ORDER OF THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber)

2 October 2026 (*)

( Action for annulment – Common foreign and security policy – Restrictive measures adopted in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine – Freezing of funds and economic resources – Investor-State dispute settlement proceedings concerning measures adopted under Decision 2014/512/CFSP or Decision 2014/145/CFSP, Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 or Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 – Partial lack of competence of the General Court – Lack of individual concern – Regulatory act entailing implementing measures – Partial inadmissibility )

In Case T‑640/25,

Vladimir Aleksandrovich Ber, residing in Saint Petersburg (Russia), represented by D. Rovetta, M. Campa, V. Villante and M. Moretto, lawyers,

applicant,

v

Council of the European Union, represented by B. Driessen and E. Nadbath, acting as Agents,

defendant,

THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber),

composed of K. Kowalik-Bańczyk, President, H. Cassagnabère and T. Pavelin (Rapporteur), Judges,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci,

having regard to the written part of the procedure, in particular:

–      the plea of lack of competence and inadmissibility raised by the Council by separate document lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 20 November 2025,

–      the application to intervene of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy lodged at the Court Registry on 15 December 2025,

–      the application to intervene of the Kingdom of Spain lodged at the Court Registry on 19 December 2025,

–      the application to intervene of the European Commission lodged at the Court Registry on 19 December 2025,

–      the applicant’s observations on the plea of lack of competence and inadmissibility lodged at the Court Registry on 26 January 2026,

makes the following

Order

1        By his action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Mr Vladimir Aleksandrovich Ber, seeks annulment, first, of Article 1(15) and (16) of Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1495 of 18 July 2025 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ L, 2025/1495) and, second, of Article 1(18) to (20) of Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494 of 18 July 2025 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ L, 2025/1494), in so far as they concern him (together, ‘the contested provisions’).

 Background to the dispute and facts subsequent to the introduction of the dispute

2        The applicant is a Russian national whose name has never been included on the lists of persons and entities to which restrictive measures decided by the European Union apply and who is the owner of investments which have been held, settled and processed by the Russian National Settlement Depository (NSD) through Euroclear Bank SA/NV (‘Euroclear’), whose registered office is in Brussels (Belgium).

3        NSD is a company, incorporated under Russian law, that is a licensed depository providing securities record-keeping and custody services as a central depository and which also provides financial services, in particular as a non-bank credit institution licensed to provide bank settlement services.

4        In March 2014, the Russian Federation illegally annexed the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol and since then has engaged in ongoing destabilisation actions in eastern Ukraine. In response, the European Union has imposed restrictive measures in the light of the actions of the Russian Federation destabilising the situation in Ukraine, restrictive measures in the light of actions compromising or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and restrictive measures in response to that illegal annexation.

5        On 17 March 2014, the Council of the European Union adopted, under Article 29 TEU, Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 16).

6        On the same day, the Council adopted, under Article 215 TFEU, Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 6).

7        In particular, on 31 July 2014, in view of the gravity of the situation in Ukraine despite the adoption in March 2014 of travel restrictions and asset freezes against certain natural and legal persons, the Council adopted, on the basis of Article 29 TEU, Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 229, p. 13), in order to introduce targeted restrictive measures on access to capital markets, defence, dual-use goods and sensitive technologies, including in the energy sector.

8        That same day, the Council adopted, on the basis of Article 215 TFEU, Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 229, p. 1), which contains more detailed provisions to give effect, both at EU level and in the Member States, to the requirements laid down in Decision 2014/512.

9        On 24 February 2022, the President of the Russian Federation announced a military operation in Ukraine and, on the same day, Russian armed forces attacked Ukraine at several locations in the country.

10      On 3 June 2022, the Council decided to adopt, first, Decision (CFSP) 2022/884 amending Decision 2014/512 (OJ 2022 L 153, p. 128) and, second, Regulation (EU) 2022/879 amending Regulation No 833/2014 (OJ 2022 L 153, p. 53).

11      On the same day, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/883 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 153, p. 92) and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/878 implementing Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 153, p. 15), by which it added the name of NSD to the lists of persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures set out in the annex to Decision 2014/145, as amended, and in Annex I to Regulation No 269/2014, as amended.

