JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)

30 September 2026 (*)

( Common Foreign and Security Policy – Restrictive measures adopted in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine – Freezing of funds – Restrictions on entry into the territories of the Member States – List of persons, entities and bodies subject to the freezing of funds and economic resources and subject to restrictions on entry into the territories of the Member States – Maintenance of the applicant’s name on the list – Article 2(1)(a) of Decision 2014/145/CFSP – Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 – Error of assessment )

In Case T‑590/24,

Oleksandr Viktorovych Yanukovych, residing in Saint Petersburg (Russia), represented by B. Kennelly, Senior Counsel,

applicant,

v

Council of the European Union, represented by A. Boggio-Tomasaz and J. Rurarz, acting as Agents, assisted by B. Maingain, lawyer,

defendant,

THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber),

composed of E. Buttigieg, President, M. Kancheva and F. Bestagno (Rapporteur), Judges,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci,

having regard to the written part of the procedure, in particular the measure of organisation of procedure of 6 February 2026 inviting the parties to submit their observations on the appropriate conclusions to be drawn, for the present case, from the judgment of 10 September 2025, Yanukovych v Council (T‑642/22, not published, EU:T:2025:837), and the replies of the applicant and of the Council, lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 27 March and 26 March 2026 respectively,

having regard to the withdrawal by the applicant of his request for a hearing and having decided, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, to give a ruling without an oral part of the procedure,

gives the following

Judgment

1        By his action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Mr Oleksandr Viktorovych Yanukovych, seeks annulment of (i) Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/2456 of 12 September 2024 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L, 2024/2456) and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2455 of 12 September 2024 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L, 2024/2455) (together, ‘the September 2024 maintaining acts’) and (ii) Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/528 of 14 March 2025 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L, 2025/528) and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/527 of 14 March 2025 implementing Regulation No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L, 2025/527) (together, ‘the March 2025 maintaining acts’), in so far as all those acts (together, ‘the contested acts’) concern him.

 Background to the dispute and events subsequent to the bringing of the action

2        The applicant is the son of the former President of Ukraine.

3        The present case has arisen in the context of the restrictive measures adopted by the European Union in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

4        On 17 March 2014, on the basis of Article 29 TEU, the Council of the European Union adopted Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 16).

5        On the same date, on the basis of Article 215 TFEU, the Council adopted Regulation No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 6).

6        On 25 February 2022, in view of the seriousness of the situation in Ukraine, the Council adopted (i) Decision (CFSP) 2022/329 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 50, p. 1) and (ii) Regulation (EU) 2022/330 amending Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 51, p. 1) in order, inter alia, to amend the criteria by which natural or legal persons, entities or bodies could be made subject to the restrictive measures at issue.

7        Article 2(1) and (2) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, (‘Decision 2014/145, as amended’) is worded as follows:

‘1.      All funds and economic resources belonging to, or owned, held or controlled by:

(a)      natural persons responsible for, supporting or implementing actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or stability or security in Ukraine, or which obstruct the work of international organisations in Ukraine;

…

(e)      natural or legal persons, entities or bodies conducting transactions with the separatist groups in the Donbas region of Ukraine;

…

and natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them, as listed in the Annex, shall be frozen.

2.      No funds or economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in the Annex.’

8        The detailed rules for the freezing of those funds are set out in the subsequent paragraphs of Article 2 of Decision 2014/145.

9        Article 1(1)(a) and (c) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, prohibits the entry into, or transit through, the territories of the Member States of natural persons who satisfy essentially the same criteria as those set out in Article 2(1)(a) and (e) of that decision.

10      Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/330, requires the adoption of measures to freeze funds and lays down the detailed rules governing the freezing of those funds in terms that are, in essence, identical to those of Decision 2014/145, as amended. Article 3(1)(a) to (g) of that regulation essentially reproduces Article 2(1)(a) to (g) of that decision.

11      By letters of 25 February and 8 July 2022, the Council informed the applicant of its intention to add his name to the lists annexed to Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/330, and to Decision 2014/145, as amended, (‘the lists at issue’), and sent him the files bearing the references WK 1272/2022 (‘the first WK file’), WK 1272/2022 ADD 1 REV 1 and WK 1272/2022 ADD 2 REV 1 (‘the first WK ADD 2 file’) (together, ‘the first WK files’).

12      On 4 August 2022, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/1355 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 204 I, p. 4) and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1354 implementing Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 204 I, p. 1) (together, ‘the initial acts’).

13      The reasons for the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue are as follows:

‘Oleksandr Yanukovych is a businessman and the son of former President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych. During the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych and thanks to the personal connection with a group of persons close to his father, he assembled an array of business interests and accumulated a great fortune. He still runs his business activities in the Donba[s] region controlled by the separatists groups, especially in the energy, coal, construction, banking and real estate sectors. In particular, thanks to close ties with the pro-Russian separatists, he acquired key economic assets in the so-called “Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics”, inter alia in the energy, coal and real-estate sectors. The separatist OPLOT battalion (listed since February 2015) protected his real-estate development projects in the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic”.

Therefore, Oleksandr Yanukovych is responsible for supporting or implementing actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and he conducted transactions with the separatist groups in the Donbas region of Ukraine.

