 June 2023, the Council informed the applicant that it intended to extend the restrictive measures taken against him and sent him the file bearing the reference WK 7868/2023.

19 By letter of 30 June 2023, the applicant submitted his observations.

20 By Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1767 of 13 September 2023 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2023 L 226, p. 104) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1765 of 13 September 2023 implementing Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2023 L 226, p. 3), the restrictive measures taken against the applicant were extended until 15 March 2024. By letter of 15 September 2023, the Council informed the applicant of its decision.

21 The reasons for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue were amended as follows:

On 21 April 2010, then President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych and then President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev signed an agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, according to which the term of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation in Sevastopol was extended from 2017 to 2042. By signing the agreements, Yanukovych created favourable conditions for increasing Russia’s military presence in Ukraine and the re-equipment and modernisation of the weapons of the Black Sea Fleet in the territory of Crimea. Subsequently, Russian weapons that were on the territory of Ukraine were used to annex the Autonomous “Republic of Crimea” and the city of Sevastopol in 2014.

He considers himself as the legitimate President of Ukraine and has consistently presented a pro-Russian stance in his public interventions. According to different sources, Viktor Yanukovych has been part of a Russian special operation, aimed at replacing the Ukrainian President with him, during the first phases of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Furthermore, the President of the Republic of Chechnya Ramzan Kadyrov, has requested the President of Ukraine to transfer all his powers to Viktor Yanukovych.

22 By letter of 21 December 2023, the Council informed the applicant that it intended to extend the restrictive measures taken against him and sent him the file bearing the reference WK 16833/2023.

23 By letter of 10 January 2024, the applicant submitted his observations.

24 By Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/847 of 12 March 2024 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ L, 2024/847) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/849 of 12 March 2024 implementing Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ L, 2024/849) (together, ‘the March 2024 maintaining acts’), the restrictive measures taken against the applicant were extended until 15 September 2024. By letter of 13 March 2024, the Council informed the applicant of its decision.

25 The reasons for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue were amended as follows:

On 21 April 2010, then President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych and then President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev signed an agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, according to which the term of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation in Sevastopol was extended from 2017 to 2042. By signing the agreements, Yanukovych created favourable conditions for increasing Russia’s military presence in Ukraine and for the re-equipment and modernisation of the weapons of the Black Sea Fleet in the territory of Crimea. Subsequently, Russian weapons that were on the territory of Ukraine were used to annex the autonomous so-called “Republic of Crimea” and the city of Sevastopol in 2014.

In 2023, Ukraine’s State Bureau of Investigation submitted an indictment against Viktor Yanukovych on charges of treason and aiding Russia in carrying out subversive activities in Ukraine.

He considers himself as the legitimate President of Ukraine and has consistently presented a pro-Russian stance in his public interventions. According to different sources, Viktor Yanukovych has been part of a Russian special operation, aimed at replacing the Ukrainian President with him, during the first phases of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Furthermore, the President of the Republic of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, has requested the President of Ukraine to transfer all his powers to Viktor Yanukovych.

26 On 12 September 2024, the Council adopted the September 2024 maintaining acts, extending the restrictive measures taken against the applicant until 15 March 2025 for the same reasons as those set out in paragraph 25 above. By letter of 13 September 2024, the Council informed the applicant of its decision.

27 On 14 March 2025, the Council adopted the March 2025 maintaining acts, extending the restrictive measures taken against the applicant until 15 September 2025 for the same reasons as those set out in paragraph 25 above. By letter of 17 March 2025, the Council informed the applicant of its decision.

28 By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 14 October 2022, the applicant sought, pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, annulment of the initial acts and, following the modification of that application, of the maintaining acts of September 2022, March 2023, September 2023 and March 2024. By the judgment of 10 September 2025, Yanukovych v Council (T‑643/22, not published, EU:T:2025:838), the Court dismissed the action in its entirety.

Forms of order sought

29 In the final form of his pleadings, the applicant claims that the Court should:

– annul the contested acts in so far as they concern him;

– order the Council to pay the costs.

30 The Council claims that the Court should:

– dismiss the action;

– order the applicant to pay the costs.

Law

31 The applicant relies on a single plea in law in support of his action. He submits that the Council made a manifest error of assessment in maintaining his name on the lists at issue by adopting the September 2024 and March 2025 maintaining acts.

32 The Council disputes the merits of that plea in law.

Preliminary observations

33 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the single plea in law raised by the applicant must be regarded as alleging an error of assessment rather than a manifest error of assessment. Whilst it is true that the Council has a degree of discretion to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether the legal criteria on which the restrictive measures at issue are based are met, the Courts of the European Union must ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all EU acts (see judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 121 and the case-law cited).