12      The inclusion of the name of NSD in the lists of persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures led to the freezing of that entity’s euro-denominated accounts and prevented it from carrying out transactions through the clearing houses Euroclear and Clearstream. Consequently, investors who were not on those lists, but whose securities were held or passed through NSD, were subject to an indirect freezing of their funds, in that they were deprived of the possibility of transferring or redeeming those securities, and of receiving the income arising therefrom, without, however, being individually subject to a restrictive measure.

13      On 18 July 2025, the Council adopted (i) Decision 2025/1495, which is contested by the applicant, in so far as Article 1(15) and (16) of that decision inserts new paragraphs 2a, 2b, 2c and 7b into Article 7 of Decision 2014/512, and (ii) Regulation 2025/1494, which is also contested by the applicant, in so far as Article 1(18) to (20) thereof inserts new paragraphs 2a and 2b of Article 11 and new Articles 11d to 11f into Regulation No 833/2014. Those new provisions, which do not differ substantially according to whether they appear in Decision 2025/1495 or in Regulation 2025/1494, with the exception of the rule on subsidiary jurisdiction, laid down only in Article 1(19) of that regulation, are intended, generally and in particular, to preclude any recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award made against a Member State in investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) procedures concerning measures imposed pursuant to Decision 2014/512 or Decision 2014/145, or Regulation No 833/2014 or Regulation No 269/2014.

14      More specifically, the new provisions at issue seek, in essence, first, and as follows from Article 1(18) of Regulation 2025/1494 and Article 1(15) of Decision 2025/1495, to prohibit Member States from recognising, implementing or enforcing any arbitral award adopted in the context referred to in paragraph 13 above (‘the prohibition on recognition, implementation and enforcement’ or ‘the first part’); second, and as is apparent from Article 1(20) of that regulation and Article 1(16) of that decision, to oblige the Member States to raise any objection they have against the recognition and enforcement of those arbitral awards (‘the obligation to object’ or ‘the second part’); third and last, as follows from Article 1(19) and (20) of that regulation and Article 1(16) of that decision, to empower the Member States to recover all direct and indirect damages, including legal costs, incurred as a result of the ISDS procedure concerned (‘the recovery measures’ or ‘the third part’).

15      On 3 September 2025, the applicant, in accordance with Article 10(1) of the Bilateral Investment Treaty established by the Agreement between the Governments of the Kingdom of Belgium and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, concerning the mutual encouragement and protection of investments, signed at Moscow on 9 February 1989 (‘the BIT’), served on the Kingdom of Belgium a notice of dispute, which, in the absence of an amicable settlement of the dispute between the parties within six months of that notification, is such as to give rise to arbitration proceedings.

 Forms of order sought

16      The applicant claims, in essence, that the Court should:

–        annul the contested provisions, in so far as they concern him;

–        order the Council to pay the costs.

17      The Council contends, in essence, that the Court should:

–        dismiss the action in part as having been brought before a court which has no jurisdiction and in part as inadmissible;

–        order the applicant to pay the costs.

 Law

18      Under Article 130 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, where, by a separate document, the defendant applies to the General Court for a decision on inadmissibility or lack of competence without going to the substance of the case, the Court must decide on the application as soon as possible, where necessary after opening the oral part of the procedure.

19      In the present case, the Court considers that it has sufficient information from the documents before it to enable it to give judgment without opening the oral part of procedure.

 The jurisdiction of the Court

20      The Council contends that the Court has no jurisdiction to rule on the legality of Decision 2025/1495. It submits, first, that it was adopted on the basis of Article 29 TEU, which is a provision falling within the scope of the ‘common foreign and security policy’ within the meaning of Article 275 TFEU, and, second, that it does not contain any measure directed against specific individuals or entities, but lays down rules of general application.

21      In his observations on the plea of lack of competence and inadmissibility, the applicant disputes the Council’s arguments.

22      The applicant submits, primarily, that the Council adopts an unduly restrictive and formalistic interpretation of the jurisdiction of the General Court.