Furthermore, he is associated with his father Viktor Yanukovych, who is responsible for supporting or implementing actions or policies which threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, as well as the state’s stability and security.’

14      On 14 September 2022, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/1530 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 239, p. 149) and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1529 implementing Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 239, p. 1) (together, ‘the September 2022 maintaining acts’), which extended the measures taken against the applicant until 15 March 2023 without making any changes to the reasons for including his name on the lists at issue in comparison with the reasons set out in the initial acts.

15      By letter of 22 December 2022, the Council informed the applicant that it intended to extend the restrictive measures taken against him for the same reasons as those set out in the initial acts and sent him the file bearing the reference WK 17598/2022 REV 1 (‘the second WK file’).

16      By Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/572 of 13 March 2023 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2023 L 75 I, p. 134) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/571 of 13 March 2023 implementing Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2023 L 75 I, p. 1), the restrictive measures taken against the applicant were extended until 15 September 2023. By letter of 14 March 2023, the Council informed the applicant of its decision.

17      By letters of 19 June and 18 August 2023, the Council informed the applicant that it intended to extend the restrictive measures taken against him and sent him the files bearing the references WK 7868/2023 and WK 10556/2023 (‘the third WK files’).

18      By Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1767 of 13 September 2023 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2023 L 226, p. 104) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1765 of 13 September 2023 implementing Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2023 L 226, p. 3) (together, ‘the September 2023 maintaining acts’), the restrictive measures taken against the applicant were extended until 15 March 2024. By letter of 15 September 2023, the Council informed the applicant of its decision.

19      The reasons for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue were amended as follows:

‘Oleksandr Yanukovych is a businessperson and the son of former President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych.

During the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych and thanks to the personal connection with a group of persons close to his father, he assembled an array of business interests and accumulated a great fortune.

He still runs his business activities in the Donba[s] region controlled by the separatist groups, especially in the energy, coal, construction, banking and real estate sectors. In particular, thanks to close ties with the pro-Russian separatists, he acquired key economic assets in the so-called “Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics”, inter alia in the energy, coal and real-estate sectors.

The separatist OPLOT battalion (listed since February 2015) protected his real-estate development projects in the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic”.

Oleksandr Yanukovych’s MAKO Holding company was officially transferred to Russian jurisdiction and is now registered in Donetsk. Prior to the transition to Russian jurisdiction, the MAKO group of companies was de jure under Ukrainian jurisdiction.

Therefore, Oleksandr Yanukovych is responsible for supporting or implementing actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and he conducted transactions with the separatist groups in the Donbas region of Ukraine.

Furthermore, he is associated with his father Viktor Yanukovych, who is responsible for supporting or implementing actions or policies which threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, as well as the state’s stability and security.’

20      By letters of 21 December 2023 and 8 February 2024, the Council informed the applicant that it intended to extend the restrictive measures taken against him for the same reasons as those set out in the September 2023 maintaining acts and sent him the files bearing references WK 16833/2023 and WK 5142/2023 ADD 2.

21      By Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/847 of 12 March 2024 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ L, 2024/847) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/849 of 12 March 2024 implementing Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ L, 2024/849) (together, ‘the March 2024 maintaining acts’), the restrictive measures taken against the applicant were extended until 15 September 2024. By letter of 13 March 2024, the Council informed the applicant of its decision.

22      By letter of 27 June 2024, the Council informed the applicant that it intended to extend the restrictive measures against him for the same reasons as those set out in the September 2023 maintaining acts and sent him the file bearing the reference WK 8599/2024 (‘the fifth WK file’).

23      On 12 September 2024, the Council adopted the September 2024 maintaining acts, extending the restrictive measures taken against the applicant until 15 March 2025 for the same reasons as those set out in paragraph 19 above. By letter of 13 September 2024, the Council informed the applicant of its decision.

24      On 14 March 2025, the Council adopted the March 2025 maintaining acts, extending the restrictive measures taken against the applicant until 15 September 2025 for the same reasons as those set out in paragraph 19 above. By letter of 17 March 2025, the Council informed the applicant of its decision.

25      By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 14 October 2022, the applicant sought, pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, annulment of the initial acts and, following the modification of that application, of the maintaining acts of September 2022, March 2023, September 2023 and March 2024. By the judgment of 10 September 2025, Yanukovych v Council (T‑642/22, not published, EU:T:2025:837), the Court dismissed the action in its entirety.

 Forms of order sought

26      In the final form of his pleadings, the applicant claims that the Court should:

–        annul the contested acts in so far as they concern him;

–        order the Council to pay the costs.

27      The Council claims that the Court should:

–        dismiss the action;

–        order the applicant to pay the costs.

 Law

28      The applicant relies on a single plea in law in support of his action. He submits that the Council made a manifest error of assessment in maintaining his name on the lists at issue by adopting the September 2024 and March 2025 maintaining acts.

29      The Council disputes the merits of that plea in law.

 Preliminary observations

30      As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the single plea in law raised by the applicant must be regarded as alleging an error of assessment rather than a manifest error of assessment. Whilst it is true that the Council has a degree of discretion to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether the legal criteria on which the restrictive measures at issue are based are met, the Courts of the European Union must ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all EU acts (see judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 121 and the case-law cited).