34 Next, it must be noted that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires, inter alia, that the Courts of the European Union are to ensure that the decision by which restrictive measures were adopted or maintained, which affects the person or entity concerned individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119, and of 5 November 2014, Mayaleh v Council, T‑307/12 and T‑408/13, EU:T:2014:926, paragraph 128).

35 Such an assessment must be carried out by examining the evidence and information not in isolation but in their context. The Council discharges the burden of proof borne by it if it presents to the EU Courts a sufficiently specific, precise and consistent body of evidence to establish that there is a sufficient link between the entity subject to a measure freezing its funds and the regime or, in general, the situations, being combated (see judgment of 20 July 2017, Badica and Kardiam v Council, T‑619/15, EU:T:2017:532, paragraph 99 and the case-law cited).

36 It is the task of the competent EU authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded. It is however necessary that the information or evidence produced should support the reasons relied on against the person concerned (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 121 and 122, and of 3 July 2014, National Iranian Tanker Company v Council, T‑565/12, EU:T:2014:608, paragraph 57).

37 In that regard, it should be noted that the context of the measures at issue must be taken into account and the standard of proof which may be required of the Council must be adapted in the light of the difficulty of obtaining evidence and objective information (see judgment of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 102 and the case-law cited).

38 Moreover, it is clear from the recent case-law of the Court of Justice that the Council is not precluded from taking into account, in order to assess whether a person satisfies a listing criterion such as the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(a) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, (‘the (a) criterion’), information or evidence relating to circumstances prior to the date of the adoption of the act imposing or maintaining restrictive measures, provided that that information or evidence supports the reasons for that act and contributes to establishing that, despite the passage of time and in view of all the relevant circumstances specific to each case, the person concerned satisfies the listing criterion at issue. In particular, it cannot be ruled out that such information and evidence may be taken into account in order to establish, in the light of the listing criterion concerned, continuity between, on the one hand, the previous situation of the person concerned and, on the other hand, his or her current situation (see judgment of 13 March 2025, Shuvalov v Council, C‑271/24 P, EU:C:2025:180, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).

39 Furthermore, it should be noted that restrictive measures are of a precautionary and, by definition, provisional nature, and that their validity always depends on whether the factual and legal circumstances which led to their adoption continue to apply and on the need to persist with them in order to achieve their objective. It is thus for the Council, in the course of its periodic review of those restrictive measures, to conduct an updated assessment of the situation and to appraise the impact of such measures, in order to determine whether they have made it possible to attain the objectives pursued by the initial inclusion of the names of the persons and entities concerned on the list in question or whether the same conclusion in respect of those persons and entities can still be drawn (see judgments of 27 April 2022, Ilunga Luyoyo v Council, T‑108/21, EU:T:2022:253, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited, and of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited).

40 In order to justify maintaining a person’s name on the list in question, the Council is not prohibited from basing its decision on the same evidence justifying the initial inclusion, re-inclusion or previous retention of the name of the person concerned on that list, provided that (i) the reasons for listing remain unchanged and (ii) the context has not changed in such a way that that evidence is now out of date (judgment of 23 September 2020, Kaddour v Council, T‑510/18, EU:T:2020:436, paragraph 99). That context includes not only the situation of the country in respect of which the system of restrictive measures was established, but also the particular situation of the person concerned (see judgments of 9 June 2021, Borborudi v Council, T‑580/19, EU:T:2021:330, paragraph 60 (not published) and the case-law cited, and of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited).

41 It is in the light of the foregoing that it is necessary to examine whether the Council made an error of assessment in deciding to maintain the applicant’s name on the lists at issue.

The evidence produced by the Council

42 In the present case, in order to justify the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, the Council provided the documents in the first WK files, which include the following material:

– a press article published in February 2022 on the website of Unian (exhibit 1);

– a statement by the applicant set out in a document of the United Nations Security Council of March 2014 (exhibit 2);

– a press article published in January 2018 on the website of NV (exhibit 3);

– a press article published in March 2016 on the website of Tass (exhibit 4);

– a press article published in January 2019 on the website of The New York Times (exhibit 5);

– a press article published in June 2020 on the website of Unian (exhibit 6);

– an extract from a page on the website of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine published in 2020 (exhibit 7);

– a press article published in September 2020 on the website of Novaya Gazeta (exhibit 8);

– a press article published in November 2020 on the website of ForPost (exhibit 9);

– a press article published in July 2020 on the website of Novaya Gazeta (exhibit 10);

– a press article published in December 2021 on the website of Gordon (exhibit 11);

– another press article published in December 2021 on the website of Gordon (exhibit 12);

– a press article published in December 2021 on the website of The Guardian (exhibit 13);