23      According to the applicant, the decisive criterion for defining the concept of ‘restrictive measures’ within the meaning of Article 275 TFEU is not whether Decision 2025/1495 formally identifies individual addressees, but whether that decision provides for measures which, by reference to objective criteria, directly regulate the legal situation of natural or legal persons by imposing adverse legal consequences on them.

24      In that regard, Article 1(15) and (16) of Decision 2025/1495, read in conjunction with the parallel amendments introduced by Regulation 2025/1494, establishes restrictive measures within the meaning of Article 275(2) TFEU, in so far as it seeks to deprive a defined class of persons, namely Russian and Belarusian investors and connected persons, of the practical effectiveness of ISDS.

25      Furthermore, the applicant claims that, having regard to their aim and content, the amendments made by Article 1(15) and (16) of Decision 2025/1495 fall within the scope of the common commercial policy and should have been adopted on the basis of Article 207 TFEU or other relevant legal bases of the FEU Treaty, rather than be included in a sanctions package under Article 215 TFEU and reproduced in a decision taken under Article 29 TEU.

26      It must be noted from the outset that Decision 2025/1495 was adopted on the basis of Article 29 TEU, which is a provision concerning the ‘common foreign and security policy’ within the meaning of Article 275 TFEU.

27      In that regard, pursuant to the last sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 24(1) TEU and the first paragraph of Article 275 TFEU, the Court of Justice of the European Union does not, in principle, have jurisdiction with respect to the provisions relating to the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) or with respect to acts adopted on the basis of those provisions. By contrast, first, both the last sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 24(1) TEU and the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU provide that the Court of Justice of the European Union has jurisdiction to monitor compliance with Article 40 TEU. Second, the last sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 24(1) TEU confers on the Court of Justice of the European Union jurisdiction to review the legality of certain decisions referred to in the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU. The latter provision confers jurisdiction on the Court of Justice of the European Union to give rulings on actions, brought subject to the conditions laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, concerning the review of the legality of Council decisions, adopted on the basis of provisions relating to the CFSP, which provide for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons (judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 60).

28      It follows that, in examining the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union to hear and determine an action concerning acts or omissions falling within the scope of the CFSP, it is necessary to ascertain, first, whether the situation at issue falls within one of the situations provided for in the last sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 24(1) TEU and the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU, in which that jurisdiction is expressly allowed (judgment of 10 September 2024, KS and Others v Council and Others, C‑29/22 P and C‑44/22 P, EU:C:2024:725, paragraph 115).

29      If that is not the case, it is necessary, second, to assess whether the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union may be based on the fact that the acts and omissions at issue are not directly related to the political or strategic choices made by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union in the context of the CFSP, and in particular the common security and defence policy (judgment of 10 September 2024, KS and Others v Council and Others, C‑29/22 P and C‑44/22 P, EU:C:2024:725, paragraph 116).

30      Thus, if the acts and omissions at issue are not directly related to those political or strategic choices, the Court of Justice of the European Union has jurisdiction to assess the legality of those acts or omissions or to interpret them. By contrast, if those acts or omissions are directly related to those political or strategic choices, that institution must declare that it lacks jurisdiction (judgment of 10 September 2024, KS and Others v Council and Others, C‑29/22 P and C‑44/22 P, EU:C:2024:725, paragraph 117).

31      In the first place, the Court must examine whether the provisions of Decision 2025/1495 prescribe ‘restrictive measures against natural or legal persons’ within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU.

32      In that regard, as regards acts adopted on the basis of provisions relating to the CFSP, it is the individual nature of those acts which, in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU and the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, permits access to the Courts of the European Union (judgment of 23 April 2013, Gbagbo and Others v Council, C‑478/11 P to C‑482/11 P, EU:C:2013:258, paragraph 57; see also judgment of 17 February 2017, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and Others v Council, T‑14/14 and T‑87/14, EU:T:2017:102, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

33      Measures of general application do not constitute ‘restrictive measures against natural or legal persons’ within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU. That is in particular the case when provisions provide measures the scope of which is determined by reference to objective criteria and do not target identified natural or legal persons, but are applicable generally (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraphs 97 and 98).