31      Next, it must be noted that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires, inter alia, that the Courts of the European Union are to ensure that the decision by which restrictive measures were adopted or maintained, which affects the person or entity concerned individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119, and of 5 November 2014, Mayaleh v Council, T‑307/12 and T‑408/13, EU:T:2014:926, paragraph 128).

32      Such an assessment must be carried out by examining the evidence and information not in isolation but in their context. The Council discharges the burden of proof borne by it if it presents to the EU Courts a sufficiently specific, precise and consistent body of evidence to establish that there is a sufficient link between the entity subject to a measure freezing its funds and the regime or, in general, the situations, being combated (see judgment of 20 July 2017, Badica and Kardiam v Council, T‑619/15, EU:T:2017:532, paragraph 99 and the case-law cited).

33      It is the task of the competent EU authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded. It is however necessary that the information or evidence produced should support the reasons relied on against the person concerned (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 121 and 122, and of 3 July 2014, National Iranian Tanker Company v Council, T‑565/12, EU:T:2014:608, paragraph 57).

34      In that regard, it should be noted that the context of the measures at issue must be taken into account and the standard of proof which may be required of the Council must be adapted in the light of the difficulty of obtaining evidence and objective information (see judgment of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 102 and the case-law cited).

35      Moreover, it is clear from the recent case-law of the Court of Justice that the Council is not precluded from taking into account, in order to assess whether a person satisfies a listing criterion such as the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(a) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, (‘the (a) criterion’), information or evidence relating to circumstances prior to the date of the adoption of the act imposing or maintaining restrictive measures, provided that that information or evidence supports the reasons for that act and contributes to establishing that, despite the passage of time and in view of all the relevant circumstances specific to each case, the person concerned satisfies the listing criterion at issue. In particular, it cannot be ruled out that such information and evidence may be taken into account in order to establish, in the light of the listing criterion concerned, continuity between, on the one hand, the previous situation of the person concerned and, on the other hand, his or her current situation (see judgment of 13 March 2025, Shuvalov v Council, C‑271/24 P, EU:C:2025:180, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).

36      Furthermore, it should be noted that restrictive measures are of a precautionary and, by definition, provisional nature, and that their validity always depends on whether the factual and legal circumstances which led to their adoption continue to apply and on the need to persist with them in order to achieve their objective. It is thus for the Council, in the course of its periodic review of those restrictive measures, to conduct an updated assessment of the situation and to appraise the impact of such measures, in order to determine whether they have made it possible to attain the objectives pursued by the initial inclusion of the names of the persons and entities concerned on the list in question or whether the same conclusion in respect of those persons and entities can still be drawn (see judgments of 27 April 2022, Ilunga Luyoyo v Council, T‑108/21, EU:T:2022:253, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited, and of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited).

37      In order to justify maintaining a person’s name on the list in question, the Council is not prohibited from basing its decision on the same evidence justifying the initial inclusion, re-inclusion or previous retention of the name of the person concerned on that list, provided that (i) the reasons for listing remain unchanged and (ii) the context has not changed in such a way that that evidence is now out of date (judgment of 23 September 2020, Kaddour v Council, T‑510/18, EU:T:2020:436, paragraph 99). That context includes not only the situation of the country in respect of which the system of restrictive measures was established, but also the particular situation of the person concerned (see judgments of 9 June 2021, Borborudi v Council, T‑580/19, EU:T:2021:330, paragraph 60 (not published) and the case-law cited, and of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited).

38      It is in the light of the foregoing that it is necessary to examine whether the Council made an error of assessment in deciding to maintain the applicant’s name on the lists at issue.

 The evidence produced by the Council

39      In the present case, in order to justify the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, the Council provided the documents in the first WK file, which include the following material:

–        a press article published in May 2019 on the website of Narodna Pravda (exhibit 1);

–        a press article published in May 2019 on the website of Fakty ta Komentari (exhibit 2);

–        a press article published in March 2015 on the website of NV Biznes (exhibit 3);

–        a press article published in July 2015 on the website of Gordon (exhibit 4);

–        an undated extract from the ‘yanukovich.info’ website (exhibit 5);

–        a press article published in December 2014 on the website of NV (exhibit 6);

–        a press article published in February 2018 on the website of Rosbalt (exhibit 7);

–        a press article published in October 2016 on the website of Ekonomicheskaya Pravda (exhibit 8);

–        a press article published in January 2020 on the website of Radio Svoboda (exhibit 9).

40      The file WK 1272/2022 ADD 1 REV 1 referred to in paragraph 11 above contains the following evidence:

–        a press article published in March 2022 on the website of Fortune (exhibit 1);

–        a press article published in March 2022 on the website of Firstpost (exhibit 2);

–        a press article published in March 2022 on the website of ABTC (exhibit 3);

–        another press article published in March 2022 on the website of ABTC (exhibit 4);

–        a press article published in March 2022 on the website of Asia ABC (exhibit 5).

41      The first WK ADD 2 file contains the following evidence:

–        a press article published in December 2014 on the website of Reuters (exhibit 1);

–        a press article published in December 2014 on the ‘argumentua.com’ website (exhibit 2);

–        another press article published in December 2014 on the ‘argumentua.com’ website (exhibit 3);

–        a press article published in December 2014 on the website of ‘radiosvoboda.org’ (exhibit 4);

–        a press article published in December 2014 on the website of the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (‘occrp.org’) (exhibit 5);

–        a press article published in December 2014 on the ‘ukrrudprom.com’ website (exhibit 6);

–        an extract from the ‘genshtab.info’ website of December 2014 (exhibit 7).