– a press article published in January 2020 on the website of Radio Svoboda (exhibit 14);

– a press article published in August 2021 on the website of Vedomosti (exhibit 15);

– a press article published in March 2022 on the website of KP.UA (exhibit 16);

– another press article published in March 2022 on the website of KP.UA (exhibit 17);

– a press article published in March 2020 on the website of Pravda (exhibit 18);

– a press article published in March 2022 on the website of Obozrevatel (exhibit 19);

– a press article published in March 2022 on the website of Fortune (exhibit 20);

– a press article published in March 2022 on the website of RBC (exhibit 21);

– another press article published in March 2022 on the website of RBC (exhibit 22);

– a press article published in January 2022 on the website of RBC (exhibit 23);

– a press article published in August 2021 on the website of RBC (exhibit 24);

– a press article published in March 2022 on the website of Telesur (exhibit 25);

– a press article published in March 2022 on the ‘republicworld.com’ website (exhibit 26);

– a press article published in March 2022 on the website of RBC (exhibit 27);

– a press article published in March 2022 on the website of Pravda (exhibit 28).

43 In order to justify the adoption of the September 2022 maintaining acts, the Council relied on the same evidence as that set out in the first WK files.

44 In order to justify the adoption of the March 2023 maintaining acts referred to in paragraph 17 above, the Council relied on the second WK file, which contains the following material:

– a press article published in November 2022 on the website of Gazeta.ru (exhibit 1);

– a press article published in November 2022 on the website of Ria Novosti (exhibit 2);

– a press article published in November 2022 on the website of Yur-gazeta.ru (exhibit 3);

– a press article published in November 2022 on the website of The Odessa Journal (exhibit 4);

– a press article published in November 2022 on the ‘republicworld.com’ website (exhibit 5);

– a press article published in November 2022 on the website of Belsat (exhibit 6);

– a press article published in November 2022 on the website of The Washington Post (exhibit 7);

– a press article published in November 2022 on the website of Politeka (exhibit 8);

– a press article published in November 2022 on the website of Pravda (exhibit 9).

45 In order to justify the adoption of the September 2023 maintaining acts referred to in paragraph 20 above, the Council took into account file WK 7868/2023, referred to in paragraph 18 above, which contains a press article published in December 2022 on the website of Unian.

46 For the adoption of the March 2024 maintaining acts, the Council relied on file WK 16833/2023 referred to in paragraph 22 above, which contains a press release of 15 September 2023 from Ukraine’s State Bureau of Investigation and an article published in September 2023 on the website of Kyiv Post.

47 In order to justify the adoption of the September 2024 and March 2025 maintaining acts, the Council relied on the same evidence as that set out in the WK files provided previously and referred to in paragraphs 42 to 46 above.

Reliability and credibility of the evidence

48 The applicant calls into question, in essence, the reliability and relevance of the sources used by the Council as the basis for maintaining his name on the lists at issue in the September 2024 and March 2025 maintaining acts.

49 The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.

50 In that regard, it must be recalled that, in accordance with settled case-law, the activity of the Courts of the European Union is governed by the principle of the unfettered assessment of the evidence, and it is only the reliability of the evidence before the Court which is decisive when it comes to the assessment of its value. In order to assess the probative value of a document, regard should be had to the credibility of the information it sets out and, in particular, to the person from whom the document originates, the circumstances in which it came into being, the person to whom it was addressed and whether, on its face, the document appears to be sound and reliable (see judgments of 31 May 2018, Kaddour v Council, T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316, paragraph 107 and the case-law cited, and of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraph 95 (not published) and the case-law cited).

51 In the absence of investigative powers in third countries, the assessment of the EU authorities must rely on publicly available sources of information, reports, articles in the press, intelligence reports or other similar sources of information (judgments of 14 March 2018, Kim and Others v Council and Commission, T‑533/15 and T‑264/16, EU:T:2018:138, paragraph 107, and of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 59).

52 Furthermore, it must be observed that the conflict situation involving the Russian Federation and Ukraine makes it particularly difficult in practice to access certain sources, to specify the primary source of some information and, where appropriate, to collect testimonies from persons who agree to be identified. The ensuing investigative difficulties can thus be a factor in preventing the provision of specific evidence and objective information (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 116).

53 In the present case, the applicant cannot dispute the reliability and credibility of the exhibits which make up the WK files referred to in paragraphs 42 to 46 above merely by claiming, in the abstract, that they consist mainly of press articles. In view of the situation referred to in paragraph 52 above, the Council cannot in fact be criticised for relying mainly on press articles (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 September 2025, Yanukovych v Council, T‑643/22, not published, EU:T:2025:838, paragraph 56).