34      In the present case, the measures laid down in Article 1(15) and (16) of Decision 2025/1495 do not constitute ‘restrictive measures against natural or legal persons’ within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU, but rather measures of general application, in respect of whose legality the General Court has no jurisdiction to rule (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraphs 97 to 99, and of 13 September 2018, Gazprom Neft v Council, T‑735/14 and T‑799/14, EU:T:2018:548, paragraph 60).

35      That solution is not called into question by the fact that the applicant seeks annulment of Article 1(15) and (16) of Decision 2025/1495 only in so far as it concerns him. Indeed, while that provision may be applied to the applicant, that does not alter its legal nature as a measure of general application, particularly since his name was not mentioned in that decision.

36      Moreover, the applicant himself admits that Decision 2025/1495 is an act of general application.

37      In the second place, by his arguments summarised in paragraph 25 above, the applicant asks the Court, in essence, to review compliance with Article 40 TEU. On that basis alone, the Court has jurisdiction to review the legality of Article 1(15) and (16) of Decision 2025/1495.

38      In the third place, the contested provisions of Decision 2025/1495 relate directly to the political or strategic choices made by the Council in the context of the CFSP. Indeed, those provisions amend and supplement the regime of restrictive measures set out in Decision 2014/512, of which they form an integral part and from which they are not severable. That regime, established in 2014 and amended and reinforced on several occasions, in particular since 2022, is an essential element of the European Union’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the Russian Federation and Ukraine and is thus the result of political or strategic choices made by the Council in the context of the CFSP.

39      In those circumstances, the claim seeking annulment of Article 1(15) and (16) of Decision 2025/1495 must be rejected as having been brought before a court which has no jurisdiction over it, except in so far as the applicant’s arguments seeking the review of compliance with Article 40 TEU are concerned.

40      By contrast, it should be noted that the Court’s jurisdiction is in no way limited as regards Regulation 2025/1494 which, having been adopted on the basis of Article 215 TFEU, gives effect to Decision 2025/1495, adopted in the context of the CFSP. Such regulations constitute EU acts, adopted on the basis of the FEU Treaty, and the Courts of the European Union must, in accordance with the powers conferred on them by the Treaties, ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the legality of those acts (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 106).

 Admissibility of the action

41      It should be recalled that the admissibility of an action brought by natural or legal persons against an act which is not addressed to them, in accordance with the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, is subject to the condition that they be accorded standing to bring proceedings, which arises in two situations. First, such proceedings may be instituted if the act is of direct and individual concern to those persons. Second, such persons may bring proceedings against a regulatory act not entailing implementing measures if that act is of direct concern to them (see judgment of 15 July 2021, Deutsche Lufthansa v Commission, C‑453/19 P, EU:C:2021:608, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).

42      It is therefore necessary to examine at the outset whether the applicant, which is not the addressee of the contested provisions, may establish his standing to bring proceedings on one or other of the situations provided for in the second and third limbs of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, that is to say, first, whether he is directly and individually concerned by those contested provisions or, second, whether those provisions are of a regulatory nature, are of direct concern to him and do not entail implementing measures.

 Individual concern

43      The Council contends, first, that the contested provisions are a defence against any arbitration, in particular against arbitration proceedings conducted under the BIT, for the European Union and its Member States, where arbitration risks nullifying the effects of any restrictive measure adopted in the context of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine.

44      Thus, it is not possible to determine the group of persons who are liable to commence arbitration proceedings to challenge the EU restrictive measures against the Russian Federation at the time of the adoption of the contested provisions, and the circle of potential applicants before an unlimited number of courts and arbitral tribunals is also unlimited.

45      Second, the Council submits that the applicant did not differentiate himself by initiating the settlement of a dispute between investors and States after the adoption of Decision 2025/1495 and Regulation 2025/1494. In its opinion, given that the contested provisions concern any arbitration pertaining to any investment under any bilateral investment treaty concluded with the Russian Federation, those provisions do not merely refer to the shares and bonds covered by the BIT. Similarly, since the notice of dispute of 3 September 2025 postdates the adoption of Decision 2025/1495 and Regulation 2025/1494, it cannot be relevant for the purpose of determining whether the applicant had standing to bring proceedings on the date on which the aforementioned decision and regulation were adopted.