42      In order to justify the adoption of the September 2022 maintaining acts, the Council relied on the same evidence as that set out in the first WK files.

43      In relation to the March 2023 maintaining acts referred to in paragraph 16 above, the Council produced the second WK file, consisting of a press article from the website of Politeka of April 2022 and a tweet by a journalist from April 2020.

44      In relation to the September 2023 maintaining acts, the Council took into account the third WK files, consisting of a press article published in February 2023 on the website of RIA and an official note from the Ukrainian security service (SBU) from July 2023.

45      In relation to the March 2024 maintaining acts, the Council relied on the files WK 16833/2023 and WK 5142/2023 ADD 2 referred to in paragraph 20 above, consisting of an extract dated November 2023 from the Spark Interfax database, providing evidence of the fact that the applicant is a co-owner of the company MAKO HOLDING LLC (‘MAKO’), a press article published in April 2023 on the ‘kommersant.ru’ website and a file containing 26 exhibits relating to the business environment and the economy of the Russian Federation.

46      In relation to the September 2024 maintaining acts, the Council relied on the fifth WK file, consisting of an extract dated April 2024 from the Spark Interfax database, providing evidence of the fact that the applicant is a co-owner of MAKO and of the company CAPITAL BUILDING COOPERATION LTD, a press article published in February 2023 on the ‘gazeta.ru’ website and an extract from the ‘rupep.org’ website.

47      Last, in order to justify the adoption of the March 2025 maintaining acts, the Council relied on the same evidence as that set out in the WK files provided previously and referred to in paragraphs 39 to 46 above.

 Reliability and credibility of the evidence

48      The applicant calls into question, in essence, the reliability and relevance of the sources used by the Council as the basis for maintaining his name on the lists at issue.

49      The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.

50      In that regard, it must be recalled that, in accordance with settled case-law, the activity of the Courts of the European Union is governed by the principle of the unfettered assessment of the evidence, and it is only the reliability of the evidence before the Court which is decisive when it comes to the assessment of its value. In order to assess the probative value of a document, regard should be had to the credibility of the information it sets out and, in particular, to the person from whom the document originates, the circumstances in which it came into being, the person to whom it was addressed and whether, on its face, the document appears to be sound and reliable (see judgments of 31 May 2018, Kaddour v Council, T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316, paragraph 107 and the case-law cited, and of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraph 95 (not published) and the case-law cited).

51      In the absence of investigative powers in third countries, the assessment of the EU authorities must rely on publicly available sources of information, reports, articles in the press, intelligence reports or other similar sources of information (judgments of 14 March 2018, Kim and Others v Council and Commission, T‑533/15 and T‑264/16, EU:T:2018:138, paragraph 107, and of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 59).

52      Furthermore, it must be observed that the conflict situation involving the Russian Federation and Ukraine makes it particularly difficult in practice to access certain sources, to specify the primary source of some information and, where appropriate, to collect testimonies from persons who agree to be identified. The ensuing investigative difficulties can thus be a factor in preventing the provision of specific evidence and objective information (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 116).

53      In the present case, the applicant cannot dispute the reliability and credibility of the exhibits which make up the WK files referred to in paragraphs 39 to 46 above merely by claiming, in the abstract, that they consist mainly of press articles. In view of the situation referred to in paragraph 52 above, the Council cannot in fact be criticised for relying mainly on press articles (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 September 2025, Yanukovych v Council, T‑642/22, not published, EU:T:2025:837, paragraph 56).

54      As regards the arguments raised by the applicant in respect of the information set out in certain exhibits in the WK files referred to in paragraphs 39 to 46 above on the ground that the information is irrelevant or incorrect, those arguments should be found to fall within the scope of the examination of whether the Council’s factual basis is sufficient to justify the inclusion and maintenance of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 September 2025, Yanukovych v Council, T‑642/22, not published, EU:T:2025:837, paragraph 57) and they will be examined, if appropriate, below, in the context of analysing the application of the (a) criterion to the applicant.

55      In the light of the foregoing, in view of the context of the war and in the absence on the part of the Council of investigative powers in third countries (see paragraph 51 above), and in the absence of other arguments raised by the applicant capable of calling into question the reliability and credibility of the sources used by the Council, that claim by the applicant must be rejected (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 September 2025, Yanukovych v Council, T‑642/22, not published, EU:T:2025:837, paragraph 58).

 Error of assessment

56      It should be noted, first of all, that, in the present case, the applicant is challenging the lawfulness of the September 2024 and March 2025 maintaining acts. The Court’s review therefore concerns only those acts. It should also be noted that, as indicated in paragraphs 46 and 47 above, in order to justify adopting the September 2024 maintaining acts, the Council relied on the fifth WK file, consisting of an extract dated April 2024 from the Spark Interfax database, a press article published in February 2023 on the ‘gazeta.ru’ website and an extract from the ‘rupep.org’ website, and, in order to justify adopting the March 2025 maintaining acts, it relied on the same evidence as that set out in the WK files provided previously.  It is therefore necessary to determine whether, on the basis of that evidence, the Council was entitled to maintain the applicant’s listing in the September 2024 and March 2025 maintaining acts.