54 As regards the arguments raised by the applicant in respect of the information set out in certain exhibits in the WK files referred to in paragraphs 42 to 46 above on the ground that the information is irrelevant or incorrect, it should be noted that those arguments fall within the scope of the examination of whether the Council’s factual basis is sufficient to justify the inclusion and maintenance of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 September 2025, Yanukovych v Council, T‑643/22, not published, EU:T:2025:838, paragraph 57) and that they will be examined, if appropriate, below, in the context of analysing the application of the (a) criterion to the applicant.

55 In the light of the foregoing, in view of the context of the war and in the absence on the part of the Council of investigative powers in third countries (see paragraph 51 above), and in the absence of other arguments raised by the applicant capable of calling into question the reliability and credibility of the sources used by the Council, that claim by the applicant must be rejected (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 September 2025, Yanukovych v Council, T‑643/22, not published, EU:T:2025:838, paragraph 58).

Application of the (a) criterion to the applicant

56 It should be noted, first of all, that, in the present case, the applicant is challenging the lawfulness of the September 2024 and March 2025 maintaining acts. The Court’s review therefore concerns only those acts. It should also be noted that, as stated in paragraph 47 above, in order to justify the adoption of the September 2024 and March 2025 maintaining acts, the Council relied on the same evidence as that set out in the WK files provided previously and referred to in paragraphs 42 to 46 above. It is therefore necessary to determine whether, on the basis of that evidence, the Council was entitled to maintain the applicant’s listing in the September 2024 and March 2025 maintaining acts.

57 In the absence of an express reference, in the contested acts, to the legal provisions which served as the basis for maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, it must be noted that his name was included on those lists on the basis of the (a) criterion. It is apparent from the reasons for the contested acts that relate to him, referred to in paragraph 25 above, that the Council considered him to be responsible for supporting or implementing actions or policies threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and the stability and security of that State.

58 In that regard, it should be noted that that criterion, which concerns, inter alia, support for or the implementation of actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine or stability or security in Ukraine, requires that a link, whether direct or indirect, be established between the activities or actions of the person or entity concerned and the situation in Ukraine that gave rise to the adoption of the restrictive measures at issue. In other words, those persons must, through their conduct, have been responsible for actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or for supporting those actions or policies (judgment of 10 September 2025, Yanukovych v Council, T‑643/22, not published, EU:T:2025:838, paragraph 60).

59 The applicant submits, in essence, that the evidence on which the Council relies is not capable of demonstrating to the requisite legal standard that the conditions laid down by the (a) criterion are satisfied. In particular, the applicant’s arguments seek to challenge specifically each of the findings of fact set out in the statement of reasons.

60 It is therefore necessary to examine whether the Council had at its disposal a body of evidence that was sufficiently specific, precise and consistent to justify maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue on the basis of the (a) criterion. In that regard, in line with the approach followed in the judgment of 10 September 2025, Yanukovych v Council (T‑643/22, not published, EU:T:2025:838), it is necessary to examine, first of all, the grounds alleging (i) that the applicant assisted in the Russian military interference in Ukraine by calling on the President of the Russian Federation to send Russian troops to Ukraine in March 2014; (ii) that he supported pro-Russian politicians who held public office in occupied Crimea; (iii) that he deliberately reduced Ukraine’s defence capacity, in particular in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea; and (iv) that he participated in a Russian operation aimed at replacing the Ukrainian President.

The finding that the applicant assisted in the Russian military interference in Ukraine by calling on the President of the Russian Federation to send Russian troops to Ukraine in March 2014

61 In the first place, the applicant submits that Russia already had a military presence in Crimea before 2014, and that the increase in that presence at the beginning of 2014 did not follow a request from the applicant but was in response to a request from the local authorities in Crimea. In the second place, he submits that the letter of 1 March 2014 which he sent to President Putin (see exhibits 1 and 2 in the first WK files) requested only short-lived assistance from the President of the Russian Federation and not the sending of Russian troops. In the third place, he states that, in similar terms, he also requested assistance from other countries, namely France, Germany and Poland, and that that assistance had been requested for the same purpose, namely to restore law and order, peace and stability and to protect the people of Ukraine.

62 The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.

63 In the present case, it must be noted that, as stated in the judgment of 10 September 2025, Yanukovych v Council (T‑643/22, not published, EU:T:2025:838), in the first place, the applicant is not disputing that he sent a letter to the President of the Russian Federation on 1 March 2014. That letter is worded as follows:

‘The events at Maidan Square and the illegal seizure of power in Kyiv have brought Ukraine to the brink of civil war. Chaos and anarchy reign the country, and citizens’ lives, security and human rights are under threat, especially in the southeast and in Crimea. Under the influence of Western countries, acts of terror and violence are openly carried out and people are persecuted for political and linguistic reasons.