46      Third, as regards the exceptional legal character claimed by the applicant, which lies in the fact that Regulation 2025/1494 was allegedly adopted on an incorrect legal basis, the Council contends that that does not set the applicant apart from any other person affected by the contested provisions.

47      In his observations on the plea of lack of competence and inadmissibility, the applicant disputes the Council’s arguments, arguing that he is individually concerned by the contested provisions.

48      First, the applicant claims that he is part of an objectively closed group of persons consisting of investors who, prior to the adoption of the contested measures, had already placed securities or cash investments through NSD within the EU financial infrastructure, in particular through systems supervised by Euroclear.

49      Second, the applicant relies on the fact that he had served a notice of dispute on 3 September 2025, under the BIT; accordingly, he had acquired the specific legal status of an ‘investor party to a dispute’ for the purposes of the BIT before the present action was brought. He adds that the admissibility of that action must be assessed by reference to the situation in which he found himself at the time when that action was brought.

50      Third, the applicant submits that Regulation 2025/1494, which was adopted by the Council on the basis of Article 215 TFEU, by circumventing the legislative requirements inherent in Article 207 TFEU, establishes a system whereby he is directly deprived of his rights under the BIT. Thus, he takes the view that that regulation affects him in the same way as if he were the addressee of a decision.

51      It should be borne in mind that persons other than those to whom an act is addressed may claim to be individually concerned, within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, only if that act affects them by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons and by virtue of those factors distinguishes them individually just as in the case of the person addressed (see judgment of 12 July 2022, Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council, C‑348/20 P, EU:C:2022:548, paragraph 156 and the case-law cited).

52      In that context, it follows from established case-law that the possibility of determining more or less precisely the number, or even the identity, of the persons to whom a measure applies by no means implies that it must be regarded as being of individual concern to them as long as that measure is applied by virtue of an objective legal or factual situation defined by it (judgments of 13 March 2018, European Union Copper Task Force v Commission, C‑384/16 P, EU:C:2018:176, paragraph 94, and of 12 July 2022, Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council, C‑348/20 P, EU:C:2022:548, paragraph 157).

53      By contrast, it has been accepted in the case-law that, where a measure affects a group of persons who were identified or identifiable when that measure was adopted by reason of criteria specific to the members of that group, those persons may be individually concerned by that measure inasmuch as they form part of a limited class of economic operators (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 February 2014, Stichting Woonpunt and Others v Commission, C‑132/12 P, EU:C:2014:100, paragraph 59).

54      In that regard, in order to be individually concerned as a member of a limited class of persons, it is necessary, first, for an applicant to show that he or she was identified, or at least capable of being so, when the contested act was adopted, by the author of that act, on the basis of sufficiently exact information which that author was in a position to obtain and, second, that that applicant has specific characteristics in comparison with other persons to whom that act is intended to apply (judgment of 18 December 2025, Nicoventures Trading and Others v Commission, C‑731/23 P, EU:C:2025:982, paragraph 60).

55      In the present case, in essence, the applicant identifies two main circumstances which distinguish him individually, namely, first, being part an objectively defined and closed group of Russian investors not included on the lists of persons subject to restrictive measures, whose assets held by Euroclear through NSD are frozen and, second, being an investor who has already exercised some of his rights under the BIT. He adds that the incorrect legal basis used to adopt Regulation 2025/1494 allows that regulation to be treated in the same way as an individual decision.

56      In the present case, it is not possible to determine, more or less precisely, the number or the identity of the persons to whom the contested provisions apply. On the contrary, those provisions apply to objectively determined situations and produce legal effects with respect to categories of persons envisaged in general and in the abstract.

57      As the Council submits, in essence, the contested provisions establish a defence mechanism against any recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award made against a Member State in ISDS proceedings, irrespective of its basis, since such arbitration proceedings are liable to render ineffective the restrictive measures imposed pursuant to Decision 2014/512 or Decision 2014/145, or Regulation No 833/2014 or Regulation No 269/2014, and are therefore aimed at any person seeking to nullify those restrictive measures, which were adopted in the context of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine, by means of those proceedings.

58      Accordingly, the applicant’s argument that the contested provisions prevent him from benefiting from the new policy of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (Sweden), by which he is given the possibility of choosing a place outside the European Union in order to be granted enforcement of an arbitration award which is favourable to him, cannot succeed.