57      In the absence of an express reference, in the contested acts, to the legal provisions which served as the basis for maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, the listing criterion or criteria used by the Council must be inferred from the contents of the reasons, such as the reasons set out in paragraph 19 above.

58      It is in fact clear from the reasons for the initial acts and for the maintaining acts that, as the applicant and the Council state in their written submissions, the applicant’s name was included on the lists at issue on the basis of the following three criteria: (i) under the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(a) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, in so far as the Council found that he was responsible for supporting or implementing actions or policies undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (‘the (a) criterion’); (ii) under the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(e) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, in so far as the Council found that he had conducted transactions with the separatist groups in the Donbas region of Ukraine; and (iii) under Article 2(1), in fine, of Decision 2014/145, as amended, in so far as the Council stated that he was associated with his father, Mr Viktor Yanukovych.

59      It is appropriate to examine first of all the applicant’s arguments relating to the (a) criterion.

60      It is necessary, as a preliminary point, to note that the Council considers that the reasons for including and maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue on the basis of the (a) criterion are linked, in particular, to his support for the actions or policies undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or stability or security in Ukraine.

61      In that regard, it should be noted that the (a) criterion requires that a link, whether direct or indirect, be established between the activities or actions of the person or entity concerned and the situation in Ukraine that gave rise to the adoption of the restrictive measures at issue. In other words, those persons must, through their conduct, have been responsible for actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or for supporting those actions or policies (judgment of 10 September 2025, Yanukovych v Council, T‑642/22, not published, EU:T:2025:837, paragraph 63).

62      The applicant submits, in essence, that the evidence on which the Council relies is not capable of demonstrating to the requisite legal standard that the conditions laid down by the (a) criterion are satisfied.

63      It is therefore necessary to examine whether the Council had at its disposal a body of evidence that was sufficiently specific, precise and consistent to justify maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue on the basis of the (a) criterion. In that regard, in line with the approach followed in the context of the judgment of 10 September 2025, Yanukovych v Council (T‑642/22, not published, EU:T:2025:837), it should be noted that, in essence, the reasons on the basis of which the applicant’s name was included on those lists at issue under the (a) criterion relate, in the first place, to the fact that he was engaged in economic activities in the Donbas region controlled by the separatist groups and, in the second place, to the fact that he allegedly acquired and manages economic assets by virtue of his close links with those separatist groups.

 Management of economic activities in the Donbas region

64      In the first place, as regards the economic activities which, according to the Council, the applicant manages in the Donbas region controlled by the separatist groups, the applicant submits that the financial assets and companies which he owned in that region dated back to a period well before 2014 and had been frozen since then. The financial statements, tax returns and statistical reports of the companies in which he held shares prove that he is no longer engaged in any activities in the region. Moreover, the applicant emphasises that he does not own and has never owned or held any interest in energy sector assets in the ‘Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics’. The applicant states that the documents on which the Council relied recount mere supposition and unsubstantiated ‘rumour’, which are not capable of supporting the inclusion of a name on the lists at issue.

65      In that regard, first of all, it should be noted that, in respect of the applicant’s argument that the financial assets and companies which he owned in the Donbas region had been frozen since 2014, that circumstance does not demonstrate that he is no longer engaged in any activities in that region. Even though his assets are subject to the restrictive measures imposed by the Ukrainian authorities, the fact that it is impossible for those authorities to ensure that those measures are applied in the Donbas region renders those fund-freezing measures ineffective. Consequently, the applicant remained capable of carrying on an economic activity in that region.

66      Next, certain documents confirm that the applicant continued to be engaged in economic activities in the Donbas region after the events of early 2014.

67      It is appropriate, in particular, to refer, first, to exhibit 1 in the first WK ADD 2 file, namely an article of December 2014 from the international press agency Reuters, which states that the Ukrainian Minister for the Interior considered that the applicant was a powerful force behind a businessman who was accused of having taken control of several major metallurgical, chemical and energy plants in the Donbas areas held by the separatists, with the support of the pro-Russian separatists, that it was the applicant who had made all the decisions, and that the businessman in question and the applicant operated as one group.

68      As regards, in particular, the testimony of the Ukrainian Minister for the Interior, set out in exhibit 1 in the first WK ADD 2 file, it must be noted, as the Council has done, that it is not because the person concerned is an opponent of the applicant’s father that his statements are unreliable. Furthermore, the information which he provided to the Reuters press agency concerning the close links between the applicant and the businessman referred to above is corroborated by other sources. For example, in 2013, the Centre for Eastern Studies (Warsaw, Poland) stated that Vetek, a company owned by that businessman, was, in all likelihood, a representative of the interests of the ‘family’, an informal oligarchic group associated with the applicant (see Annex B.1 to the defence in Case T‑642/22). In addition, in an article of March 2014, the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) stated that, according to prosecutors, the applicant was the actual owner of certain assets of the Vetek conglomerate (see Annex B.2 to the defence in Case T‑642/22).