I therefore call on the President of Russia, V. Putin, to use the armed forces of the Russian Federation to restore law and order, peace and stability and to protect the Ukrainian people.’

64 It should be noted that the applicant’s letter shows unequivocally that, following the events which led to his removal from office as President of Ukraine, he had requested the military intervention of the Russian Federation in order to put an end to the public disorder which he attributed to Western countries. It must be found that such a request for military intervention in Ukraine by the Russian Federation was clearly an action capable of contributing to the destabilisation of Ukraine.

65 In the second place, it must be noted that, even if it were accepted that, as the applicant claims, the military intervention in Crimea by the Russian Federation predated his invitation, the fact remains that his letter could be understood as a request to intensify the military intervention by the Russian Federation or, at the very least, confirmed the applicant’s support for that military intervention.

66 In the third place, as the Council observes, the wording used in the letters sent to France, Germany and Poland is not exactly the same as that used in the letter sent by the applicant to President Putin. It should be noted that the letters sent to France, Germany and Poland state as follows: ‘I believe that you, as a guarantor of the Agreement, should use your influence and opportunities to restore constitutional order, up to consideration of using a military or police peacekeeping mission to ensure the rule of law, peace, public order and protection of citizens of Ukraine from abuse of power, violence, open terror and political persecution.’ It should be borne in mind that, although, in those latter letters, recourse to a military or police peacekeeping mission is one of the options envisaged, the letter sent by the applicant to President Putin contains an express request for military intervention in Ukraine by the Russian Federation that does not set out any alternatives.

67 In those circumstances, the applicant’s arguments seeking to call into question the finding that he had requested military intervention by the Russian Federation must be rejected.

The finding that the applicant supported pro-Russian politicians who held public office in occupied Crimea

68 The applicant claims that he did not consent to the holding of political office in Crimea by a certain politician. He disputes that politician’s statement to the effect that the applicant had approved his candidacy for the position of Head of the Council of Ministers of the ‘Autonomous Republic’ of Crimea and argues that that statement is not credible because the applicant had left Ukraine before that politician’s candidacy was approved. He also criticises the Council for failing to verify whether the statement by the politician in question was true.

69 The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.

70 In that regard, it should be noted, as it was in the judgment of 10 September 2025, Yanukovych v Council (T‑643/22, not published, EU:T:2025:838), that, according to the information contained in exhibit 4 in the first WK files, on 27 February 2014, the applicant had approved a particular politician’s candidacy for the post of Head of the Council of Ministers of the ‘Autonomous Republic’ of Crimea. That exhibit is an article from the website of Tass of March 2016, which also states that a decree of April 2014 by President Putin had appointed the politician in question as acting Head of the Republic of Crimea. It is sufficient to note that the applicant merely denies the content of that article without in any way substantiating his position. Moreover, it must be noted that Annexes B.4 and B.5, produced by the Council in the context of the case that gave rise to the judgment of 10 September 2025, Yanukovych v Council (T‑643/22, not published, EU:T:2025:838), and appended to the application as Annex A.36, bear out the content of exhibit 4 in the first WK files.

71 Furthermore, as regards the applicant’s claim that it was not possible for him to give his consent to that politician’s candidacy on 27 February 2014 on the ground that the applicant had left Ukraine on 24 February 2014, it is sufficient to note, as the Council has done, that the applicant failed to demonstrate that it was impossible for him to give his consent from outside Ukraine.

72 In those circumstances, the applicant’s arguments seeking to call into question the Council’s finding that he supported pro-Russian politicians must be rejected.

The finding that in 2021 a new pre-trial investigation had been opened in Ukraine, according to which the applicant had deliberately reduced the defence capacity of Ukraine, particularly in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea

73 The applicant submits that the content of the four articles produced by the Council which state that he had organised a targeted reduction in Ukraine’s defence capability is incorrect and that the Council should have verified the credibility of those politically motivated accusations.

74 The applicant adds that the articles on which the Council relies refer briefly to the allegation apparently under investigation, the body supposedly carrying out the investigation and the maximum penalty on conviction, but make no reference to the length, the breadth or the scope of the investigation. Moreover, he considers that he was not officially informed of the investigation and received no notice of suspicion as required under the Ukrainian Code of Criminal Procedure. He claims that the Council did nothing to satisfy itself that his rights of defence and his right to effective judicial protection were respected in that investigation.