59      It follows that, contrary to what the applicant claims, he is not individually concerned by the contested provisions in so far as he is part of an objectively limited group of persons composed of investors who, prior to the adoption of the contested measures, had already placed securities or cash investments through NSD within the EU financial infrastructure, in particular through systems supervised by Euroclear.

60      For the same reasons, investors belonging to the group referred to in paragraph 59 above who have moreover notified their intention to exercise their rights under the BIT are also not individually concerned. They constitute only a subset of an unquantified number, albeit not infinite number, of persons seeking to nullify the restrictive measures adopted against the Russian Federation by means of ISDS proceedings.

61      Last, the applicant does not explain how the adoption of Regulation 2025/1494 on an allegedly incorrect legal basis distinguishes him from any other person affected by the contested provisions.

62      It follows that the applicant is not individually concerned by the contested provisions.

63      Accordingly, without there being any need to examine whether the applicant is directly concerned by the contested provisions, it must be held that he does not have standing to bring proceedings under the second limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.

 The regulatory nature of the contested provisions, which does not entail implementing measures

64      The Council submits, in essence, that the contested provisions entail implementing measures in respect of the applicant, in so far as, in any event, following a favourable arbitration award, the applicant needs a new decision of a national court in order to enforce that award. In its view, that is the case, since the arbitral tribunals covered by the BIT require that any arbitral award be implemented in accordance with the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, signed in New York on 10 June 1958 (United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3). It notes in that regard that the national court has the power in that context to make a reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.

65      In his observations on the plea of lack of competence and inadmissibility, the applicant disputes the Council’s arguments.

66      The applicant submits that a decision of a national court does not constitute an ‘implementing measure’ within the meaning of the third limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, since such a court does not create or complete the EU rule, but merely applies a directly applicable EU prohibition whose legal effects on the applicant flow from the contested provisions themselves.

67      The applicant takes the view, moreover, that the Council’s position amounts to requiring him to provoke a dispute concerning national recognition in order to access judicial review, which would deprive the third limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 of its effectiveness.

68      In the first place, as regards the existence of a regulatory act, it should be recalled that, according to the case-law, regulatory acts, within the meaning of the third limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, cover all non-legislative acts of general application (judgment of 6 November 2018, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission, Commission v Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori and Commission v Ferracci, C‑622/16 P to C‑624/16 P, EU:C:2018:873, paragraph 28).

69      It is necessary to determine whether Article 1(18) to (20) of Regulation 2025/1494 is of general application and whether or not that regulation constitutes a regulatory act.

70      In that regard, it must be noted that Regulation 2025/1494, first, has a general scope and, second, since it was adopted on the basis of Article 215 TFEU and, accordingly, under the non-legislative procedure laid down in that provision, it constitutes a non-legislative act and, therefore, a ‘regulatory act’, within the meaning of the third limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 June 2021, Venezuela v Council (Whether a third State is affected), C‑872/19 P, EU:C:2021:507, paragraph 92 and the case-law cited).

71      In the second place, concerning the lack of implementing measures, according to the case-law, first, the concept of ‘regulatory act which … does not entail implementing measures’ within the meaning of the final limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU must be interpreted in the light of the objective of that provision, which, as is apparent from its drafting history, consists in preventing an individual from being obliged to infringe the law in order to have access to a court. Where a regulatory act directly affects the legal situation of a natural or legal person without requiring implementing measures, that person could be denied effective judicial protection if he, she or it did not have a direct legal remedy before the EU judicature for the purpose of challenging the legality of the regulatory act. In the absence of implementing measures, natural or legal persons, although directly concerned by the act in question, would be able to obtain a judicial review of that act only after having infringed its provisions, by pleading that those provisions are unlawful in proceedings initiated against them before the national courts (see judgment of 28 April 2015, T & L Sugars and Sidul Açúcares v Commission, C‑456/13 P, EU:C:2015:284, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).