69      Second, exhibits 2 and 3 in the first WK ADD 2 file, namely two press articles from the ‘argumentua.com’ website of December 2014, confirm the applicant’s interest in the gas industry in the Donbas region and indicate that he had received licences by virtue of agreements between his father and the owner of the Zasyadko coal mine in Donetsk, without the statutory public procurement procedures.

70      Third, exhibit 5 in the first WK ADD 2 file, namely a press article from the website of the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (‘occrp.org’) of December 2014, refers to the applicant’s attempts to establish links with Donetsk officials and to increase his influence in the region by offering them high-level positions in his company MAKO.

71      Fourth, exhibit 6 in the first WK file, which is a press article from December 2014, states that the applicant’s company, MAKO, continues to implement real estate projects in Donetsk and that those construction projects are generally guarded by militants belonging to the illegal armed formation OPLOT, which is controlled by the ‘Prime Minister’ of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’.

72      Fifth, exhibit 4 in the first WK file, namely a press article published in July 2015 on the website of Gordon, refers to an interview with the Governor of Donetsk in which he confirms that the applicant owns assets in the coal sector in that region, whether directly or indirectly.

73      Sixth, exhibit 2 in the first WK file, namely a press article published in May 2019 on the website of Fakty ta Komentari, states that some of the energy sector companies in the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ were ‘handed over’ to the applicant. The handover related, in particular, to the Zuivska thermal power plant, Enerhiya Donbassa.

74      Seventh, a press article from the website of Politeka published in April 2022, produced by the Council in the second WK file, states, in essence, that the applicant’s company, through other individuals, received the Chaikino mine in ORDLO with coal reserves of 100 million tonnes.

75      Eighth, in relation to the inclusion of MAKO on the Russian register of legal persons, it should be noted that the evidence produced by the applicant (see in particular Annex A.98) shows that all the real estate held by MAKO was seized; that the person presented as being the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ was appointed as a ‘temporary administrator’; and that the legal entities within the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ were automatically placed on the Russian register in question. However, it should also be noted that the evidence provided by the Council in the third WK files indicates that on 17 January 2023 MAKO lodged an application to enter information in the Russian register of legal persons, which was accepted by what is presented as being the federal tax office of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’. That latter piece of information, provided by RIA Novosti, a press agency based in Russia, is confirmed by an official note from the SBU. Furthermore, the Russian Federation legislation providing for the re-registration of Ukrainian companies in the Russian Trade and Companies Register expressly provides that, in order to be included in that register, legal entities must ensure that the instruments of incorporation of the company in question comply with Russian law, and those entities must actively make a request for registration to the competent authorities (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 September 2025, Yanukovych v Council, T‑642/22, not published, EU:T:2025:837, paragraph 125).

76      The evidence submitted by the Council is, therefore, sufficient to conclude that the applicant requested and obtained the transfer of the head office of his company to the jurisdiction of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’.

77      In those circumstances, it must be noted that, contrary to the applicant’s claim, a number of sources confirm that he continued to carry on activities in the Donbas region after the events of early 2014.

 The acquisition and management of economic assets by virtue of close links with the separatist groups

78      In the second place, as regards the finding that the applicant, in essence, acquired and managed economic assets by virtue of his close links with the separatist groups, the applicant submits that it is incorrect and is called into question by the fact that, in June 2015, separatist militants had carried out attacks on the National Development Bank, which he owns, and that the delivery of humanitarian aid to Donbas residents by his charitable foundation had, moreover, been blocked by separatist groups. The applicant states, with regard to the acquisition of assets, that the complete lack of detail in the statement in question means that it is practically impossible to determine the evidence on which the Council relied. It is unclear what ‘key economic assets’ he purportedly acquired and when. The applicant adds that all the allegations suggesting that he was able to acquire or operate assets in the ‘Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics’, whether directly or indirectly, are based on mere supposition and rumour, some of which comes from unattributed sources, and that the majority of the press articles date back several years.

79      In that regard, it must be noted, first, that the applicant’s assertion that separatist groups blocked the delivery, by his charitable foundation, of humanitarian aid to Donbas residents is completely unsubstantiated and that circumstance cannot therefore be regarded as having been established.

80      Second, as regards the attack carried out by separatist militants on the National Development Bank, belonging to the applicant, in June 2015, it must be noted that he has produced an article from the Ukrainian online publication Obozrevatel which confirms the robbery at his bank. However, it must be noted that the robbery in question does not necessarily demonstrate that the applicant does not have close links with the pro-Russian separatists. The same article produced by the applicant states that even though that robbery had been carried out with the backing of certain employees of the Ministry of State of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’, it was carried out to further the personal interests of some of those employees. Consequently, it must be held that the fact that separatist militants perpetrated attacks on the National Development Bank, which is owned by the applicant, is not sufficient to undermine the assertion that he has close links with the pro-Russian separatists.

81      Third, as regards the finding that the separatist OPLOT battalion protected the applicant’s real estate development projects in the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’, he claims that the press article from which the information originates contains only an oral allegation that is not confirmed by evidence.

82      In that regard, it should be noted that the article to which the applicant refers is exhibit 6 in the first WK file, namely a press article from the website of NV of December 2014, which states that, according to the Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, the MAKO construction sites in Donetsk were guarded by militants belonging to the OPLOT battalion.