75 The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.

76 In that regard, it must be noted, as it was in the judgment of 10 September 2025, Yanukovych v Council (T‑643/22, not published, EU:T:2025:838), that, in order to substantiate the finding that the applicant and two of his former Defence ministers had deliberately reduced Ukraine’s defence capacity, in particular in the ‘Autonomous Republic’ of Crimea, the Council relied on exhibits 6 and 7 in the first WK files, namely two different media sources which the applicant has not demonstrated were unreliable sources. It is apparent from those documents that an investigation carried out by the main investigation department of the Ukrainian State Bureau of Investigation had shown that the applicant, together with two former Defence ministers, had organised a targeted reduction in Ukraine’s defence capability, for example by disbanding, reducing and relocating military units, during the period from 2012 to 2014. According to that investigation, such actions were carried out in particular in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, a circumstance which then facilitated its annexation by the Russian Federation.

77 The applicant does not dispute the existence of that investigation, but submits that he was not officially informed of it and received no notice of suspicion as required under the Ukrainian Code of Criminal Procedure, and that the Council should have satisfied itself that his rights of defence and his right to effective judicial protection were respected by the Ukrainian authorities in the investigation in question.

78 It should be noted, however, that, as the Council correctly states and contrary to the applicant’s claims, it is apparent from an article from the Promote Ukraine website of 25 June 2020, produced by the Council in the case that gave rise to the judgment of 10 September 2025, Yanukovych v Council (T‑643/22, not published, EU:T:2025:838), and appended to the application as Annex A.37, that the State Bureau of Investigation had summoned the applicant to appear before it on 18 June 2020 in connection with the investigation referred to above. In those circumstances, the applicant has not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the Council did not satisfy itself that his rights of defence and his right to effective judicial protection were respected in the context of that case.

79 For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that the applicant cannot rely, in that respect, on the grounds of the judgment of 30 March 2022, Yanukovych v Council (T‑291/20, not published, EU:T:2022:187). In that judgment, the Court found that the Council had not satisfied itself that the Ukrainian judicial authorities had respected the applicant’s rights of defence and right to effective judicial protection in the criminal proceedings on which it had relied in order to justify maintaining his name on the lists at issue in that case.

80 It should be noted that the judgment of 30 March 2022, Yanukovych v Council (T‑291/20, not published, EU:T:2022:187), concerned a different listing criterion, that is to say, the criterion aimed in particular at persons identified as being responsible for the misappropriation of Ukrainian State funds and persons responsible for human rights violations in Ukraine, and that the applicant’s name had been included on the list of persons subject to restrictive measures annexed to Council Decision 2014/119/CFSP of 5 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 66, p. 26) for the sole reason that he was subject to criminal proceedings brought by the Ukrainian authorities for the misappropriation of public funds or assets.

81 By contrast, in the present case, (i) the applicant’s name was included on the lists at issue on the basis of the (a) criterion, in so far as he was considered to be responsible for supporting or implementing actions or policies threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and the security and stability of that State; and, above all, (ii) the investigation by the Ukrainian State Bureau of Investigation referred to in the present case is only one of the items of evidence relevant to justifying the adoption of restrictive measures against him on the basis of the (a) criterion.

82 In those circumstances, the applicant’s claim that the Council did nothing to satisfy itself that his rights of defence and his right to effective judicial protection were respected is, in any event, ineffective because, even if it were found that the Council did not satisfy itself that those rights of the applicant had been respected by the Ukrainian authorities in the investigation referred to in paragraph 77 above, that investigation is only one of the items of evidence relevant to justifying the adoption of restrictive measures against him on the basis of the (a) criterion.

83 In the light of the foregoing, the applicant’s arguments seeking to call into question the Council’s finding that he had deliberately reduced Ukraine’s defence capability, in particular in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, must be rejected.

The finding that the applicant participated in a Russian operation aimed at replacing the Ukrainian President

84 The applicant denies having been involved in a Russian special operation aimed at replacing Ukrainian President Zelensky with the applicant. According to the applicant, the evidence produced by the Council is inconsistent. He relies in addition on a statement by the former Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine according to which the applicant was not involved in that operation aimed at replacing the Ukrainian President.

85 The applicant also denies that he travelled to Minsk (Belarus) at the beginning of March 2022 to participate in a meeting concerning a Russian special operation. He claims that the Council has failed to produce any witness statement whatsoever attributable to a named person establishing his involvement in or even the existence of such a meeting. In addition, he states that the aircraft that the Council claims belongs to him is in fact a business jet operated by NorthWest Air Company and can be chartered by anyone. Last, he submits that the numerous press articles produced by the Council all replicate the text of an article from Ukrainska Pravda and, consequently, are not separate, independent sources.

86 The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.

87 In the present case, it should be noted, as it was in the judgment of 10 September 2025, Yanukovych v Council (T‑643/22, not published, EU:T:2025:838), that several press articles indicate that, according to information from the Ukrainian intelligence services, the applicant was in Minsk at the beginning of March 2022 and that the Russian authorities were planning to install him as President of Ukraine (exhibits 16 to 20, 27 and 28 in the first WK files). It follows that the Council had at its disposal several consistent sources of information to support the finding set out in the reasons for listing.