72      By contrast, where a regulatory act entails implementing measures, judicial review of compliance with the EU legal order is ensured irrespective of whether those measures were adopted by the European Union or the Member States. Natural or legal persons who are unable, because of the conditions governing admissibility laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, to challenge a regulatory act of the European Union directly before the EU judicature are protected against the application to them of such an act by the ability to challenge the implementing measures which the act entails (see judgment of 28 April 2015, T & L Sugars and Sidul Açúcares v Commission, C‑456/13 P, EU:C:2015:284, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).

73      Where responsibility for the implementation of such acts lies with the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the European Union, natural or legal persons are entitled to bring a direct action before the EU judicature against the implementing acts under the conditions stated in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, and to plead in support of that action, pursuant to Article 277 TFEU, the unlawfulness of the basic act concerned. Where that implementation is a matter for the Member States, those persons may plead the invalidity of the basic act at issue before the national courts and tribunals and cause the latter to request a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice, pursuant to Article 267 TFEU (see judgment of 28 April 2015, T & L Sugars and Sidul Açúcares v Commission, C‑456/13 P, EU:C:2015:284, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).

74      Next, the question whether or not the implementing measures are mechanical in nature is irrelevant (judgment of 13 March 2018, Industrias Químicas del Vallés v Commission, C‑244/16 P, EU:C:2018:177, paragraph 47). In other words, the question of whether or not the contested regulatory act allows a degree of discretion to the authorities responsible for the implementing measures is irrelevant in ascertaining whether it entails implementing measures within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU (judgment of 6 June 2013, T & L Sugars and Sidul Açúcares v Commission, T‑279/11, EU:T:2013:299, paragraph 53).

75      Last, the question whether a regulatory act entails implementing measures should be assessed by reference to the position of the person pleading the right to bring proceedings under the third limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. Furthermore, in that assessment, reference should be made exclusively to the subject matter of the action (see judgment of 6 November 2018, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission, Commission v Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori and Commission v Ferracci, C‑622/16 P to C‑624/16 P, EU:C:2018:873, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited).

76      It is therefore necessary to examine whether Regulation No 833/2014, as amended by Regulation 2025/1494, requires, with regard to the applicant, implementing measures in respect of each of the three parts.

–       First part, relating to the prohibition on recognition, implementation and enforcement

77      As regards the first part, it should be noted that the recognition and enforcement of any arbitration decision favourable to the applicant arising from proceedings covered by the BIT requires subsequent proceedings before the national court.

78      It is indeed important to note that arbitral awards are not enforceable in themselves; a declaration of enforceability (exequatur) from an ordinary national court must first be obtained. In such proceedings, national courts can, or must, refer a question on the interpretation of EU law to the Court of Justice under Article 267 TFEU.

79      Thus, it should be noted that the prohibition on recognition, implementation and enforcement entails implementing measures. In order for that prohibition to produce effects vis-à-vis the applicant, it is necessary that a national court be seised of an application for a declaration of enforceability in respect of a favourable arbitral award and give a decision refusing its recognition and enforcement on the basis of that prohibition, which the applicant does not dispute. That national judicial decision is therefore a separate intermediate act, adopted by a national court, which necessarily intervenes between the regulatory provision and its actual effects on the applicant’s situation.

80      Moreover, it follows from the case-law referred to in paragraph 74 above that whether or not the national court has discretion to refuse to recognise, implement or enforce an arbitral award is irrelevant for the purposes of assessing the existence of an implementing measure.

81      In those circumstances, it is necessary to reject the applicant’s argument that the prohibition at issue applies directly to the national courts, which merely apply a directly applicable EU prohibition.

82      It should also be noted that, in the present case, it is not necessary to find that the action is admissible in order to prevent the applicant from being obliged to infringe the law in order to have access to the Courts of the European Union, even though that is precisely the raison d’être of the situation – provided for in the final limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU – in which proceedings may be instituted, as identified by the case-law cited in paragraph 71 above.

83      The applicant must, in any event, initiate a procedure for recognition, implementation or enforcement before the national court, so that judicial review, by way of an objection, of the lawfulness of the prohibition on recognition, implementation and enforcement is always possible.