83      It must be observed, as the Council does, that the applicant has not explained why the statements by the Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine should be regarded as being not credible. In addition, the link between the applicant and the OPLOT group is supported by another press article published in December 2014 on the ‘censor.net’ website, produced by the Council as Annex B.12 in the case that gave rise to the judgment of 10 September 2025, Yanukovych v Council (T‑642/22, not published, EU:T:2025:837), and appended to the application as Annex A.45, according to which the OPLOT group was financed by the applicant.

84      The applicant submits, in that regard, that he brought successful legal proceedings against the Ukrainian security services in connection with statements falsely alleging that he had financed or provided instructions to a separatist organisation. However, it should be noted that the decision of the Kyiv Court of Appeal, produced by the applicant as Annex A.93, is not relevant in the present case. That decision, which states that the Ukrainian security services publicly communicated incorrect information regarding the applicant, concerns revelations relating to the link between the latter and an organisation called ‘Young Regionalists’. Furthermore, the decision in question does not refer to the separatist group OPLOT and relates to information provided by the Ukrainian security services rather than by the media outlet on the ‘censor.net’ website, which revealed the link between the applicant and the OPLOT group.

85      In those circumstances, the applicant’s arguments seeking to call into question the finding that the OPLOT separatist battalion protected his real estate development projects in the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ likewise cannot succeed.

86      Fourth, as regards the other evidence demonstrating the applicant’s close links with the separatist groups and his acquisition of economic assets in the Donbas region by virtue of those links, reference should be made, inter alia, to exhibit 7 in the first WK file, consisting in a press article from the website of Rosbalt of February 2018, which states that the applicant financed separatists in Donbas. In that article, a former Member of the Russian State Duma indicates that ‘the initial phase of what was happening in Donbas with the formation of the DPR [“Donetsk People’s Republic”] and the LPR [“Lugansk People’s Republic”] was financed by Oleksandr Yanukovych’.

87      It is also appropriate to refer to exhibits 1 and 2 in the first WK file, which attest to the meeting, in May 2019, between the applicant and two politicians, described as the ‘Prime Minister’ and the ‘Deputy Prime Minister’ of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’, which is supported by the Russian Government. In that regard, it should be noted, as the Council does, that, although it is true that the seizure of control of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ is described as a probable reason for the applicant’s visit to Donetsk, the fact that he met those two politicians is presented as certain by both Narodna Pravda (exhibit 1 in the first WK file) and Fakty ta Komentari (exhibit 2 in the first WK file). In addition, as exhibit 2 in the first WK file indicates, another channel, Donetsk Aborigen, also referred to the applicant’s visit to Donetsk. It should also be noted that that exhibit 2 states that, in the context of that visit, some of the energy sector companies in the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ were ‘handed over’ to the applicant. The handover related, in particular, to the Zuivska thermal power plant, Enerhiya Donbassa.

88      Fifth, it should be noted that a press article from the website of RIA from February 2023 and an official note from the SBU from July 2023 show that on 17 January 2023 MAKO lodged an application to enter information in the Russian register of legal persons, and that it was accepted by the federal tax office of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’. In addition, it cannot credibly be argued that the applicant is the sole shareholder of the companies MAKO, Capital Building Corporation and Fin Asset, which are registered under Ukrainian law at Kramatorsk (Ukraine), but has no link with the companies with the same names registered a few kilometres away at Donetsk, under Russian law.

89      In the light of all of the foregoing, it must be held, as it was in the judgment of 10 September 2025, Yanukovych v Council (T‑642/22, not published, EU:T:2025:837), that the Council did not make an error of assessment in finding, in essence, that the applicant was engaged in economic activities in the Donbas region controlled by the separatist groups and had acquired and was managing economic assets by virtue of his close links with those separatist groups.

90      Accordingly, it must be held that the evidence referred to above is capable of constituting a specific, precise and consistent body of evidence capable of establishing, under the (a) criterion, that the applicant supports actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

91      That conclusion is not called into question by the applicant’s argument that the Council maintained his name on the lists at issue on the basis of historical allegations.

92      It must be noted, in that regard, that the Council may take into account, in order to assess whether a person satisfies a listing criterion such as the (a) criterion, information or evidence relating to circumstances prior to the date of the adoption of the act imposing or maintaining restrictive measures, provided that that information or evidence supports the reasons for that act and contributes to establishing that, despite the passage of time and in view of all the relevant circumstances specific to each case, the person concerned satisfies the listing criterion at issue. In particular, it cannot be ruled out that such information and evidence may be taken into account in order to establish, in the light of the listing criterion concerned, continuity between, on the one hand, the previous situation of the person concerned and, on the other hand, his or her current situation (see judgment of 13 March 2025, Shuvalov v Council, C‑271/24 P, EU:C:2025:180, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).