88 As regards the argument that the information in the press articles on which the Council relied comes only from a single source, in addition to the observations already made in paragraphs 50 to 55 above, according to which, having regard to the situation referred to in paragraph 52 above, the Council cannot be criticised for relying mainly on press articles (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 September 2025, Yanukovych v Council, T‑643/22, not published, EU:T:2025:838, paragraph 56), it should be noted that the source in question forms part of the Ukrainian intelligence services. It cannot be a requirement that information which comes from a State’s intelligence services be confirmed by other sources in order to be found to be credible, in particular where, as in the present case, several media organisations themselves consider those services to be reliable sources and have reference to them as credible sources of information.

89 Furthermore, as noted in paragraph 111 of the judgment of 10 September 2025, Yanukovych v Council (T‑643/22, not published, EU:T:2025:838), exhibits 6, 7 and 9 in the second WK file confirm the information concerning the applicant’s involvement in the Russian operation intended to replace the Ukrainian Government. That circumstance is confirmed by a source belonging to The Washington Post newspaper, which relied on the results of a review of intercepted communications involving Russian intelligence officers and on interviews with senior Ukrainian, US and European officials. According to that evidence, the applicant was part of a group which met in Belarus at the beginning of March 2022, with a view to retaking power once the city of Kyiv was controlled by Russian forces.

90 In addition, as regards the alleged inconsistencies between the exhibits in relation to the precise date on which the applicant was in Minsk, it must be noted that, according to exhibit 28 in the first WK files, the applicant was in Minsk on 2 March 2022, and that it is apparent from the same exhibit that his aircraft flew between Moscow and Minsk on 7 March 2022. Contrary to the applicant’s claim, those two statements are not incompatible, in so far as it is entirely possible that the applicant travelled to Minsk by other means and that his plane arrived in the city of Minsk only after 2 March 2022. Consequently, no inconsistency between the exhibits can be found in that respect. Furthermore, as regards the applicant’s argument that the aircraft in question does not belong to him, it is sufficient to note that that fact cannot in any way demonstrate that he was not in Minsk at the beginning of March 2022. In any event, even if the precise date on which the applicant was in Minsk were incorrect, all the relevant exhibits indicate that he was in Minsk at the beginning of March 2022 in order to discuss a special operation by the Russian authorities intended to install him as President of Ukraine.

91 As regards the statement by the former Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, according to which the applicant was not envisaged by the Kremlin as being among the candidates to become President of Ukraine, it should be noted, as the Council has done, that that statement does not call into question the fact that the Ukrainian intelligence services had discovered that the applicant was in Minsk at the beginning of March 2022 in order to discuss the possibility of again becoming President of Ukraine. It must be noted that the statement on which the applicant relies was made on 14 April 2022 and he has not demonstrated that that statement concerned the operation in which he had taken part at the beginning of March 2022, aimed at replacing the serving President of Ukraine.

92 In addition, it should be observed, as the Council has done, that the applicant has not provided any other evidence to demonstrate that the information reported by the numerous media sources, regarding his involvement in a plan whereby he would replace the Ukrainian President at the beginning of March 2022, is inaccurate. The applicant’s arguments cannot therefore succeed.

93 Furthermore, it should be noted that the statements by the President of Chechnya, Mr Ramzan Kadyrov, requesting Ukrainian President Zelensky to do everything that Russia was asking of him and to transfer his powers to the applicant, support the argument that there was a Russian operation involving the applicant aimed at replacing the serving President of Ukraine.

94 In that regard, the applicant claims that Mr Kadyrov’s statements reflect only the latter’s personal view and do not justify the adoption of restrictive measures in respect of the applicant. He considers that the Council cannot regard Mr Kadyrov as a reliable witness in the light of the material in his file.

95 In the present case, it should be noted that exhibits 21 and 22 in the first WK files indicate that the President of Chechnya, Mr Kadyrov, contacted Ukrainian President Zelensky to request him to do everything that Russia was asking of him and to transfer his powers to the applicant. It is true that Mr Kadyrov’s statements cannot, in themselves, form the basis for restrictive measures against the applicant. However, given that, as is apparent from those statements, the applicant was supported by a political leader who approved of the actions of the President of the Russian Federation, the Council was entitled to find that those statements constituted additional evidence capable of demonstrating that the applicant is supporting actions and policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or stability or security in Ukraine.