84      Moreover, the obligation for the applicant to submit an application for recognition, implementation or enforcement before the national court not only does not place him in a situation of non-compliance, but is also not artificial, because the applicant has the right to apply for such recognition, implementation or enforcement under the national law of the Member State concerned, even though EU law precludes that application from being granted (see, by analogy, judgment of 6 November 2018, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission, Commission v Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori and Commission v Ferracci, C‑622/16 P to C‑624/16 P, EU:C:2018:873, paragraphs 63 and 64).

85      It follows that the prohibition on recognition, implementation and enforcement entails implementing measures within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.

–       Second part, relating to the obligation to object

86      As regards the second part, it must be borne in mind that the obligation to object consists of requiring the Member States to raise all the objections available in proceedings for a declaration of enforceability (exequatur), which implies a fortiori the existence of implementing measures. That obligation has no effect on the legal situation of the person concerned, outside the context of proceedings for a declaration of enforceability (exequatur) previously initiated. It presupposes, first, the opening of proceedings for a declaration of enforceability (exequatur), next, the procedural intervention of the Member State by the lodging of objections on its basis and, last, a decision of the national court ruling on those objections, which constitutes an implementing measure.

87      Moreover, during the proceedings for a declaration of enforceability (exequatur) themselves or those relating to the challenge to that declaration, the person concerned may challenge before the national court the legality of the contested provisions, which can give rise to a reference for a preliminary ruling under the conditions laid down in Article 267 TFEU.

88      It follows that the obligation to object entails implementing measures within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.

–       Third part, relating to recovery measures

89      As regards the third part, it should be noted that, in all the cases envisaged by Article 7b of Decision 2014/512 and Article 11e of Regulation No 833/2014, read in the light of recital 23 of that decision, the recovery of damages and legal costs entails implementing measures, since it always occurs following a judicial decision or, at the very least, an administrative decision which is open to judicial review. That administrative or judicial recovery decision constitutes an enforcement measure.

90      In addition, the person concerned may challenge the contested provisions before the court seised, which may give rise to a reference for a preliminary ruling under the conditions laid down in Article 267 TFEU.

91      Therefore, the measures for the recovery of damages entail implementing measures within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.

92      It follows from all of those considerations that the three parts introduced by the contested provisions entail implementing measures within the meaning of the third limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. For each of them, judicial review before the national courts and, where appropriate, a reference for a preliminary ruling on the validity of the contested provisions are fully available and make it possible to guarantee the applicant effective judicial protection under the conditions set out in the case-law cited in paragraphs 71 to 73 above.

93      Accordingly, it must be held that the applicant does not have standing to bring proceedings under the third limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.

94      In those circumstances, since the applicant does not have standing to bring proceedings under either of the situations provided for in the second and third limbs of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, it is necessary, in so far as the Court has jurisdiction to hear the present action, to dismiss that action in part as inadmissible.

 The applications to intervene

95      In accordance with Article 144(3) of the Rules of Procedure, where the defendant lodges a plea of inadmissibility as referred to in Article 130(1) of those rules, a decision on the application to intervene is not to be given until after the plea has been rejected or the decision on the plea reserved. Furthermore, in accordance with Article 142(2) of those rules, the intervention is to become devoid of purpose, inter alia, where the application is declared inadmissible.

96      Given that the plea of lack of competence and inadmissibility raised by the Council has been upheld in the present case and that the present order therefore closes the proceedings, there is no longer any need to adjudicate on the applications to intervene submitted by the Kingdom of Spain, the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in support of the form of order sought by the Council.

 Costs

97      Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

98      In those circumstances, it is appropriate, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Council, to order the applicant to pay the costs.

99      Pursuant to Article 144(10) of the Rules of Procedure, the Kingdom of Spain, the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy are to bear their own costs relating to their respective applications to intervene.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber)

hereby orders:

1.      The action is dismissed in part as having been brought before a court that has no jurisdiction to hear it and in part as inadmissible.

2.      There is no longer any need to rule on the applications to intervene lodged by the Kingdom of Spain, the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

3.      Mr Vladimir Aleksandrovich Ber shall bear, in addition to his own costs, those incurred by the Council of the European Union.

4.      The Kingdom of Spain, the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall each bear their own costs in respect of their respective applications to intervene.

Luxembourg, 2 October 2026.

*      Language of the case: English.