93      In the present case, it should be noted that certain items of evidence used to justify the adoption of the contested acts in respect of the applicant’s economic activities in the Donbas region controlled by the separatist groups and his close links with those groups relate to circumstances prior to the date of the adoption of those contested acts, namely the period between 2014 and 2019. However, it should be noted that one of the items of evidence which the Council provided subsequently, specifically a press article from the website of Politeka published in April 2022, indicates that the applicant’s company, through other individuals, received the Chaikino mine in ORDLO. In addition, it must be noted that, as stated in paragraphs 75 and 88 above, certain items of evidence provided by the Council show that the application to enter information in the Russian register of legal persons, lodged by MAKO on 17 January 2023, was accepted by the federal tax office of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’. Last, that circumstance is also confirmed by exhibit 2 in the fifth WK file, namely a press article published in February 2023 on the ‘gazeta.ru’ website (Annex A.43), and by exhibits 1 and 3 in the fifth WK file, dating from March and April 2024, which refer to the applicant as being the owner of MAKO. In those circumstances, the evidence referred to confirms the information contained in a number of exhibits in the first WK files, and thereby demonstrates continuity between the applicant’s previous situation and his situation at the time when his name was maintained on the lists at issue in September 2024 and March 2025.

94      Consequently, it must be found that the applicant has not demonstrated that he has ceased all economic activity in the Donbas region and, above all, that he has severed all close ties with the separatist groups controlling that region. In those circumstances, the applicant’s argument that the Council maintained his name on the lists at issue on the basis of historical allegations cannot succeed.

95      In the light of the foregoing, it must be found that, in view of the fact that the applicant is engaged in economic activities in the Donbas region controlled by the separatist groups and acquired and manages economic assets by virtue of his close links with those groups, which also demonstrates continuity between his previous situation and his situation at the time when his name was maintained on the lists at issue, the Council was entitled, without making an error of assessment, to include and maintain his name on the lists at issue under the (a) criterion (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 September 2025, Yanukovych v Council, T‑642/22, not published, EU:T:2025:837, paragraphs 92, 127 and 128).

96      That conclusion is not called into question by the applicant’s argument that the Council made an error of assessment in maintaining his name on the lists at issue on the basis of ‘past acts which [had] exhausted their effects at the time when they were carried out’ and froze his situation as it was in the past, thereby depriving the requisite periodic review of all practical effect.

97      In the present case, it should be noted that it follows from Article 6 of Decision 2014/145 that the latter is to be kept under constant review and is to be renewed, or amended as appropriate, if the Council deems that its objectives have not been met. Article 14(4) of Regulation No 269/2014 provides that the list in an annex to that regulation is to be reviewed at regular intervals and at least every 12 months.

98      It is necessary, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 37 above, to ascertain whether the context, the objectives of the restrictive measures and the applicant’s individual situation made it possible to maintain his name on the lists at issue.

99      As regards the general context linked to the situation in Ukraine, it must be noted that, at the time of the adoption of the September 2024 and March 2025 maintaining acts, that context had remained unchanged since the adoption of the initial acts in so far as concerns the threats to the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of that State.

100    Similarly, at the time of the adoption of the September 2024 and March 2025 maintaining acts, the restrictive measures were still justified in the light of the objective pursued, namely to exert maximum pressure on the Russian authorities so that they bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine and to the military aggression against that country, and to increase the costs of the actions of the Russian Federation to undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

101    In respect of the applicant’s individual situation, it should be noted that he has not demonstrated that his situation had changed at the time of the adoption of the September 2024 and March 2025 maintaining acts, which are based on the same reasons for listing as those underlying the March 2024 maintaining acts.

102    In the light of the continuing seriousness of the situation in Ukraine and the additional evidence provided by the Council in the fifth WK file relating to the applicant’s individual situation, and in the absence of evidence provided by the latter aimed at demonstrating that he had ceased all economic activity in the Donbas region and, above all, that he had severed all close links with the separatist groups controlling that region, it must be noted that, at the time of the adoption of the September 2024 and March 2025 maintaining acts, the Council was able to justify maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue.

103    In the light of the foregoing, it must be found that the Council did not make an error of assessment when, on the date of the adoption of the September 2024 and March 2025 maintaining acts, it found that the applicant was supporting actions or policies that undermined or threatened the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, within the meaning of the (a) criterion under Decision 2014/145, as amended, in so far as the applicant was engaged in economic activities in the Donbas region controlled by the separatist groups and had acquired and was managing economic assets by virtue of his close links with those separatist groups.

104    According to the case-law, in relation to the review of the lawfulness of a decision adopting restrictive measures, and having regard to their preventive nature, if the Courts of the European Union consider that, at the very least, one of the reasons mentioned is sufficiently detailed and specific, that it is substantiated and that it constitutes in itself a sufficient basis to support that decision, the fact that the same cannot be said of other such reasons cannot justify the annulment of that decision (see judgment of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited).

105    Therefore, without there being any need to examine the merits of the other complaints raised by the applicant seeking to call into question the Council’s assessment in the light of the listing criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(e) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, concerning the transactions which the applicant allegedly conducted with the separatist groups in the Donbas region in Ukraine, and in the light of the criterion of association, concerning the fact that the applicant is associated with his father, Mr Viktor Yanukovych, the single plea in law, alleging that the Council made an error of assessment when it decided to maintain the applicant’s name on the lists at issue by adopting the September 2024 and March 2025 acts, must be rejected.

106    In the light of all of the foregoing, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

 Costs

107    Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

108    In the present case, since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Council.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)

hereby:

1.      Dismisses the action;

2.      Orders Mr Oleksandr Viktorovych Yanukovych to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council of the European Union.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 30 September 2026.

*      Language of the case: English.