96 In those circumstances, the applicant’s arguments should be rejected.

97 In the light of the foregoing, it must be held that, in view of the particular seriousness of the applicant’s actions during the period from 2012 to 2014 and his more recent involvement in a plan by the Russian authorities to replace the serving President of Ukraine at the beginning of March 2022, which also demonstrates continuity between the applicant’s previous situation and his situation when his name was initially included on the lists at issue and when it was maintained on those lists, the Council was entitled, without making an error of assessment, to maintain the applicant’s name on those lists under the (a) criterion (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 September 2025, Yanukovych v Council, T‑643/22, not published, EU:T:2025:838, paragraphs 92, 116 and 117).

98 It should also be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, with regard to the review of the lawfulness of a decision adopting restrictive measures, and having regard to their preventive nature, if the Courts of the European Union consider that, at the very least, one of the reasons mentioned is sufficiently detailed and specific, that it is substantiated and that it constitutes in itself a sufficient basis to support that decision, the fact that the same cannot be said of other such reasons cannot justify the annulment of that decision (see judgment of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited).

99 It follows that the applicant’s arguments seeking to call into question the other findings of fact set out in the statement of reasons are ineffective, in so far as the Council’s findings examined in paragraphs 60 to 95 above are sufficient to justify maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue under the (a) criterion (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 September 2025, Yanukovych v Council, T‑643/22, not published, EU:T:2025:838, paragraph 94).

100 That conclusion is not called into question by the applicant’s argument that the Council made an error of assessment in maintaining his name on the lists at issue on the basis of ‘past acts which [had] exhausted their effects at the time when they were carried out’ and froze his situation as it was in the past, thereby depriving the requisite periodic review of all practical effect.

101 In the present case, it should be noted that it follows from Article 6 of Decision 2014/145 that the latter is to be kept under constant review and is to be renewed, or amended as appropriate, if the Council deems that its objectives have not been met. Article 14(4) of Regulation No 269/2014 provides that the list in the annex to that regulation is to be reviewed at regular intervals and at least every 12 months.

102 It is necessary, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 40 above, to ascertain whether the context, the objectives of the restrictive measures and the applicant’s individual situation made it possible to maintain his name on the lists at issue.

103 As regards the general context linked to the situation in Ukraine, it should be noted that, at the time of the adoption of the September 2024 and March 2025 maintaining acts, that context had remained unchanged since the adoption of the initial acts in so far as concerns the threats to the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of that State.

104 Similarly, at the time of the adoption of the September 2024 and March 2025 maintaining acts, the restrictive measures were still justified in the light of the objective pursued, namely to exert maximum pressure on the Russian authorities so that they bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine and to the military aggression against that country, and to increase the costs of the actions of the Russian Federation to undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

105 In respect of the applicant’s individual situation, in the first place, it should be noted that he has not demonstrated that his situation had changed at the time of the adoption of the September 2024 and March 2025 maintaining acts, which are based on the same reasons for listing as those underlying the March 2024 maintaining acts and on the same evidence.

106 It should in fact be found that, in the context of the September 2024 and March 2025 maintaining acts, it is the reasons relating to the applicant’s particularly serious actions that remain decisive and sufficient to justify the maintenance of his name on the lists at issue, namely, during the period from 2012 to 2014, the request for Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine, the support for pro-Russian politicians holding public office in Crimea and the deliberate reduction of Ukraine’s defence capacity, all of which clearly contributed to the destabilisation of that country, and his more recent involvement in a plan to replace the serving President of Ukraine at the beginning of March 2022 (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 September 2025, Yanukovych v Council, T‑643/22, not published, EU:T:2025:838, paragraph 116).

107 In view of the particular seriousness of those actions, which contributed to the destabilisation of Ukraine, and in the absence of any position taken by the applicant to distance himself effectively from the Russian authorities and from their policy in Ukraine, it must be found, contrary to the applicant’s assertions, that the Council was entitled, at the time of the adoption of the September 2024 and March 2025 maintaining acts, to justify the maintenance of his name on the lists at issue by reference to those actions alone.

108 In the light of all the foregoing, the Council did not make an error of assessment when, on the dates on which the September 2024 and March 2025 acts were adopted, it found that the applicant was supporting actions or policies that undermined or threatened the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, within the meaning of the (a) criterion under Decision 2014/145, as amended.

109 Therefore, the single plea in law, alleging that the Council made an error of assessment when it decided to maintain the applicant’s name on the lists at issue by adopting the September 2024 and March 2025 maintaining acts, must be rejected.

110 In the light of all the foregoing, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

Costs

111 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

112 In the present case, since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Council.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)

hereby:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders Mr Viktor Fedorovych Yanukovych to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council of the European Union.

Buttigieg

Kancheva

Bestagno

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 30 September 2026.

V. Di Bucci

S. Papasavvas

Registrar

President

* Language of the case: English.